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General Introduction
\The fact that in common-sense thinking we take for granted our actual or potential knowledge of the
meaning of human actions and their products, is, so I submit, precisely what social scientists want to
express if they speak of understanding or Verstehen as a technique of dealing with human aairs. [...] It
has nothing to do with introspection, it is a result of processes of learning or acculturation."
Alfred Schu¨tz, Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences,
The Journal of Philosophy, 1954.
A Linguistic Schism. At first sight, economists’ scientific talk forms a single, homoge-
neous, form of discourse. All share a vocabulary: that of ‘preferences,’ ‘beliefs,’ ‘choi-
ces,’ ‘decisions,’ ‘strategies,’ ‘uncertainty,’ ‘incentives,’ and ‘rational behavior.’ And only
a few raise concerns about the official selection of situations of greatest relevance for
our field of study: ‘equilibrium’ situations and ‘Pareto efficient’ situations. It came as a
surpise to me when, somewhat late into my studies, I realized that this homogeneity is
largely a matter of appearances. Indeed, mainstream economists, despite using identical
words, do not make use of identical concepts.2 Rather, they divide themselves into two
linguistic subcommunities (Sen, 1985): one which, one may say (Elster, 2009), is versed
in suspicion, and another versed in agnosticism. When talking of ‘preferences’ or ‘choice,’
the former involve volitional concepts while the latter do not. When talking of ‘beliefs’
or ‘uncertainty,’ the former involve perceptual concepts while the latter do not. As a
consequence, members of each respective community, when talking economics, do not
wander in identical landscapes but in radically different ones. This is not without conse-
quences, let us elaborate on this.
Economists versed in suspicion are more numerous than those versed in agnosticism.
Accordingly, it is their phraseology that other social scientists identify with ‘economic
talk.’ Possibly out of a concern for policy questions, though not necessarily, ‘suspicious’
2The word ‘concept,’ itself, can be used to signify different things. To put it roughly, I identify
“concepts” to abilities. The concept ‘bird,’ for instance, amounts to an ability to discriminate birds from
other objects.
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economists explicitly or implicitly take Hume’s political maxim3 to be applicable to eco-
nomic matters. That is, they hold that, even though individuals eventually act on various
motives, it is methodologically appropriate to assume that each is governed by her or his
self-interest. A reason regularly appealed to is that preference maximization enables
scientists to grasp an empirically relevant feature of human action; namely, that, often,
its efficient cause is the fulfilment of desires (Elster, 2009). And three premisses recur
in defenses of this line of thought. First, self-interested individuals may constitute, in an
empirical sense, a majority among us. Second, there may be no reliable way to distinguish
self-interested individuals from other kinds of individuals. Third, no technology may be
available that would help us turn self-interested individuals into selfless ones. If each
such premiss is true, then defenders of the suspicious approach dispose of a strong
justification indeed.
Even though the first two premisses may not, formally, be contradicting each other, a
tension does appear between them. If no trustworthy method exists that may help us
distinguish self-interested individuals from those guided by other motives, what actually
justifies our presumption that individuals are mostly self-interested?4 Economists prone
to raise this point form a minority; they are the agnostics. They take it that preference
maximization has nothing to do with self-interest but only with rationality; that a rational
actor must know what she wants and use the means conducive to her ends (Aumann
(2000), Chapter 3). The most prominent agnostic was Samuelson; he held that, from
the scientific point of view, the semantic content of a word like ‘preference’ ought to
be confined to observable choice behavior (Samuelson, 1938, 1948). Now, clearly, this
position runs against the intuitions we build up from everyday life. For, in everyday
life, we do attribute to the word ‘preference’ a wider semantic content; possibly, one that
involves psychological inclinations or even an intention. But a typical agnostic stands
firm on her choice and give an argument for it. She says that it is not possible to have
objective knowledge of the motives which direct human action. That the “knowledge”
of someone’s motives, one’s own included, is based on introspection. And that even
though, in everyday life, we take this “knowledge” for granted, scientists may not, be-
cause introspection is fallible and does not qualify as an objective source of knowledge.5
3“It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave; though, at the same time,
it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics which is false in fact. But to satisfy
us on this head, we may consider, that men are generally more honest in their private than in their public
capacity.” (Hume (1741), Part I, Section 6).
4Is it about generalizing from our introspective knowledge? Is introspection conducive to knowledge?
Or, can one argue along Darwinian lines? Would such an argument be conclusive?
5Elster uses the conscious /subconscious distinction to build an interesting analysis of this fallibility.
See, Elster (2009), Part I.
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A Dispute of Methods. This lingusitic schism, I slowly got to understand, is not of
little importance. It is a symptom of a long standing methodologial dispute between
social scientists (see, e.g., Weber (1904)). On the one hand, proponents of an interpretive
(verstehende) social science defend or take for granted scientists’s ability to understand
recurrent motives in social action and advocate, on this basis, a need for a methodological
distinction between social and natural sciences. On the other hand, proponents of a
positivist social science deny that social scientists have a possibility to do more than merely
explaining (erkla¨ren) observable choice behavior in just the same way that natural scien-
tists explain natural phenomena. The former (are committed to) agree with Schu¨tz’s
contention that scientists can have insiders’ knowledge about human behavior and that it
makes sense for them to use this knowledge in their inquieries. They follow Weber (1904)
in his conception of models as “analytical constructs (Gedankenbild)” within which the
scientist gathers “certain traits, meaningful in their essential features, from the empirical
reality of our culture.” The latter, instead, (are committed to) refute this contention.
They argue that, once wearing a scientist’s glasses, the world you contemplate should be
devoid of emotions, psychological drives, or motives; that it should only be populated
with physical individuals, physical objects, and choice behavior; and that any other entity
mentioned in our theories should be viewed as a mere heuristic device, a mean for us to
summarize and convey information about the previously enumerated elements.
Each of the two camps, I believe, embodies a laudable set of concerns. To start with
defenders of interpretive social sciences, they correctly see that it is hard, without some
degree of understanding, to justify the use of established social scientific facts to act upon
the social world. For instance, can we incentivize citizens to act responsibly? If so, should
we and how? Is the issue at stake actually properly captured by ‘incentive-talk’? Or
should we rather use the classical frames of education and virtue? While understanding
can provide guidance in these matters, a positivist claim to the effect that all we must do
is change some parameters singled out as relevant by revealed preference analysis would
be a qeer kind of claim. For one, it would run against important philosophical strands
that lay foundations for Samuelson’s view.6 Second, it would entail a conservative stand
that some among us will not feel obliged to accept unless they are given a solid reason for
doing so. Now, conversely, it would be a clear breach to scientific ethic not to seriously
consider the agnostic argument. Indeed, positivistically inclined scientists have long
shown the value there is in epistemic conservatism.7 Empirical evidence suggests that
it plays an essential role when it comes to bringing about scientific progresses and that
it sometimes prevents scientists from erecting epistemic obstacles (Daston and Galison,
6Wittgenstein (1921) argues against views that have facticity of description carry over to predictions.
7I.e., the tendency to raise questions related to the source of scientific knowledge.
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2007).8 So the question seems to come down to the following one: is the reason for
dropping off understanding a ‘solid’ one?
Chapter 1. The first essay I submit here is an attempt to answer this question. I observe
that modern analytical philosophy gives us the means to (i) reject the conception of
knowledge at the root of agnostic arguments, and (ii) defend Schu¨tz’s contention that
Verstehen “has nothing to do with introspection, [that] it is a result of processes of learning
or acculturation.” My argument builds on essentially two pieces of philosophical work:
Sellars (1956) and Anscombe (1957).9 Sellars argues that knowledge is, before anything,
a linguistic affair; that it is about developing a disposition to consciously conceptualize
events in a way approved of by other members of one’s epistemic community. Anscombe
observed that (a) the concepts we mobilize when we identify events with instances of
‘intentional actions’ are not causal concepts but volitional and teleological ones; and that
(b) when we ask an agent about her intention in doing something, what we are in fact
asking for is not an avowal of her state of mind but information about the description
under which she knows her own action. The agent’s answer, as a consequence, isn’t
entierly private: it has to lie within a range of socially approved conceptualizations of
the occuring events. Under this light, it appears that Schu¨tz’s processes of acculturation
coincide with processes whereby individuals learn what appropriate descriptions exist
for a class of specific events, viz. intentional actions. And knowledge of intentions is not
merely “potential” but “actual:” it does not essentially differ from scientific knowledge. I
conclude that, also in the event that introspection must be discarded from the scientific
entreprise, it is not correct to conclude that we are left with choice behavior only.
Under the view developed in Chapter 1, what yields understanding is not introspection
but the observation of specific forms of linguistic behavior. There, I do not identify lin-
guistic behavior with individuals’ description of their own actions but with the set of
concepts at their disposal for describing events we refer to as intentional actions and, in
particular, for regulating their or others’ intentional actions. So conceptual analysis and
folk psychology—branches of philosophy involved in the empirical analysis of action-,
behavior-, and mind-related concepts—may be used, I claim, to enrich our analyses of
economic phenomena. My two subsequent chapters are attempts to justify that claim.
8An epistemic obstacle is an unconscious structure present in scientific thinking which hinders
advancements of science (Bachelard, 1938). Weber (1904) points, for instance, the common belief held
by 19th-century scientists according to which a comprehensive rational system could be build that would
encompass reality in it entirety.
9Both writers belong to a strand of philosophy quite foreign to Schu¨tz’s. I considered the possibility to
delve into Schu¨tz’s own reasons for asserting this. I soon gave up. First, because I doubted I had time for
the daunting investigations of continental philosophy it would have required. Second, because modern
economics stands on building blocks laid down by analytical philosophers. A bridge with analytical
philosophy would have been anyhow necessary.
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Chapter 2. The second essay I present here is an illustration of the light that two regulative
concepts can cast on phenomena involving a voluntarily provided public good. Namely,
the concept of “joint commitment” (Gilbert, 1989) and that of “free riding.” I draw a
distinction between two kinds of public goods: ones I call legitimate and others I call non-
legitimate. Legitimate public goods are particular in the sense that, in their presence,
individuals can use systems of demand-rights to check upon the behavior of their co-players. For
instance, abiding by a rule of etiquette is often tantamount to contributing to a public
good. At any rate, it is so when the considered rule of etiquette promotes efficiency (e.g.,
observing silence in a classroom). And if you do not follow rules of etiquette while I do,
then I have some authority to remind you of your engagements, I will exert that authority,
and you will acknowledge it. But this does not happen in the presence of non-legitimate
public goods, such as a crowdfunded Youtube broadcast or a crowdfunded charity. In-
deed, being a contributor to either of these two goods does not endow me with an autho-
rity to demand from non-contributors that they make an effort. To take account of this
discrepency, I suggest that, in the presence of a legitimate public good, individuals carry
out a joint intention to steer clear of free riding. This is an assumption about equilibrium
behavior, not about the structure of preferences. More specifically, in a standard Nash
equilibrium, allocations ought to be stable with regard to potential individual deviations.
But in the presence of regulative behavior, a deviation by one player may trigger the
application of a system of demand-rights, whereby individuals who are now seen as
making too low a contribution are authoritatively asked to increase their contributions.
I design an equilibrium concept in which allocations are stable with respect individuals’
deviations to the allocations they may reach by changing their contribution and exerting
their demand-rights. I show that, within a specific class of demand-rights, the equilibrium
that has all individuals contribute identical amounts is salient.
Chapter 3. The third essay I present here is meant to explore situations in which, in
spite of strong reasons for making the public good a legitimate one, legitimacy is not
yet established. For instance, when individuals are identically endowed, have identical
preferences, and face identical production technologies, a commitment to steer clear of
free riding does not merely help them deal with the free riding problem, it also helps
them bring about a Pareto efficient situation. In such situations, it is fair to say of indi-
viduals that they have strong reasons for making the public good a legitimate one. Yet,
they may not have had a possibility to do so. Experiments that give individuals an
opportunity to volontarily and repeatedly contribute to a public good, I suggest, are
instances of situations in which legitimacy could be of help but has not yet been establi-
shed. Some well known stylized facts have been gathered about these experiments. For
example, it was observed that contributions, although declining from period to period,
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always remain significant. I investigate the possibility that this decreasing trend is the
result of two phenomena: reputational concerns by strategic players and disagreement
regarding the concept of “doing one’s bit.” Kreps et al. (1982) showed that, in finitely
repeated public good games, reputational concerns may only come into play if some
players behave irrationally or entertain a belief that some players behave irrationally. A
first interesting finding I obtain in this chapter is this: their statement isn’t robust to
extentions of the concept of rationality. Indeed, I show that, when a subset of individuals
is thought to abide by the principles of individual rationality and another by those of
collective rationality, then there are instances in which it is individually rational to enter-
tain a reputation of cooperator.
The thesis is structured as follows: the main findings of each essay and their analysis are
presented in the respective Chapters 1 to 3. The first chapter’s philosophical glossary as
well as all the proofs for the two other chapters are respectively gathered in Appendices
A to C. All due references are listed in the Bibliography, at the end of this volume.
Chapter 1
Mediated Preference Revelation
\On the most basic level, what we are trying to do in science is to understand the world. Predictions are
an excellent means of testing our comprehension, and once we have the comprehension, applications are
inevitable; but the basic aim of scientic activity remains comprehension itself."
Robert Aumann, Collected Papers (Vol. 1), 2000.
\I should explain that I am not arguing, in general, against internal correspondences that may be implied
by the substantive nature of the specic exercise (e.g., by the maximization of an independently given
utility function, if that is appropriate), but only against imposing such choice conditions in an a priori
way as requirements of \internal consistency."
Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, Econometrica, 1993.
1.1 Introduction
Many contemporary economists are positive scientists: they assert facts.∗1 To do so, they
must learn to distinguish between those (sets of) statements which express facts and
those which do not. It is conventional to teach them this skill not by the means of explicit
discourses but by training them to draw the distinction (Kuhn, 1962). A neophyte econo-
mic modeler, for instance, will eventually have to meet the question “What does your
model change?,” usually meaning “What novel assertions are you making about choice
behavior?” An explicit position regarding what facts are and how they have to be assessed
1Starred terms are terms I endow with a technical, sometimes idiosyncratic, meaning. Definitions are
collected in Appendix A.
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is called a method. A discussion advancing reasons for a method is called a discourse
on method. The most notorious method in economics is Samuelson’s theory of revealed
preferences (Samuelson, 1938, 1948). The discourse on method that has had the greatest
influence in its favor is Friedman’s “methodology of positive economics” (Friedman,
1953). Revealed preference theorists assert (i) that ordinal utility theory and the principle
of preference maximization—which, together, govern micro-founded economic models—
should not be taken at face value, and (ii) that the preferences or beliefs they refer to are
not real entities but heuristic devices whose unique purpose is to facilitate the transmission
of information about economists’ empirical data: individual choice behavior. They dis-
tinguish choice behavior from intentional action, for they claim never to assert any fact
about intentions or mental states and they expect each of their theoretical statements to
be translated into verifiable observation statements.2
In this paper, I am concerned primarily with the methodology of game theory. The first
developments in game theory were not brought forth with positivist intentions. Rather,
they embodied an attempt to delineate a normative account of rational action.3 When
game theory started to be used as an instrument for positive economics, disagreements
appeared regarding its interpretation. For the sake of clarity, I shall classify these into two
kinds. On the one hand, some asked after which kind of entities, present in alternative
forms of discourse,∗ entities introduced in game theoretical discourse should be modeled.
For instance, Rubinstein (1991) argues that strategies modeled after complete plans of
action will trigger a different logic in scientific reasoning than strategies modeled after
conjunctions of a plan of action and a set of justifications for that plan.4 He also argued
that thinking of a game form as a full description of physical events rather than as a
comprehensive description of a rational perception of the situation will affect a scientist’s
modeling choices.5 On the other hand, many took as given the set of entities present in
game theoretical discourse (preferences, beliefs, actions, etc.) to instead raise questions
about the desirability of postulating that such entitites, which are not observables,∗ actually
exist. For instance, many practitioners implicitly commit, under the approving eye of
philosophers of economics,6 to the actual existence of preferences. But some prominent
2A short, immediate, illustration of the translation process is given by the meaning associated with the
term “preferences”. Let X be a set of available alternatives, B any subset of it, and Ci(B) the choice set of
an individual i presented with budget set B. When a follower of Samuelson asserts “agent i prefers x to
y,” he thereby means “Take B ⊆ X such that {x, y} ⊆ B. If y ∈ Ci(B), then x ∈ Ci(B).”
3On this point, see Aumann (2000), Chapter 3. A notable exception, it seems to me, is Luce and Raiffa
(1957), which establishes a direct connection between ordinal utility theory and game theory.
4In the first case, it is natural to talk of a player’s strategy ‘choice.’ But this is not true in the second
case, where some elements of a player’s strategy are thought of as being an opponent’s belief.
5The first interpretation, for instance, entices us to take the notion of infinite repetition literally, but not
the second one.
6See Hausman (1994) for a methodological argument, Okasha (2016) for a causal argument, and
Dietrich and List (2016) for an ontological one.
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theorists stand out in their defense of the view that, besides action profiles, game theore-
tical models merely consist of heuristic devices.7
The two sets of concerns differ in an important way. The first one relates to the delineation
of a collection of entities, present in some other form of discourse, which it is best to
formalize and integrate into game theoretical discourse. The second one takes as given
the set of entities present in game theoretical discourse and asks which epistemic attitude∗
is most appropriate for social scientists to adopt. On the second matter: one may be a
(scientific) realist,∗ that is, commit to the actual existence of entities present in theoretical
discourse, independently of their observability. Alternatively, one may be anti-realist, that
is, commit to the actual existence of observable entities only. Each of the two attitudes
suffers a downside. Anti-realism, on the one hand, must face the fact that policies based
on mere metaphors can be harmful (see, e.g., Arendt (1972), Hayek (1975), or Ostrom
(1990), Chapter 1). Successful alterations of an existing incentive structure, for instance,
demands that agents do abide by preferences similar to those that economists take them
to have. Realism, on the other hand, forces scientists to qualify as “knowledge” facts
which are not outcomes of direct observation but outcomes of an inference to the best
explanation.8 There are known instances, in the history of science, when this attitude
proved to be an obstacle to further advances in scientific knowledge (Daston and Galison,
2007). While it may well be that healthy dialectics between the two attitudes are more
fruitful than the selection of either, this may only happen when each alternative is credible.
In this chapter, I show that the case for realism has been, thus far, unduly weakened by
two intricate misconception.
Call behaviorist∗ the anti-realist attitudes akin to those of Samuelson and Friedman. There
is a more popular,9 realist, interpretation of economics, within which rationality is not
identified with choice behavior but with the fulfillment of individual wants. More preci-
sely, it isn’t uncommon for economists to believe that preferences and beliefs are modeled
after individual mental states, i.e., arrengements of internal physiological entities, and
that, because mental states cause choice behavior, information about them may be infer-
red from actors’ choices. Let me call mentalist∗ any realist account of revealed preference
theory in which it is contended that (i’) individuals’ mental life ought to explicitly enter
economic modeling, (ii’) whenever possible, observed choices ought to be interpreted as
7See Aumann (2000), Chapter 1, for a pragmatic argument, Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) for a
methodological one, and Rubinstein (2012) for a rhetorical one.
8For a discussion of what “best” may mean in the context of economic explanations see, among others,
Ma¨ki (2006) and Sugden (2000).
9This point has been made by many philosophers of economics: among others, see McCloskey (1983),
Hausman (2011), and Dietrich and List (2016). In fact, it is not at all clear that behaviorism, despite being
the official standard, was ever held up by a majority of economists (Coase, 1982).
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outcomes of an act of preference maximization, and (iii’) preferences so revealed, call
them behavioral preferences, actually coincide with individuals’ mental preferences.10 I
claim (1) that the mentalist and behaviorist interpretations stand on two misconceptions
and (2) that the mentalist view steepens rather than flatten, the hurdle faced by realism
in economics. The latter blame is, in fact, quite transparent. Game theoretical models
depend not only on preferences and beliefs, but also on their being commonly known.
If mentalists have it right that preferences and beliefs are internal features of the actor’s
mind, then even the most standard common knowledge assumptions will prove very
demanding. For they then raise questions regarding how individuals should ever reach
such a level of shared knowledge about each others’ mental states. I can see no reason to
reject the behaviorist contention that no knowledge can be had of other minds; so long,
that is to say, as one interprets it literally.
The actual focus of this essay is on the first claim, which is more subtle. Understanding
and overcoming the aforementioned misconceptions, I argue, will allow us to reconcile
our common knowledge assumptions with, on the one hand, the behaviorist contention
that no knowledge can be had of other minds and, on the other hand, the mentalist
contention that choice has to do with the fulfillment of wants. A first misconception,
shared by behaviorists and mentalists alike, known as “belief in the Myth of a Given,”
is pointed out in Sellars (1956). To believe in the Myth of a Given consists in believing
that observational knowledge is something that ‘arises,’ that is, that there exists a set of
‘basic facts’ whose truth or falsity may be merely observed by knowers. Instead, I will
follow Sellars in his assertions that observational knowledge amounts to a conscious,
rule governed, application of concepts to the witnessed events. From this perspective,
mentalists appear to be asserting that, upon witnessing events we call ‘intentional actions,’
we conceptualize what occurs using physiological concepts. This, Anscombe (1957)
pointed out, is a (second) misconception. Upon witnessing intentional actions we do
not consider them qua outcomes of a causal, inner mechanism —even though they may
be this, too. Rather, calling some event an ‘intentional action’ amounts to placing it in
a teleological frame, to embedding it in a means-end relationship. Physiological and
teleological talk, in turn, are radically different forms of discourse. The latter involves
‘volitional’ concepts and has us place events in a realm that goes beyond that of physics.
For, unlike the former, it aims not at explanation of human behavior, but at its regulation.11
10Not all writers insisting on the need to import vocabulary about mental states into game theoretical
discourse take a realist stand. Rubinstein and Salant (2008), for instance, assert that “there is no escape
from including mental entities, such as the way in which an individual perceives the objects and his mental
preferences, in economic models.” Yet, in other writings, Rubinstein is quite clear about his reluctance to
accept a realist point of view (Rubinstein, 2012). Views akin to Rubinstein’s are, as far as I can see it,
instances of behaviorism.
11A simple thought experiment illustrates our linguistic awareness of the cause vs. reason distinction.
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A consequence is this: upon acting rationally, i.e., upon trying to bring about events
which observers could describe as rational actions, an agent must embed her action in a
series of means-end relationships that observers would recognize as having application
in the situation she finds herself in. Now, reasons for acting, the elements of discourse
that enter those means-end relationships, are observables. We observe them and get to
know about them by engaging or witnessing regulative talk about human behavior. I
draw two conclusions from this. First, Sen’s contention that preference maximization
need not be seen as an a priori methodological principle does have foundations. Indeed,
we can conceive of it as an empirically relevant rationale. Second, to reach an understanding
of a situation, economists should widen their evidence base to include, in addition to
choice behavior, pieces of linguistic behavior relevant to that situation. Different situations
are observed to kindle approval for the use of different regulative concepts and rational
agents, upon framing a situation, distinguish between concepts that have application and
those that do not. For instance, it was long recognized by Smith (1776) that the concept
of benevolence has no application in situations of trade. Or, as I will argue in the next
chapter, the concepts of obligation and free-riding have application in the presence of some
public goods but not others. Scientists willing to understand behavior in the presence of
the first kind of public goods must recognize the fact that, in their presence, preference
revelation will be mediated by these two regulative concepts.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. I start with a brief overview of
two mainstream views of the logic of scientific discourse: the mentalist and behaviorist
one. The behaviorist philosophy of science, it is well known, strongly influenced mid-
century economic methodology. As such, it constitutes a potential reason why many
economists show some reluctance to accept the identification of preferences with mental
states. In section 3, I discuss some limitations of the behaviorist philosophy of knowledge
and present Sellars’ alternative. Sellars’ view brings no support to the identification of
preferences to mental states. But it sets the ground for Anscombe’s account of intentions.
I detail the latter, and emphasize that Anscombian intentions, as opposed to mentalist
ones, are not entirely private. Indeed, they neither are properties of the actor’s mind nor
properties of the observed events, but consitutents of the from of discourse that we use
to conceptualize events we call ‘intentional actions.’ In section 4, I detail the implications
of Sellars and Anscombe views for scientists’ conception of rationality. In particular, I
argue that it brings us closer to solving the puzzle of common knowledge faced by the
mentalist approach. I briefly conclude in section 5.
Saying of a person that she is a cause of your happiness is not the same as saying that she is a reason for
your happiness. The easiest way to check on this is to substitute happiness with despair. A person may be
a cause of your despair, but she may not be a reason for you to despair. Despair is difficulty conceived of
as (an intermediate step for) a good. More on the distinction in sections 1.3.2 and 1.4.1.
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1.2 Economics and The Logic of Scientific Discourse
Discourse—communication in speech or writing—is not a single, unified practice,∗ but a
collection of practices (Wittgenstein, 1953; Austin, 1979). I will call discursive practices
forms of discourse. Each form of discourse is characterized by a unique set of rules that
legitimates moves from some inputs—features of reality, elements of perception, or pre-
viously uttered sentences—to outputs: a sentence or a set of sentences. For instance,
logical discourse is a practice which consists in applying rules of inference—e.g., the modus
ponens—to sets of propositions in order to yield still further propositions. Upon engaging
in a logical argument, a speaker’s perfomance will be correct or mistaken according
to whether or not, each times she makes a move, she does so in conformity with one
of the pre-specified rules of inference. I call the set of rules that characterizes a form
of discourse its logic.∗ Consider the two following questions, which have relevance for
our topic. First, does going beyond as if preferences necessarily thwart the objectivity of
the social sciences? Second, in the event that it need not, does mentalism constitute an
adequate alternative to behaviorism or is another interpretation needed? I want to argue
that our disagreements with regard to these questions find their roots in disagreements
about the rules that govern scientific discourse.
Rational individuals willing to make factual assertions cannot do so arbitrarily. They
ought to operate in ways which respect the standards of science, i.e., they must engage
in scientific discourse. Behaviorists identify scientific discourse with two practices: theo-
retical and observational discourse. Theoretical discourse, they say, is the practice in
which individuals engage when they assert true analytic statements∗ (or deny false ones).
Observational discourse is the practice in which individuals engage when they assert
observation statements (or deny false ones), i.e., statements such as “this object is blue,” or
“individual i chooses product A.” The mentalist view can be seen as equally separating
scientific discourse into theoretical and observational practices (Hume (1739) and Hayek
(1937) do so), but the rules they associate with each activity are radically different.
Theoretical discourse, they say, is the activity in which individuals engage when they
report relations of ideas, and observational discourse the one in which individuals report
matters of facts. An important difference is that mentalist reports, which may be truthful
or untruthful, are governed by principles of ethics, while behaviorist assertions, which
may be adequate or mistaken, are governed by skill. A further difference concerns the
domain of objects over which a knower’s moves are defined. Mentalists assert that the
inputs of observation and theoretical statements alike pertain to the private realm of
individual perception. Behaviorists hold that each kind of statement takes as inputs
elements in the realm of public∗ physical entities. I must expand a little on this.
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1.2.1 Two Logics for Scientific Discourse
The mentalist syllogism12 starts with an account of what is given to us through perception.
Call sense-impressions the inner experiences to which an individual is subject when con-
fronted with her environment. Mentalists draw a distinction between sense-impressions
and mental images, which they define as faint but accurate copies of the sense-impressions.
When an individual experiences a sense-impression, her mind systematically forms a
mental image of that impression. Given these, mentalists reason as follows. First, they
identify reasoning with a series of movements whereby an individual brings different
mental images in the presence of one another and judges whether these are in some
way related. Second, they classify relations between images into two kinds. Relations
of ideas are relations between images which we may know to be necessarily true or false
because their assessability follows from the involved images only (e.g., ‘two is larger than
one’). Matters of fact, in contrast, are relations between images whose truth-value has
a contingent character. Beyond reasoning, their assessment demands observations, i.e.,
supposed (but unjustifiable) correspondences between simple impressions and the outer
world. An individual may report about the relations of ideas she has disconfirmed or
confirmed; such reports constitute pieces of theoretical discourse. A report about matters
of facts, in contrast, constitutes a piece of observational discourse.
Hume’s writings, in which the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of
fact was first drawn (see Hume (1739), Book I, Part III, Sections I and II), constitute a
representative instance of the mentalist view. Hume counts as relations of ideas all logical
relations, such as those of ordering or negation, as well as all conceptual relations, such
as that between a triangle and the value of the sum of its angles. He includes in potential
matters of facts relations of resemblance, of contiguity in space and time, and of causality.
Finally, he takes the presence of two types of relations to yield two possible forms of
knowledge. When an individual assents to a mental image she experiences because,
using relations of ideas only, she is able to relate it to self-evident relations between
simpler images, then her knowledge is a priori and it inherits the necessary character of
relations of ideas. If, instead, the assent to an experienced image requires the use of
a matter of fact, then her knowledge is a posteriori and it inherits the contingent, less
secure, character of observations.13 The representativity of Hume’s account holds in
12My reconstructions of the mentalist and behaviorist syllogisms, naturally, are very rough. The very
suggestion that there should be ‘a’ mentalist and ‘a’ behaviorist way to look at things makes it clear. I do
not and cannot seek accuracy here. My less ambitious intention is to briefly outline two logics which I
shall later criticise. Hopefully, the critique is robust to fine grained variations in the various positions that
mentalist or behaviorist authors actually held.
13Indeed, a posteriori truth involves a given, an unjustifiable claim of correspondence between reality
and sense-impressions.
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the following sense: to mentalists, knowing amounts to experiencing a specific mental
state. Discourse may be had about facts, but it is logically preceded by the experience of
knowledge and it consists in the utterance of intentional reports about the contents of
one’s mind.
Behaviorists rely on a very different syllogism: one associated with a philosophical move-
ment known under the name of logical positivism.14 At the core of their argument stand
three ideas. First, that observational discourse applies to physical reality directly and
not, as mentalists would have it, indirectly through mental perceptions. Second, that
theoretical discourse does not consist of reports about cognitive self-evidence, but in the
unfolding of analytic truths, i.e., truths which we uncover by following conventional rules
of language. And third, that scientific discourse logically precedes, as opposed to being
logically preceded by, knowledge. To set things straight, let us call a conceivable state of
affairs any singular arrangement of physical objects. A realized state of affairs, then, is an
arrangement of physical objects that actually obtains. Logical positivists define reality
as a partition of conceivable states of affairs into realized and unrealized ones. They
further distinguish meanigful sentences, i.e., sentences that express a statement to which
the concept of truth may be applied, into two kinds. There are, on the one hand, synthetic
sentences, which express a structured proposition, i.e., a representation, in symbols, of a
conceivable state of affairs. Their truth or falsity is a posteriori. And there are, on the
other hand, analytic sentences, which express statements whose truth or falsity obtains
by virtue of the (definitional) meaning of the symbols they contain and, hence, is a priori.
Their line of reasoning runs as follows. Call observation reports those sentences which
express a basic proposition, i.e., a symbolic depiction of a state of affairs so simple that
its truth can be assessed ostensively without being doubted (“Here, now, light.”). The
utterance of an observation report, behaviorists contend, is the mere expression of a
disposition humans have to ostensively learn language. As a consequence, observational
discourse is the outcome of a series of trained dispositions whereby individuals become
able to utter, in the presence of a simple state of affairs, observation reports. It does
not involve a knower’s ability to produce mental images in any essential way.15 Coming
14The account is akin to Ayer’s verificationism (Ayer, 1946), Hempel’s physicalism (Hempel, 1935), and
what Samuelson (1948) refers to as operationalism.
15A good illustration occurs in Wittgenstein (1953), §6. “[The] ostensive teaching of words can be said
to establish an association between the word and the thing. But what does this mean? Well, it may mean
various things; but one very likely thinks first of all that a picture of the object comes before the child’s
mind when it hears the word. [. . . ] But if the ostensive teaching has this effect,—am I to say that it effects
an understanding of the word? Don’t you understand the call ”Slab!” if you act upon it in such-and-
such a way?” What Wittgenstein points at here is this: think of a child deprived of mental images and
nontheless able to pick the slab anytime her teacher calls “Slab!” Would we not be willing to say that the
child understands the word? If so, then the mental image cannot be what we refer to when we mention
the ‘meaning’ of the word “Slab.” And it is in no way essential to the ostensive learning process.
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now to theoretical discourse, let truth functions be functions whose inputs and outputs
are propositions and whose output has a truth value determined by that of its inputs.16
Logical positivists follow Wittgenstein (1921) in his assertions to the effect that all rules
of meaningful language are truth functions (see, esp. §6). This position, eventually,
allow them to equally reduce theoretical discourse to a series of trained dispositions;
dispositions whereby individuals become able to apply truth functions to propositions.
On this view, theoretical discourse, just like observational discourse, is devoid of sub-
stantive mental contents, and the truth of all scientific sentences may be reduced to a
series of behavioral episodes. Knowledge of a structured proposition is achieved by
identifying basic propositions of which it is a truth function and ostensively verifying
these basic propositions. Knowledge of an analytic statement is achieved by identifying
simple tautologies (e.g., the laws of excluded middle and of noncontradiction) of which
it is a truth function.
To sum up, mentalists and behaviorists offer two different accounts of knowledge. These
have in common the recognition of two types of knowledge: a posteriori knowledge,
whose justification has to do with facts, and a priori knowledge, whose justification is
independent of facts. But they differ in that the former identify knowledge with a specific
type of mental state while the latter identify it with behavioral episodes. Note that a
posteriori knowledge is the most relevant type of knowledge for the topic of this essay.
For, if knowledge of other minds is possible, as mentalists contend, then it is a type of
knowledge that depends on actually realized states of affairs.
Mentalism Behaviorism
Discursive domain




(between sense- (ostensive assessment
impressions and events) of basic propositions)
Foundationalism Foundationalism
Justification
(Direct or indirect relation (Truth function of
to true sense impressions) true basic proposition)
Table 1.1. Table 1. Mentalist vs. Behaviorist a posteriori Justified True Belief
In the two subsequent subsections, I detail further the logical positivist account and show
its connection with the foundations of neo-classical economics.
16An example is logical conjunction, the truth value of proposition p ∧ q is fully determined by that of
p and q, as the associated truth table shows. Truth tables are credited to Wittgenstein and Post.
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1.2.2 Structured Propositions
The contention that a posteriori knowledge may be characterized without making a refer-
ence to the knower’s mental states is not an intuitive one. Ordinary ideas about know-
ledge are closer to the mentalist syllogism: they involve mental states, oftentimes a form
of enlightenment.17 Nonetheless, logical positivists did manage to give convincing argu-
ments against this claim. It will take this subsection and the begining of the next one
to see how. Let us start with the distinction they draw between a ‘sentence’ and the
‘statement’ it expresses. A sentence’s statement is its semantic content, i.e., the informa-
tion that is being conveyed from one individual to another when both understand the
sequence of symbols that make up a sentence. One can easily distinguish it from the
sentence by using synonymous sentences in different languages: “Socrates is a man,”
“Sokrates ist ein Mann,” and “Socrate est un homme,” are three sentences which express
the same statement. Logical positivists folow Frege (1892), Russell (1905, 1919) and
Wittgenstein (1921) in their identification of empirical statements with structured propo-
sitions, i.e., symbolic representations of reality. Wittgenstein puts it this way: “in order
to understand the essential nature of a proposition, we should consider hieroglyphic
script, which depicts the facts that it describes” (§4.016, emphasis added). The central,
unintuitive, contention they add to this view is that, to explain how we come to associate
states of affairs with their respective structured propositions, there is no need to make
any reference to mental states.
I already mentionned that logical positivists identify reality with the existence and non-
existence of states of affairs (Wittgenstein (1921), §2.06). A structured proposition, then,
is a representation in language of a state of affairs. At first sight, it seems that, even
for a sentence as simple as “Socrates is a man,” our grasping of the expressed state of
affairs does involve mental states in a rather essential way. To see why it need not be
so and, therefore, why it may be possible to build a scientific language that does not
depend on them, let us first ask ourselves: what state of affairs is being represented by
the proposition expressed in “Socrates is a man”? Intuitively, one may want to say that
the proper name refers to an existent entity—Socrates, that ‘a man’ equally does so (just as
it seems to do in the sentence “a man crosses the street”) and that ‘is’ refers to an identity
relation that holds between the entity represented by ‘Socrates’ and that represented by
‘a man.’ But this view cannot be correct. For, if it were, ‘a man’ and ‘Socrates’ would
refer to the same individual, and asserting “Socrates is a man,” would merely amount
17We easily picture someone uttering “Eureka!” or “I know!” as being in one way or another
enlightened. Following Descartes, we take it that “God as given us an inner light to distinguish the true
from the false”(Descartes (1637), p. 24) and attach these mental phenomena to the essence of what it is
for someone to know something.
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to asserting a tautology: the identity of an individual with himself. Clearly, that is not
the meaning we associate to that sentence. This suggests that the relationship between
sentences and the structured propositions they express is not a straightforward one.
And this implies that, to be in a position to emit a judgment regarding the necessity,
or its absence, of a reference to mental states of the discursive knower, we must be better
informed about the rules of meaningful language, i.e., the general features of structured
propositions.
The clarification of the relationship between sentences and their expressed propositions
is to be credited, to a large extent, to Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Frege (1892)
identified the kind of issues I presented in the previous paragraph. Russell (1905, 1919)
came up with the suggestion that one may deal with sentences akin to “Socrates is a man”
by identifying indefinite descriptions (here: ‘a man’) to instances of unitary relations. In
particular, we ought to think of ‘a man’ as a relation of inclusion in the set of all men,
whatever this, in turn, should mean.18 But many more questions remains. For instance,
“Socrates is a man,” once analysed along Russelian lines, still involves entities we call
‘relations.’ And since a proposition, on Wittgenstein’s own words, is like a “hieroglyphic
script” in that it “depicts the facts that it describes,” it now seems that Russell’s view
commits us to the assertion that ‘relations’ we depict are objects as real as, say, this
apple. This was, in fact, Russell’s stand (see, e.g., Russell (1912), chapter IX). But not all
philosophers readily accept such commitments, so Russells view could not have imposed
itself without significant modifications. It is Wittgenstein (1921) who, upon trying to
generalize Russell’s theory of descriptions, suggested a more acceptable variant of it.
He argues against Russell’s contention that relations, like names, are depicting terms.19
For if it were true, an infinite regress would arise in that one could still ask: how does
the depicted relation, qua existing object, relate to the other objects? Rather than being
depictable real entities, relations are elements of punctuation in the proposition. They
endow propositions with a structure, which, in turn, enable us to give them their sense,
i.e., to associate them with a corresponding states of affairs.
Wittgenstein’s contentions about real entities did not stop there. Eventually, he argues, all
real entities must be of a single kind. He calls them “objects” or “simples” and conceptualizes
them as black shapes on a white surface. From the logical standpoint, he observes, an
object must be characterized by its form, the collection of the possible ways in which it
18The cautious reader will have justified worries about the status of ‘a man’ in the sentence “a man
crosses the street.” Russell’s suggestion is to reformulate such sentences in the following way: “There
exists x, x is a man, and x crosses the street.”
19“Instead of “The complex sign ‘aRb,’ says that a stands to be b in the relation R,”’ we ought to put
“That ‘a’ stands to ‘b’ in a certain relation says that ‘aRb.”’ (§3.1432), “Situations can be described, but not
given names. (Names are like points; propositions like arrows—they have sense.)” (§3.144)
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may combine with other objects (§2.011-2.01231), rather than by any kind of content. As
a consequence, objects are not further analyzable (§2.02) and ‘names’ are the symbols
we use to depict them, the symbols that “stand for” them (§3.203, §3.22-3.221). States
of affairs, in turn, are equally identifiied by their form (or structure): a unique way in
which the objects it involves are combined. If we consider the possibility that such or
such structure may exist, we express what he calls a logical picture of that state of affairs,
also known as, a (structured) proposition (§3).20 Accordingly, language, the realm of
structured propositions, is the collection of pictures that truth functions entitle us to form
about reality (§3.03). It is an a priori realm (§2.222-2.225, §4.51, §5.61) in the sense that
it’s elements are neither true nor false but only contain the possibility of truth or falsity
(§3.13). To declare an empirical fact true or false, in turn, is to hold up its associated
logical picture, correlate it with reality, and assert “This obtains” or “This does not obtain”
(§2.201).
Propositions, so described, relate to reality in a specific way: using language is projecting
reality onto a subset of it, the set of symbols (§3.1-3.141). Meaning is preserved if the
projection follows the rules of meaningful language, that is, if the proposition is a truth
function of elementary propositions, where elementary propositions are depictions of
reality so simple that we may straightforwardly correlate them with reality. Every pro-
position, then contains up to two kinds of constituents: logical constants, punctuation-
marks that encode the way in which reality is projected onto the space of ‘hieroglyphs’
(§5.4611 and §6.124), and names, the ‘hieroglyphs’ proper. Elementary propositions cor-
relate straightforwardly because they are mere concatenations of names, i.e., they do not
involve any punctuation sign (§4.22, see also Anscombe (1971)). Much of Wittgenstein’s
work consists in giving credit to the view that, eventually, all genuine synthetic statements
may be reduced to a set of elementary proposition to which a series of truth functions
have been applied (§6). This doctrine, despite its abstractness, should ring a bell to
economists familiar with Samuelson’s claim that statements involving theoretical terms
like ‘preference’ ought to be reduced to specified observable phenomena: episodes of
choice behavior. Eventually, a correlation between propositions and reality consists in
the identification of each name contained in the proposition with an object of reality, and
in this identification only (§5.4733). Questions regarding the nature of this identification
gave rise to logical positivism, to which I now turn.
20I here conflate Wittgenstein’s propositions and proto-propositions. Given the aim of the paper, I take
it that it is better so.
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1.2.3 Logical Positivism and Behaviorist Economics
The logical positivist movement was initated by a group of Viennese philosophers and
scientists who, in the 20’s and 30’s, held regular meetings during which topics in philo-
sophy of science were discussed. The group, which became known under the name
‘Vienna Circle,’ developped ways of thinking about knowledge that greatly influenced
mid-century science, behaviorist economics included. Logical positivists took over much
of Wittgenstein’s account of language (see, e.g., Cavaille`s (1935)) and adjoined to it a
theory of knowledge, i.e., an account of the conditions under which the truth value of
structured propositions comes to be ascertained. The logical positivist theory of know-
ledge is embodied in three main variants: verificationism, physicalism, and operationalism.
Proponents of either variants accept Wittgenstein’s identification of reality to a partition
of conceivable states of affairs into existent and non-existent ones. They also accept his
contention that states of affairs eventually amount to singular combinations of a unique
type of entity, the ‘simples.’ And, importantly, they turn the claim that all structured
propositions are truth functions of elementary propositions into a foundationalist thesis.
That is, they claim that the edifice of knowledge stands, as an upside down pyramid
would, on a set of propositions we reach certainty about: the elementary propositions.
Knowledge of elementary propositions, in turn, they take to be non-inferential, i.e., to
stand on its own feet. Schlick (1934), for instance, has it that statements, a priori and
a posteriori alike, which may be non-inferentially known all share a common property.
Namely, that one may not understand their meaning without simultaneously assessing their
truth-value.
Consider some analytical sentence, say, one that expresses a logical truth. It’s incontro-
vertibility arises from the fact that understanding its meaning, the expressed proposition,
and assessing it’s truth-value are one and the same (noncognitive) event.21 If we look at
synthetic statements, matters appear, at first, to be radically different. Understanding the
proposition expressed by a synthetic statement amounts to grasping which observable
events would put an observer in a position to assess the truth of that statement. Put
differently, it amounts to identifying the entities that one has to correlate with each
name involved in the proposition in order to be able to say “This obtains,” or ‘This
does not obtain.” And certainly, understanding so conceived need not amount to an
actual verification of the involved facts. Nonetheless, consider a situation in which an
individual develops a disposition of the following kind: she can utter statements of the
21Tautologies and contradictions provide good illustrations of this assertion. Understanding the
proposition codified by “p ∨ ¬p” and assessing its validity are one and the same event. Furthermore,
it is difficult to characterize this event as a “cognitive” one, since it just amounts to a correct use of the
disjunction.
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form “Here, now, so-and-so” when, and only when, specific states of affairs arise. For
instance, she may have an ability to utter “Here, now, apple, falls,” or “Here, now, x, y,
choice of x” when and only when the specified events occur. Such linguistic abilities—
call them utterances of observation statements—are like a pointing at observed states of
affairs.22 Upon executing them, we “carry out the process which is necessary for the
verification of all [empirical] statements” (Schlick (1934), p. 225), i.e., we necessarily
verify their truth. Observation statements, in other words, constitute a class of synthetic
statements for which understanding and truth-value assessment are coincident and non-
cognitive.
Going back to Wittgenstein’s account of language and substituting Schlick’s non-inferen-
tial knowings for his elementary propositions, we obtain an account of scientific know-
ledge as exposed in Ayer (1946).23 On that account, a known statement is a statement
that expresses a proposition which is a logical construct of non-inferential knowings:
tautologies or observation statements. Scientists remain free to introduce theoretical
terms into their discourses, but only in the sense that one remains free to name p the
logical construct a ∨ b ∧ c, where a, b, and c are basic propositions. Theoretical terms
facilitate the scientific enterprise by simplifying the encoding of empirical observations.
But it is a mistake to give them a meaning other than that of being logical constructs of
elementary propositions, for this is the only objective meaning they can have. This view,
when connected with economic analysis, yields interesting implications. For instance,
since neither preferences nor beliefs may refer to observable, physical entities, their use
in economic models must be that of theoretical terms. And their meaning must be arising
from a possibility to translate them (without remainder) into observation statements.
This is precisely the “as if” doctrine. I conclude this section with pieces of evidence
against the coincidental nature of this connection.
During the 30’s most members of the Vienna Circle emigrated to the U.S., and ther is
evidence that their ideas raised the interest of intellectual leaders in some major univer-
sities. The Boston area, where Samuelson obtained his degrees and started his career, is
known for having welcomed much of the diaspora.24 So Samuelson’s account of revealed
preferences, which advocates the substitution of a ‘technical’ concept of preference for
the “discredited” psychological one (Samuelson, 1938), need not come as a surprise.
22A child who has just learned the word “car” and repeats it everytime s/he sees one could be seen as
doing just that kind of gesture. See also footnote 15.
23In the first edition of his book, Ayer rejects Schlick’s account of observation statements (see, esp. pp.
90-91). But he corrects himself on that point in the introduction to the second edition (see pp. 10-11).
24An account of the “Vienna Circle in Exile” that settled in Boston is given in Holton (1995). A welcome
can signal intellectual affinities. Indeed, Bridgman, who’s ideas on science are explicitly referred to by
Samuelson, is a co-founder of the Unity of Science Institute, along with Quine, Carnap, and Frank.
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Further evidence can be found in two forms. First, direct connections between individuals
can be established. Ramsey, who suggested to substitute a ‘technical’ concept of belief for
the psychological one (Ramsey, 1931), was well acquainted with Wittgenstein. In fact,
the former is known to have spent much time discussing with the latter the accuracy and
consequences of his Tractatus.25 Similarly, Morgenstern, who moved from Vienna to the
U.S. in the late 30’s, acknowledged having “struggled hard with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus” and “frequently” attended meetings of the Vienna Circle (Morgenstern, 1976).
Second, the terminology used in mid-century economic writings is revealing. Savage and
Arrow, for instance, respectively assert that ‘neo-Bernoullians’ “improve on Bernoulli in
that [they] define utility operationally in terms of the behavior of a person constrained by
certain postulates” (see Savage (1972), section 5.6, emphasis added) and that “the only
meaning the concept of utility can be said to have is their indications of actual behavior”
(Arrow (1963), p. 9, emphasis added).
Beyond Samuelson’s explicit attempts to “[drop] off the last vestiges of the utility analysis”
(see Samuelson (1938), p. 62) and to construct “operationally meaningful” propositions
(expression repeatedly used in Samuelson (1948), emphasis added), defenders of a more
pragmatic line of reasoning could be met too. Such thinkers found sufficient to lay the
emphasis on the possibility to proceed without taking any stand regarding the actual
existence of mental states. Friedman, for instance, draws a semantic distinction between
statements about unobservables entities, referred to as hypotheses, and statements about
observables, referred to as consequences, and argues that there is no need to read hypotheses
literally, that their only purpose is to help us to organise assertions about consequences.
He asserts that “viewed as a language, theory has no substantive content;” that “it is
a set of tautologies;” and that “its function is to serve as a filing system for organizing
empirical material and facilitating our understanding of it.” (Friedman (1953), p. 148.)
Luce and Raiffa upon asserting that “there is no need to assume, or to philosophize
about, the existence of an underlying subjective utility function” (see Luce and Raiffa
(1957), section 2.6), seem to take a similar stand. This view did not satisfy Samuelson,
for whom Friedman’s argument induces the reader to think about unobservable entities
as really existent but merely dismissed from scientific discourse.26 It nontheless remain
influential, as the following statement found in Aumann (1998) shows: “To avoid mis-
25“Since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize
grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book. I was helped to realize these mistakes—to a degree
which I myself am hardly able to estimate—by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank
Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life”
(see Wittgenstein (1953), Preface).
26See Samuelson (1963), where the author complains about the logical inconsistency of the ‘F-Twist’
and its propensity to induce the reader to believe that abstract theoretical terms could be taken to refer to
real, unobservable, entities.
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understanding, we stress that we do not consider the CPA [Common Prior Assumption]
‘true;’ the concept of truth does not apply here. We do think that it embodies a reasonable
and useful approach to interactive decision problems” (p. 929).
1.3 The Undermining of Realism in Economics
“Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories
and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the
world described by the sciences” (Chakravartty, 2017). The credibility of realism in
modern economics, possibly, is undermined by significant adherence to two erroneous
beliefs. First, many influential economic theorists27 use a rethoric reminiscent of the
logical positivist and instrumentalists conceptions of theoretical discourse. They take it
that, in economic models, preferences and beliefs are theoretical terms, that theoretical
terms do not name any causal explanans, and that therefore one would be mistaken
when attempting to correlate them to whatever common-sense preferences and beliefs
are names for. Albeit right on some aspects, this conception misses out the explanatory
role of theoretical discourse and rests on a radical and problematic distinction between
scientific and common-sense knowledge. Second, many who do not adhere to the anti-
realist view just mentioned hold that econmists’ basic unobservable entities (preferences,
beliefs, etc.) are refinments of homonymous common-sense concepts: concepts from
folk-psychology. Again, there is something to it, but the folk psychology that we refer to
must be rightly construed. In this section, I take up each issue in turn.
1.3.1 The Normativity of Observational Knowledge
A first hurdle for defenders of logical positivism comes from casual empirical evidence:
their account of knowledge seems to be used and endorsed by only a minority among
practicioners of science.28 As far as economists are concerned, it has been argued that
their rhetoric is based on wider grounds than those pushed for by logical positivist,
and rightly so (see McCloskey (1983)). Or, that many among them do not look for
mere explanation (Erkla¨rung), but for understanding (Verstehen) (Coase, 1982; Sugden,
2000). In a nutshell, this says that, when it comes to selecting among competing theories,
economists do not exclusively value empirical adequacy but operate a trade off between
27I already mentionned Aumann (1998), see also Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) and Rubinstein (2012).
28Empirical evidence for the physical sciences is provided in Bachelard (1938), Kuhn (1962), and
Polanyi (1958). Empirical evidence for economics is discussed in Coase (1982) and McCloskey (1983).
Finally, Goffman (1959) discusses the case of everyday life.
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empirical adequacy and alternative criteria exploiting their common-sense knowledge
of social life. This casual empirical hurdle, however, is not the only one. Indeed, from a
purely fromal perspective too, logical positivism, in the form in which it was presented,
faces difficultes. For instance, Anscombe (1971) (see esp. Chapter 1) shows that the
identification of Wittgenstein’s elementary propositions with observation statements is
unfaithful to Wittgenstein’s own account of them. I now present in greater details two
formal issues that “any historian of [the shift from logical positivism to later analytical
philosophy] would do well to focus on” (Rorty, introduction to Sellars (1956)).
For one, Quine (1951) argues, it is not logically possible to combine, as logical positivists
do, the claim that the meaningful entities of a language are its sentences and the claim
that a language derives its meaning from a potential correspondence with states of affairs.
The reason has two sides. On the one hand, the claim that individual sentences are the
meaningful elements of a language goes hand in hand with an important distinction: that
drawn between analytical and synthetic statements. As it happens, the only unequivocal
way to maintain a sensible version of this distinction, i.e., one that would include some
extra-logical synonym pairs, is to use the verificationist account of synonymy. That is,
to say of two statements that they are synonymous “if and only if they are alike in point
of method of empirical confirmation or infirmation” (p. 35). On the other hand, it is
quite clear that, independently of how minute one is, what is being verified is never
a single proposition expressed by one sentence but—and inescapably so—a collection
of propositions expressed by a collection of sentences, a theory. The logical positivist
identification of the foundations of knowledge with analytical and observation state-
ments—for which it is true to say that understanding and verification amount to the
same thing— cannot reconcile these two sides. Although verificationist-synonymy may
happen between theories, it cannot happen between individual sentences.
Sellars (1956) brings another, decisive, argument into the debate. The logical positivist
account of knowledge rests, we have seen, on a reduction of meaning to the depiction
of physical states of affairs and, eventually, on a possibility for individuals to develop a
disposition to ‘correctly’ point at simple, realized states of affairs. The idea of ‘correctness’
involved here, he underlines, is understood by logical positivists as the correctness of
a body movement. But that, clearly, cannot do. For, if the relationship of observation
statements to the occurring events really is of this kind, then observation statements
are a mere continuation of particular sensations. As such, they cannot logically entail
knowledge. Knowledge is knowledge of facts, not of particulars (§3). A fact, when
properly asserted, is endowed with normative authority, that is, it is expected from the
knower that she can give a appropriate justification for her assertion. The ability to
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justify, in turn, signals that the knower is following rules of language consciously, not
merely ‘correctly’ (§34, §35). Sellars, who sides with logical positivists in their reluctance
to refer to mental states, points out that reference to inner perceptions will not do as
a justification (§38). His original move is to put to work a distinction duly noted by
Rawls (1955) around the same time: that between justifying a practice and justifying
a particular action that fall under this practice. The correctness of fact stating must be
construed, he argues, “as being an instance of a general mode of behavior which, in a
given linguistic community, it is reasonable to sanction and support” (§35). In other
words, the correctness of observation statements is justified by reference to an existing
practice.29
The point found in Sellars (1956) bares resemblence with the one made by the later
Wittgenstein (see, Wittgenstein (1953), esp. §1 - 15). Namely, that facts do not bear
out the long held belief that language learning reduces to ostensive learning, and, in
particular, that it does not demand any sort of reference to a context. Meaning arises
from and is learned from the use we make of language in specific contexts. The forms
of discourse have their elements—words, sentence tokens, or collections of sentences—
used in accordance with rules of language whose shape originates in the end that gave
the practice its use (see Wittgenstein (1953), §11, for an imaged expression of this point).
Sellars further explores Wittgenstein’s idea (see, esp. §29-30) and argues that the autho-
rity of observations statements originates not in a given, an unjustifiable correspondence
between word and world, but in the recognition that, within the context of “looks talk,”
it is appropriate to single out this observation report as a “reliable symptom” of some
realized fact. Without such a recognition by the knower, no actual correlation of words
with world can be said to have taken place (Sellars (1956), §33 - §38). An economics
professor discloses factual knowledge when, upon observing an individual’s choices,
she asserts that the individual prefers apples to pomegranates. A fresh student who
repeats the professor’s assertion while thinking about the pleasure of bitting apples and
the burden of reaching the seeds of a pomegranate, does not.
The kind of recognition we just mentioned, clearly, presupposes knowledge of a general
fact of the kind “X is a reliable symptom of Y.” This is a severe issue for logical positivists,
for it implies that amending their account in a way that accomodates the concept of a
‘correct’ observation report will not do. Their foundationalist doctrine then leads them
into an infinite regress: observation of particular facts requires the use of general facts,
29The reference need not be explicit. For instance, Sellars entices us to think of justifying observational
knowledge by naming further observable objects or properties. In this way one implicitly shows that the
circumstances are ”normal” and that there are no reasons for doubting “looks talk.” Theoretical assertions,
differently, may be justified by reference to the facts that they are usually taken to be causally explaning.
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which, in turn should be motivated by particular facts, and so on. Sellars, who gives
up on foundationalism, is not concerned with this issue. Knowledge, on his account,
amount not to tracing back one’s statement to a class of foundational, verifiable, non-
inferential knowings. Rather, knowing a fact amounts to “being able to justify what
one says,” that is, to being able to refer to a discursive practice in which the concerned
statement is a factual statement. We may come back to our fresh economics student who,
after a combination of mistaken assertions and reminders about Samuelson’s concept
of revealed preferences, reaches a stage where, after having observed an individual’s
behavior, she can assert of him that he prefers a to b and justify her assertion.
It is important not to leap into the belief that, by rejecting foundationalism, Sellars lets
anything go. X counts as “a reliable symptom of Y” in the context of a practice. That is, the
general fact tho which one may refer in order to justify one’s knowledge of particular facts
must have been singled out by some practice. And the authority with which this general
fact will be endowed will have to do with the empirical relevance and rational appeal
of the said practice. Thus, in line with Quine’s defense of holistic empiricism, Sellars
simply appears to shift the burden of truth from isolated statements to a set of scientific
discursive practices. And even though it is well known that the priviledged relationship
between truth and scientific discursive practices still is an ongoing debate among philo-
sophers of science,30 acknowledging this fact does not amount to a claim against science.
“Empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, Sellars writes, is rational,
not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put
any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once” (Sellars (1956), §38). This view of science,
importantly, opens up a road for Sellars’ further assertions about folk psychology. If
scientific discourse combines, to various extents, different forms of discourse, then why
should we not think that this is equally true of common-sense discourse? Towards the
end of his essay, Sellars suggests that common-sense discourse does entail some amount
of theoretical talk. He adds that a neat way to understand mental states may be to
construe them as theoretical entities which individuals would have taken a habit to refer
to when looking for causes of behavior. Here are the beginings of folk psychology as a
theory (Ravenscroft, 2019).
1.3.2 Intentions as Forward-Looking, Volitional Explanantia
It is beyond doubt that our mental experiences may affect our acceptance of beliefs. It
is the case, for instance, when we are subject to wishful thinking. But wishful thinking,
30Even when it comes to the most established scientific discursive practices, such as logic and
mathematics. See Carroll (1895), Quine (1948), and Maddy (2012).
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precisely, is defined in opposition to authoritative acceptation of beliefs; it may be cited
as a cause of our belief but it may not amount to having a justification for accepting this
belief. This observation can be cast into an interesting light: upon asking a person ‘why?’
an individual does this or that (e.g., why she accepts a belief?), we may not be asking
for a causal explanans, an entirely private kind of explanans, but for some other, not
entirely private, kind of explanans. For, we have just seen that, on Sellars’ view, rational
acceptation of belief gets its justification from a normative explanans, a reference to the
rules of a practice. What about instances of the question ‘why?’ that aim at eliciting
an actor’s intention? Intentions, which are central to any attempt to understand social
life, were banned from the scientific realm by mid-twenteeth century methodological
changes in economics. The stipulated reason was, on Samuelson (1938)’s words, to
“drop-off the last vestiges” of utility as a “discredited psychological concept.” In other
words, Samuelson asserted that, since economists may never get clear about the causal
explanans of individuals’ actions, they should restrict their observation statements to
statements about choice behavior. That actions may be linked to normative explanantia
already casts doubt on the the validity of Samuelson’s syllogism. In this section, I follow
Anscombe (1957)’s argument to the effect that a consistent account of intention can
neither take them to be causal nor normative explantia, but may take them to be forward-
looking, volitional explanentia.
Today, many a scholar still has it that folk talk about intentions really is causal-talk and
that it refers to mental states (Scheer, 2004). But this view, Anscombe (1957) argued, is
mistaken and owes its prominance to essentially two facts, which any account of intention
ought to accomodate. For one, it is indeed the case that, whenever one inquires about
an individual’s intention in doing this or that, one is always bound to leave the last word
to the actor herself (§4). For instance, if I ask you about your intentions in writing this
letter, and if your answer has the appropriate form, I have no choice but to accept your
authority on that matter. Call this fact the existence of a first-person authority. Second,
it is also the case that, upon acting intentionally, an actor seems to groundlessly know
the intention with which she is acting. For instance, consider a situation in which you
want to open your office window. Upon standing up from your chair, no observable
event indicates whether you are about to pay a visit to the neighbor office or to open the
window. Yet, you know you are opening the window. Call such cases of knowing cases
of groundless knowledge. The presence of this specific form of knowledge gives comfort
to the idea that, somehow, you must be ‘directly observing’ mental states of yours, i.e.,
observing them in a way different from the way we observe outer events (§29 and §32).
Goundless knowledge and first person authority, Anscombe argues, “conspire to make
us think that if we want to know a man’s intentions it is into the content of his mind, and
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only into these, that we must enquire” (§4).
But it is not the case that all evidence is in favor of the mentalist account of intentions
either. First, expressions of intention, in most cases, describe a state of affairs that is yet
to come. If, as mentalists view it, they were avowals of a current state of mind, then
an explantion should be given for the existence of a causal connection between such
states of the actor’s mind and the futur state of affairs that is being mentioned (§2). It is
difficult to believe that a state of mind can intelligibly cause or bring about the occurence
of a determinate state of affairs. Presuming that this state of mind is called to mind
by the actor will not help. For then the calling to mind would itself be an intentional
action; an infinite regress would be entered (§19). Second, we can make an additional
observation about expressions of intention, Anscombe puts it this way: “It is not the case
that a description of any future state of affairs can be an answer to [a question to a man
about his intention]. A man’s intention in acting is not so private and interior a thing
that he has absolute authority in saying what it is—as he has absolute authority in saying
what he dreamt” (§22, second emphasis added). Indeed, if, upon being asked about her
intentions in doing this or that, an agent gives an arbitrary answer, then she runs a risk
of not making sense. She may not for instance, give a mere physical description of what
she is currently doing—the questioner, who sees that, does not ask for it. Nor can she
claim to be bringing about a state of affairs which by no means will be brought about by
the kind of movements she is currently performing.
A single intellectual move, Anscombe suggests, enables us to get in line with all of the
four empirical observations we just mentionned. She invites us (§2 and §32) to pay
greater attention to differences in the way an individual knows what causes her action
and the way she knows the intention with which she acted. In particular, we should look
at the way error about causes differ from errors about own intentions. If a desire to
eat chocolate is what causes me to hold a belief that having 80g of chocolate a day is
a healthy habit, I still may believe that I hold this belief because I feel healthier since
I took this habit. In this event the mistake I make is a mistake of judgment: my belief
about what causes me to believe in the healthy features of chocolate is wrong because it
does not match the events. Consider now the case in which I accepted that belief with an
intention to bring my eating habits in line with ministerial recommendations. It may be
that I am mistaken, i.e., that this belief is not in line with ministerial recommendations.
But in that case, the mistake I make is not one of judgment. Rather, I wrongly infered,
maybe, from the recommendation that a daily intake of fruits is healthy, and the fact that
cacao is a fruit that I should hold the belief that a daily intake of chocolate, whose main
ingredient is cacao, is healthy. This is a mistake in performance: the events are not matching
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the description under which I know my belief acceptance; not the other way around.
This observation is key in the following sense: it is only because we have a tendency to
identify all forms of knowledge with contemptlative (a.k.a. theoretical) knowledge that we
feel concerned with the groundlessness of our knowledge of the reasons with which we
act. “If there are two knowledges—one by observation, the other in intention—then it
looks as if there must be two objects of knowledge; but if one says the objects are the same,
one looks hopelessly for the different mode of contemplative knowledge in acting, as if there
were a very queer and special sort of seeing eye in the middle of the acting” (§32). But
nothing prevents us from asserting that knowledge of ones own intentions is a practical
kind of knowledge. That is, we may assume that agents, upon acting intentionally, use
conventional forms of descriptions of events as blueprints for their own actions and try
to bring about events in conformity with this form of description. This would explain
groundlessness, partial first-person authority, and avoid us the trouble of making un-
justifiable causal claims. For, within a linguistic community, rational individuals may
not describe events arbitrarily but must abide by justifiyable forms of descriptions. And
although the relation between events and forms of description need not be bijective,
the realm of possible intentions in doing this or that remains finite and, importantly,
a possible object of contemplative knowldge.31 When an agent acts rationally, the first-
person authority comes only to settle possibly arising issues about (i) intentionality in
acting, and (ii) identification of the description under which her actions are intentional. A
rational individual, certainly, is not granted the right to pick any description she pleases.
As for what intentionality in acting is, Anscombe suggests that “we do not add anything
to the action at the time it is done by describing it as intentional” (§19). For, to call an
action intentional simply is to place it in a conceptual frame that goes “beyond physics,” a
conceptual frame centered on the concepts of life and animality (§47). This, I believe, can
be understood along Sellarian lines.32 Knowing is about placing events in a conventional
conceptual framework and, upon being asked, being able to justify one’s placing by a
reference to that convention. Anscombe is arguing that intentional actions simply are a
subset of events which we know not under the concept of physical causality but under
that of volition.33 Volitional explanantia are a forward-looking kind of explanantia, they
31Being disruptive in the way one looks at things is a sort of event that equally possesses its form of
description, i.e., conceptualization. Namely, being disruptive.
32And maybe also by more continental approaches to philosophy. For, on this point, Anscombe and
Sellars seems to me to line up with Sartre’s contention that “the world of explanations and reasons is not
that of existence” (Sartre (1938), p. 148), translation and emphasis are mine.
33“Consider a question ‘What is the stove doing?’, with the answer ‘Burning well’ and a question ‘What
is Smith doing?’ with the answer ‘Resting’. Would not a parallel answer about Smith really be ‘breathing
steadily’ or perhaps ‘lying extended on a bed’? Someone who was struck by this might think it remarkable
that the same expression ‘What is—doing?’ should be understood in such different ways: here is the case of
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relate to the state of affairs that the individual wants to bring about. As such, they neither
coincide with the normative kind of explanans that Sellars mentions—these are looking
back at a practice—but constitute a third kind of action-explanans, the second that isn’t
entirely private. Now, either of (i) a brief recollection of the Ancient Greeks’ convention
to place movements of birds into the sphere of divine intentionality or (ii) a thorough
historical study of the formation of the concept of a ‘reflex’ (Canguilhem, 1955) shows
that the set of events which we place into one or the other of the three categories changes
as time elapses. But the time of universal determinism, certainly, has not yet come.
1.4 Mediated Preference Revelation
It is now time to take stock and draw some of the conclusions that follow from our
previous arguments. There are essentially two. First, contrary to Samuelson (1938,
1948)’s assetions, it is not the case that dropping the psychological concept of utility
leaves economists with choice behavior only. Folk psychology hasn’t only developped
along a causal, mentalist dimension, but along a regulative, mind-independent dimension
too McGeer (2007). Individual action, with which social scientists are concerned, to
the extent that it is rational, must meet the standards of folk psychology as a regulative
practice. That is, rational action must be action performed in view of making a description
of the state of affairs come true, and it must be based on a justifiable conceptualization
of the occuring events. Therefore, independently of our ability, qua scientists, to know
the causal-explanentia of observed behavior, we still have a possibility to know their
volitional- and normative-explanantia, because these, on top of being recorded in the re-
gulative dimension of folk-psychology, stand on their own feet. Second, the conceptual
framework in which we place events we call “intentional actions” has an observable struc-
ture. One which, actually, is carefully described in Anscombe (1957). She showed that
descriptions of intentional actions relates in an essential way to practical reasonings.
And this suggests that, between internal consistency of choice and desire fulfillment, an
alternative view of rationality can be drawn. One in which a rational action is a form of
behavior practically known to the agent under a description that (i) meets the linguistic
standards of the agent’s linguistic community, and (ii) may be viewed as the starting
point of a valid practical reasoning.
the ‘enormously complicated tacit conventions’ that accompany our understanding of ordinary language,
as Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus,” (Anscombe (1957), §43).
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1.4.1 Rational Behavior and Regulative Forms of Discourse
When it comes to suggesting an alternative to behaviorism, the flag of mentalism is
traditionally held up in the economic literature. I identify mentalism with three theses:
(i’) conformity (in some form) of an individual’s rational behavior with his experienced
mental states, (ii’) interpretation, whenever possible, of observed choices as outcomes of
an actual act of preference maximization, and (iii’) agreement of behavioral (revealed)
preferences with the individual’s actual (mental) preferences.34 Mentalism, so charac-
terized, is a realist position which, I have already argued, raises an epistemic problem
that is quite independent of whether or not one adheres to Sellars’ view. Game theorists
model interactive situations in which individual beliefs or preferences are, completely
or incompletely, commonly known. It is unclear how mentalists can justify that agents
dispose of such an extensive knowledge of other minds, or even that scientists get to
know facts about these. In this section, I argue that, because rational action is behavior
in conformity with regulative talk about behavior, and because the empirically relevant
concepts of regulative talk are observables, an alternative to mentalism exists which does
not face such a severe epistemic problem.
We have seen that, additionally to forcing social scientists to base their policy recom-
mendations on mere metaphors, the behaviorist approach rests on a questionable philo-
sophy of knowledge. These arn’t the only issues it faces. Sen vehemently criticized it for
(i) its failure to take into account committed behavior (Sen, 1977), (ii) the unreasonable
demands which its main assumption, the revelation assumption, imposes on individual
choices, be it under risk (Sen, 1985) or in a certain environment (Sen, 1973), and (iii) its
lack of logical consistency (Sen, 1993). There is a difficulty, however, with some of the
arguments typically brought against behaviorism. For instance, consider the following
thought experiment (from Sen (1985), p. 110):
“Take a choice function C(·), assumed to be ‘rationalizable’ (i.e., ‘binary’) and let
R be the binary relation representing it. Construct the binary relation R∗ from R
by ‘reversing’ every strict preference, and let C∗(·) be the choice function generated
by (and ‘rationalizable’ with respect to) R∗. If a person with unchanged non-choice
characteristics (i.e., the same feelings, values, tastes, etc.) were to end up choosing
34One could be tempted to identify mentalism with (i’) and (ii’) only, and thus to reject (iii’). In fact, this
seems to be the view taken in some strands of the litterature, for instance in research on learning in games
(see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998) or Hart and Mas-Colell (2013), in particular the explicit discussion
of ‘uncoupledness’ in latter). Under this view, while mental life matters, knowledge of it remains private
and the hypothesis of preference maximization merely registers the fact that individuals tend to do what
they want, without ever asserting anything about the objects of their wants. But it leads to a dead-end: if
knowledge of others’ wants is impossible, then Nash equilibrium is not within reach (Hart and Mansour,
2010; Hart, 2011).
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in exactly the ‘opposite’ way in each case, i.e., according to C∗(·) rather than C(·), it
would be hard to claim that his or her choices have remained just as ‘rational’. But
the ‘opposite’ choices are exactly as consistent!”
There is a sense in which this argument will appear convincing to a mentalist but cannot
convince true behaviorists. For, we have seen it, behaviorists dismiss the very possibility
to make factual assertions about objects or qualities mentalits call “values,” “feelings,”
or “tastes.” A consequence is that, without an account of observable non-choice charac-
teristics, Sen’s argument is bound to prompt the “no-nonsense operationalist35” to (mis-
chievously) ask: ‘What do you mean by values and feelings? How, in point of fact, does
the one differ from the other?36”
Combining Sellars and Anscombe’s views solves precisely this problem. Sellars tells us
that knowing amounts to framing witnessed events in a way that is approved of in the
context of some practice. Anscombe (1957) tells us that “intentional actions” should not
be seen as actions fulfilling some specific properties (say, consistency), nor as actions
performed by an individual whose mind is in a specific state, but as events in individual’s
life that we frame using specific concepts. Namely, events for which our framing process
makes use of ‘animist’ or ‘vitalist’ concepts. Furthermore, she gives a detailed analysis of
the specific form that description of intentional actions may take. “Aristotle’s ‘practical
reasoning,’ she says, [..] can be looked at as a device which reveals the order that there is
in [the ordinary language conventions that regulate intentional concepts]” (§43). There
is but one way to understand her analysis: intentional actions are events which can
legitimately be identified with a conclusion in a piece of practical reasoning. And while
this would be of no avail if Hume had it right that when being practically rational we
always aim to fulfill our desires (see Hume (1739), Book II, Section III, Part III), Anscombe
dismantles this view too (§30). Practical reasons have to do with states of affairs becoming
true, as opposed to states of affairs being true. They involve knowledge of the eventuality
as well as an attempt to bring it about.37
It is worth insisting on that last point. The belief that desires and interest lay down
the law about a man’s wants is a widely accepted one, and its effect is to push social
scientists in either of the mentalist or behaviorist camp. For, it is the identification of
practical rationality with the fulfillment of desires that drives policy concerned scientists
35Sen’s nickname for behaviorists, see Sen (1985), p. 112.
36Ayer (1946), an important proponent of logical positivism indeed developed an own account of a
view called emotivism. Emotivists identify ethical and value judgments to expressions of feelings.
37Anscombe’s reasoning on that point is fairly abstract. It is not useful to replicate it here. Consider
instead the following intuition, suggested in Foot (2001): “Many of us are willing to reject a ‘present
desire’ theory of reasons for action because we think that someone who knowingly puts his future health
at risk for a trivial pleasure is behaving foolishly” (p. 63).
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into an endless search for universal laws of self-interest; and it is this same identification
that give a reason to epistemically conservative scientists to conlcude that a technical
concept of rationality, based on consistency of choice, is necessary to conduct objective
scientific analysis. By pursuing a line of reasoning that undermines this belief, Anscombe
brings grist to an interpretation of game theory that differs from the two mainstream
ones: Bacharach’s rational approach (Bacharach, 2006). Bacharach insists that the frames
within which individuals reason, too, are objects to be studied by scientists. As he puts
it (p. 7),
“people evidently do reason, more or less well... Moreover, some of the reasons that
plausibly guide people’s behaviour are very general and so have great explanatory
power—for example, the reason for choosing an alternative that it maximises expected
utility.”
His second point is of great importance: validity of the reasoning is one thing, but empi-
rical relevance matters more. Clearly so for social scientists, who are concerned with that
very matter. But also for actors of everyday life, who, in interactive situations, must pay a
cost for abiding by valid but empirically marginal practical reasonings. This may be seen
from a life-experience narrated by Rousseau (1782) in his sixth walk. There, Rousseau is
concerned with the possibility for him to keep his ‘freedom’ and perform ‘good deeds.’
Roughly put, his reasoning is as follows:
1. A good action is an action carried out with an intention to do bring pleasure to
another person;
2. A man’s freedom consist in having a choice not to to act against his desires; 38
3. Whenever I (Rousseau) perform a good action, my intentions are “misjudged” by
my beneficiaries; they take me to be acting virtuously;
4. Acting virtuously and performing a good action are two different things. A virtuous
action is an action carried out in order to play one’s part in a ‘society’ that benefactor
and beneficiary form together;
5. Virtuous actions entail duties which, once I recognize them, anihilate my other-
regarding feelings and cause me displeasure;
⇒ “The only good in my power from now on is to refrain from doing anything for fear
of unintentionally and unwittingly doing ill.”
38I take it to be the case that Rousseau had a desire-fulfillment theory of individual welfare. There is
also room for a Kantian reading of his conception of liberty (see, e.g., Rousseau (1762), Book I, Chapter
VIII). The matter is not essential to the general argument.
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I do not think that Rousseau’s example, in which the idiosyncratic character of his framing
of events makes it impossible for him to bring about the said events, presents us with an
isolated case. Quite the contrary, I believe that this squares well with insights we may
gain from a great variety of strands in the literature.39 It is in line with the intuition,
captured in Plato’s allegory of the cave (Plato (380), VII 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7), that dis-
ruptive modes of reasoning tend to create barriers in an individual’s social life. At any
rate, little evidence suffices to suggest an interesting possibility. Namely, that the chances
for a mode of reasoning to become empirically relevant in a given interactive situation
depends on the success it brings to the individual (or groups of individuals) who adopt
it. Individual rationality, on this view, is neither an a priori methodological principle, nor
an a posteriori and sovereign principle of human nature, but a mode of reasoning that
yields strong reasons for acting in many economically relevant situations. Of course,
we also know of some situations in which individual rationality yields only very weak
reasons for acting. It is the case when each among the many can choose to pay a price and
cast a vote, or when it comes to providing a public good. In such situations, other modes
of reasoning, maybe a rule-utilitarian one (Harsanyi, 1977b), a reciprocal one (Sugden,
1984), or a Kantian one (Roemer, 2010, 2015), yield stronger reasons for acting.
1.4.2 Solving Common Knowledge Issues: the Case of Bilateral Trade
In the first chapter of the Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) suggests that the division of labor
is the most important factor of economic development. In the second chapter, he seeks
to find a “principle which gives occasion to the division of labor.” His suggestion is that
“the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another,” which “is common
to all men,” constitutes such a principle. It is clear that he took this statement quite
literally.40 Similarly, many modern economists have no troubles accepting Smith’s talk
of propensities. But not all. Those with behaviorist inclinations, for the reason we have
just seen, take it that any such principle should be translated, without remainder, into
observable choice behavior. This divergence in ‘opinions,’ eventually, has consequences
for scientific practice. While mentalists can freely talk of incentive based policy, beha-
viorist can only difficultly do so. In this section, I detail what facts are being reported,
39In the realm of the social sciences, I can think of Goffman’s assertions to the effect that individuals
“project” a “definition” of the situation and that these projections “limit what it is the individual can be,”
(Goffman, 1959) and of Bourdieu’s concept of a ‘field.’ The 20th century literature, too, is rich in characters
with idiosyncratic, inflexible modes of reasoning who, much like Rousseau, end up socially isolated or ill
appreciated. Meursault (Camus, 1942), Clappique (Malraux, 1933), Morel (Gary, 1956), and Hans Schnier
(Bo¨ll, 1963) all are instances.
40On this matter, the analytical introduction to Smith’s Wealth of Nation by Andrew Skinner is clear.
Skinner identifies Smith as a member of the Scottish Enlightenment, a school of thought which asserted
the existence of propensities in human nature “independently of our knowledge of them.” (see, pp. 12,13)
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upon analyzing bilateral trade, by each of the two schools. I also illustrate how, even in
the event that mentalist assertions fail to convince, there is an alternative to behaviorism
that provides grounds for incentive based policies.
On behaviorists’ view, talks of “propensities to trade” are metaphorical talks, that is,
mere linguistic devices helpful to keep track of, or convey information about observable
physical regularities. The expression can be, and scientists ought to reduce it to an expres-
sion involving observable choice behavior only. In the present case, the observation that
individuals often operate simultaneous bilateral choices, whereby goods of one type are
exchanged for goods of another type at a certain rate. In this way, assuming a “propensity
to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” does not commit the scientist to
any factual claim about the actual mental states of the trading partners or about their
intentions. It merely presents us with a concise way to summarize assertions about
the allocation of goods among individuals and individuals’ propensity to bring about


















Statements about preferences summarize
gathered information about initial
endowments, final allocations, and exchange
rates.
On the behaviorist account, equilibria do not record patterns of individual mental states
or perceptions of the situation but patterns of individual behavior. There can be no
scientific ground for restrictions on the shape of indifference curves other than those
entailed by choice observations. For all we know, it could be that the indifference curves
pointing upwards are those of the Baker—who wants, say, to have the brewer fed and
talkative. Similarly, the ones pointing downwards could be those of the Brewer.
It is clear that the behaviorist interpretation fails to give a ground for implementing
incentive based policies. Without knowing what the baker and brewer want we cannot
give them incentives to alter their behavior. This yields a pragmatic reason for economists
to commit to the existence of some mental states, among which knowledge and belief, as
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well as to the existence of mental entities, such as preferences. On this view, preferences
are causal determinants of an individual’s actions. Observation of behavior enables us
to draw inferences about them, but introspection constitutes an alternative source of
information; it gives us an opportunity to state facts about indifference curves also in
the absence of behavioral observations. Smith himself must be viewed as taking such
a position. For instance, he takes it for granted that each trader seeks to maximize the
amount of beer and bread in his hands, and that, for this reason, the indifference curves
pointing upwards must be those of the Brewer and those pointing downwards must be

















Statements about preferences record
information about an (ideal) individual’s
mental states.
Mentalists work with ideal-types, that is, theoretical constructs summarizing factual
information about properties which are thought to be widely shared by real individuals.41
Thus, they interpret statements about preferences as statements which they expect to
be approximately true—maybe in a statistical sense—or credible about individuals’ real
preferences. In the present case, a desire to possess larger stocks of goods, possibly
formalized with an assumption of monotonous preferences. Such statements could, in
principle, be justified by the means of behavioral observations only, but de facto they
arn’t. Mentalists rhetoric, instead, relies on alternative principles such as, for instance,
similarity principles regarding human nature (Harsanyi, 1977a).
Neither of the two mainstream views, I argued in this essay, is convincing. Behaviorism,
with its world of allocations and exchange rates, has an “air of paradox” (see Ayer (1946),
p. 20). We do seem to know more about each other’s actions than the way in which they
affect the allocation of goods in society. At the same time, if it is agreed that introspection
41The theoretical nature of ideal-types does not go against realism. Realism does not require exact
correspondence between words and world. Example of ideal-types of preferences in economics are selfish
preferences, risk averse preferences, other-regarding preferences, or distributional preference.
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can difficultly be counted as a legitimate source of scientific knowledge, then mentalism
fails to tell us what additional information we have about individuals’ behavior and where
from we have it.42 The alternative I advocate is in fact suggested by Smith’s own choice
of words. He holds that our disposition for barter is more likely to be a consequence
“of the faculties of reason and speech” and, on several occasions, identifies trade with a
form of “contract.” “Two greyhounds, he writes, in running down the same hare, have
sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his
companion, or endeavors to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself.
This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their
passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair
and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog.” (Emphasis added,
p. 118).
I want to suggest that Smiths’ observations need not so much be about human nature as
about the nature of trade, about trade as an established practice with an (implicit) contract.
What we call trading isn’t a mere exchange of good, but the act of exchanging goods with
an intention to get the best material bargain for oneself. Individuals who master the concept of
trade know this. The baker need not explicitly tell himself that, upon engaging in a trade
with the brewer, he will seek a good bargain; yet, because he practically knows his intention
to “trade,” i.e., because he tries to bring about a state of affairs that an observer who
masters the concept of trade would find fit to describe as an token of trade, he also knows
the situation is also about getting a good bargain, he knows that the brewer, because he,
too, masters the concept of trade, knows it is about getting a good bargain, and he knows
the brewer knows that he knows, ad infinitum.
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Brewer











• Facts may be stated about:
Initial endowments,
Final allocations,
The exchange rate ,
The practice of trade.
Statements about preferences record
information about a practice, that of trade, in
which individuals may engage.
42One possible road might be the theory-theory of folk psychology. But it is necessary to note
that, along this line, a significant difference exists between ‘anonymous’ interactive situations—i.e.,
interactive situations involving many individuals and in which actual physical interaction are reduced to
a minimum—and simpler situations in which a few individuals are in the presence of one another. Much
of our ’explicative’ folk-psychological knowledge relies on direct observation of body movements.
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Each society, eventually, is characterized by a set of social practices in which its individuals
regularly engage. Information about these practices is recorded in the concepts under
which they are subsumed and conveyed by the means of regulative talk. Individuals who
master these concepts can rationally use them as blueprints for their own actions. Events
we describe as tokens of “trade” cannot be described as tokens of “charitable giving”,
tokens of “coerced exchange,” or tokens of “symbolic exchange.” Each of these concepts
cover a different ground and individuals mastering them know what each entails. The
activity of trade, for instance, involves a “contract” whose terms are recorded in the
concept of trade.43 This contract, Anscombe (1958) shows, involves a concept of obligation—
an ‘owe;’ but, as correctly pointed out by Smith (1776), it does not involve the concept
of benevolence. Each society, eventually, bears the responsibility of the practices and
concepts it puts forward. Recent developments have shown that the concept of trade can
be amended and that it may, for instance, come to involve ideas of distributive justice.
Individuals now have a possibility to choose between engaging in a classical trade or
in a ‘fair trade.’ Upon choosing the one over the other, they know which attitude to
expect from their trade partners, which attitude their trade partners expect from them,
they know that their partners know the same, and that they know that they know, ad
infinitum.
1.5 Conclusion
One of Samuelson’s reasons for holding up the flag of revealed preference was this: it is
not possible to acquire knowledge about another individual’s mental states, therefore,
social scientists are bound to use choice behavior as the only building block of their
models (Samuelson, 1938). In this chapter, I did not contest the premiss in Samuelson’s
argument. Rather, I argued against its conclusion. Even in the event that no knowledge
of mental states can be gained, we are not justified in saying that, to keep on with the
epistemic demands of science, social scientists ought to reduce rational behavior to con-
sistent choice behavior. The reason is twofold. First, the behaviorist contention that
knowledge may be reduced to a series of behavioral episodes has long lost its appeal
among philosophers of knowledge. Sellars (1956) showed that this account rests on a
myth, the ‘Myth of the Given,’ and that it fails to explain the normative nature of know-
ledge. The normative nature of knowledge, he argues, stems from the ability to relate
43With regard to the parallel between trade and contracts, the following statement from the Theory
of Moral Sentiments is illustrative: “[The individual]...in the race for wealth and honors and preferments...
may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors.
But if he should hustle or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It
is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of.” (II.ii.2.I), quoted in Skinner’s analytical introduction.
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one’s factual statements to an established discursive practice. Knowing consists in placing
events in an inferential argument, and because this ‘placement’ is subject to approval or
disapproval by our peers, knowledge has a normative status. Second, and contrary to
a belief shared—for different reasons—by mentalists and behoviorists, ‘intentions’ and
‘mental states’ relate to ‘intentional actions’ in radically different ways. While ‘mental
states,’ independently of how we conceive of them, take the role of causal explanans for
our actions, Anscombe (1957) showed that ‘intentions’ are nothing but redescriptions of
our actions. Redescriptions in regulative terms.
There are, I believe, three important consequences that follow from the argument I just
developped. First, in order to give a realistic turn to our assumptions about rational
behavior, economists do not have to make costly ontological∗ commitments such as those
suggested by mentalists and rejected by behaviorists. An alternative appears once we
recognize that (i) rational action consists in acting in accordance with the rules that
characterize our practices and that (ii) access to these rules is secured by a specific kind of
discursive practice: regulative folk-psychology. Second, it can be argued that ‘rationality’
and ‘self-interest fulfillement’ are not, in general, synonymous. Unconditional synonymy
between the two terms is the outcome of a conflation: that between reasons for acting
and the causes of an action. Once we observe that reasons for acting and the causes
of an action are known to the actor in two distinct ways—the one practically, the other
observationally—the conflation is easily dispelled. As contended by Sen, empirically
relevant reasons for acting need not be restricted to the set of individually rational ones: an
individual’s reasons for acting may be moral, legal, individually rational, or collectively
rational. Third, economists can benefit from philosophers’ work. Psychology and biology,
because they yield insights as to how behavior may fail to be rational, have already been
accepted as relevant neighboring fields. Conceptual analysis and philosophy of mind,
which can help unveiling the structure of our reasons for acting, have an equal claim to
a place at the frontier of economics.44 I concretize this third claim in Chapters 2 and 3.
44Harsanyi’s analysis of rule-utilitarian voting behavior shows how the claim can be concretized
(Harsanyi, 1977b). Sugden’s and Bacharach’s analysis of team reasoning (Sugden, 1993; Bacharach, 2006)
and Roemer’ analysis of Kantian reasoning (Roemer, 2010) equally are instances of this approach. By the
same token, economists will maybe unveil new forms of irrational behavior, such as (i) when individuals
act on their desires despite having, in point of fact, committed to conform their behavior to a different
principle, or (ii) when individuals fail to realize that their action might not only be known under the
description they approve of, but also under another description they do not approve of.
Chapter 2
On The Provision of Legitimate Public
Goods
\When I perform my duties as a brother, a husband, or a citizen and carry out the commitments I have
entered into, I full obligations which are dened in law and custom and which are external to myself
and my actions."
E´mile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, 1895.
2.1 Introduction
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a free rider is “a person who, or organization
which, benefits (or seeks to benefit) in some way from the effort of others, without
making a similar contribution.” If “effort” refers to the magnitude of an individual’s
contribution and “similar” contributions are contributions of comparable magnitude,
then there are instances in which revealed preference analysis of public good games
does not appear to be empirically adequate.1 Indeed, assume that revealed preference
theorists have it right that rationality commands individuals to contribute in a way which
maximizes their preferences, whatever these may be. Then, in the presence of rational
individuals, (i) the realized distribution of contributions to the public good merely re-
1I refer here to the a posteriori version of revealed preferences. The revealed preference principle, in its
“as if” or a priori sense, is not the least concerned with individuals’ perception of the situation. Crucial
aspects of the argumentation I put forth in this chapter will appear inappropriate to proponents of the
latter approach. I discuss in Chapter 1 the (un)desirability and (un)tenability of the “as if” methodology.
Arguments against it can equally be found in more authoritative sources. See, in particular, Sen (1993,
1997).
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flects the realized distribution of individual preferences; (ii) no individual faces a rational
obligation to contribute more than what she currently does; and (iii) there is no room for
contributors to try to bring non-contributors to their senses. Yet, consider the following
case: to finance state expenditures, a tax scheme has been instituted which, for feasibility
reasons, is contingent on only a limited number of observables. Assume some indi-
viduals have a possibility to alter the status of their observable attributes without actually
undertaking the actions that theses observables are taken to be reliable symptoms of.2 For these
individuals, a fraction of their taxes—to the extent that they do pay it—is, formally, a
voluntary contribution to a public good. Why, then, is it not uncommon to witness, in
such contexts, attempts by contributors to call non-contributors to their senses?
Can it be argued that the case just described is one in which individuals, despite having
no rational obligation to increase their contribution, have a moral obligation to do so? In
other words, neglecting the irrationality inherent in a failure to grasp the consequences
of one’s own moral standrads, are we in a case where contributors try to convince non-
contributors that their preferences, as revealed, do not fulfill standards of morality they
would freely abide by. Moral suasion happens, too, but it not the phenomenon I want to
describe here. Indeed, the value of public expenditure is a complex matter over which we
generally accept significant disagreements. Although many among us believe that some
amount of public expenditure is needed for bringing about the common good; although
moral arguments sometimes raise non-contributors’ preferences for public expenditure
and, by the same token, turn them into contributors; we do recognize that every rational
non-contributor remains free not to conform her preferences to given moral standards.3
On the contrary, we sometimes are reluctant to accept that she is under no obligation to
limit tax avoidance. The reason is this: a tax scheme democratically arrived at reflects a
collective intention, that is, a plan of action which citizens have agreed to jointly implement.
Every non-contributor, qua citizen, has a right to mark her (rational) disagreement with
the given plan but also an obligation to comply with it until it is democratically amended.
The obligation is a political one4 and is best seen, on Durkheim’s words, as external to the
individual.
2For instance, until January 1st 2016, a German citizen could, in order to lower her taxable income,
legally engage in the dividend stripping practice known under the name of Cum-Cum trade (see, e.g.,
https://www.ft.com/content/741df8aa-178f-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e.) The legality, prior to 2012 changes
in German legislation, of a closely related practice, Cum-Ex trading, is still debated. Estimated costs
of the two practices for European tax authorities add up to more than 50 billion Euros (https://cumex-
files.com/en/).
3I leave aside the difficult question of the relationship between moral behavior and rational behavior.
Some would argue that I cannot (Foot, 2001). But the question here is only meant to raise attention to
a specific point: that complaints addressed by contributors to non-contributors, in the presence of some
public goods, are the expression of a mode of reasoning that is not a moral one.
4Socrates did not base his rejection of Crito’s offer to escape on moral grounds, but on political ones.
See especially Plato (385), Sections 50c to 54e.
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In this chapter, I suggest that, in a context of voluntary provision of a public good, such
political obligations can fruitfully be formalized as steming from a joint commitment to
steer clear of free riding. Despite my use of game theoretical tools, the analysis I present
does not follow the tenet of revealed preferences. In fact, it cannot do so. Revealed
preference theorists identify individuals’ preferences with their choice behavior. In so
doing, they restrict the interpretation of the game and the set of sensible solution concepts.
If, say, in a two players game where Player 1 can take actions a1 or b1 and Player 2 actions
a2 or b2, Player 1 is observed to choose (a1, b2) over (b1, b2), then, according to the principle
of revealed preferences, scientists can say no more than that, in the event that player 2 opts
for b2, it is rational for player 1 to opt for a1. In Chapter 1, I argue against this view on the
ground that, for any situation of interest, scientists have an opportunity to observe individuals’
linguistic behavior too. Pieces of linguistic behavior, for instance, may be an (approved
of or disapproved of) application of the concept of free riding to qualify certain actions,
or a (approved of or disapproved of) reference to a joint commitment. Call legitimate a
public good such that, in its presence, individuals, with the help of these two concepts,
bring their behavior in conformity with a system of political obligations. I claim that, in
situations that involve a legitimate public good, preference revelation is mediated by our
linguistic behavior in such a way that, to capture the situation’s logic, we must depart
from the revealed preference paradigm.
The distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate public goods is a concrete one.
Consider the following two possible worlds: World 1 is populated by efficiency con-
cerned individuals who may contribute to a public good by following a code of etiquette;
World 2 is populated by altruists who may contribute to a public good by financing a
charity that will help the least fortunate ones. Our own world appears to be a blend of
these two worlds, but, importantly, not any kind of blend. For, when it comes to assessing
whether behavior is in conformity with etiquette, individuals appeal to a system of rights
and obligations, while they do not do so when they are given an opportunity to finance
a charity. If, during a public lecture, I display good manners but you continually talk
with your neighbor, then each of us would, in a normal context, aknowledge that I can
authoritatively demand from you to ‘behave.’ Differently, my being a contributor to
charities does not give me any such kind of entitlement: in a normal context, each of us
would consider illegitimate any attempt from me to suggest that you have an obligation
to contribute to charities. This discrepency, possibly, has to do with the fact that etiquette
following behavior results from political considerations, while contribution to charities
results from moral ones. At any rate, the presence of such systems of rights and obliga-
tions—call them systems of demand-rights (Gilbert, 2015)—regulating etiquette following
behavior allows us to call efficiency a legitimate public good. The absence of such a
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system for the case of charities, conversely, shows that we do not, in general, attribute a
legitimate character to well funded charities.
Gilbert (1989, 1990, 2015) explains the presence of systems of demand-rights by appeal
to a specific form of commitment: joint commitments to act as a body. Upon acting as a
body, individuals no longer seek to unilaterally bring about their most preferred outcome,
they commit to multilaterally carry out a plan of action. To model these situations, three
approaches come to mind, according to whether the game form, the solution concept,
or preference profiles are subjected to variations. Revealed preference theorists take as
given the first two and look for individual preference patterns that generate empirically
adequate outcomes. Insitutionalists take as given the two last and ask which game form
yields sensible results. In this paper, I take preferences and game form as given and try
to find a fitting solution concept. I develop a concept of collective equilibrium in which
individual jointly commit to steer clear of free riding. The inherent vagueness associated
with the “free rider” concept could, in principle, give rise to the presence of multiple
equilibria. I show that, when systems of demand rights merely endow individuals with
a right to remind lower contributors of their obligations, one equilibrium is more saliant
than the others: that in which all individuals make identical contributions. I further
argue that situations in which we might expect the appearance of such equilibria are
situations in which participants form a relatively homogeneous group.
To sum up, I contend that departures from the revealed preference paradigm can increase
our understanding of interactive situations. It is so, for instance, when the considered
situation involves a specific kind of public good: a legitimate public good. In the presence
of a legitimate public good, individuals jointly commit to steer clear of free riding. The
idea that collective or moral commitments may play a significant role in public good
provision was already pushed forward by several economists5 and implemented by still
others.6 I implement it here in a novel way: none of the existing studies draws a distinc-
tion between legitimate and non-legitimate public goods, and, to the best of my know-
ledge, no model is outcome equivalent to the one I present here. In the next section I
discuss the concept of legitimacy and briefly survey two literatures: that on the Nash
theory of voluntarily provided public goods and that on collective intentionality and
team reasoning. In section three, I present my main line of argument. Namely, that,
beyond inefficiency, there is a second reason why individuals may want to put an effort
to change their behavior or environment: the presence of free riders. I define free riding,
investigate the determinants of free riding in Nash equilibrium, and present collectively
rational equilibria, a solution concept which records the existence of a joint agreement to
5See, e.g., Runciman and Sen (1965), Sen (1973, 1974, 1977), Sugden (1982, 1993), or Bacharach (2006).
6See, e.g., Laffont (1975), Harsanyi (1982), Sugden (1984), or Roemer (2010, 2015).
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steer clear from free riding. I show that the presence of a simple system of demand-rights
may help relatively homogeneous individuals to reach an outcome that Pareto dominates
the Nash outcome.
2.2 Legitimacy, Nash Reasoning, and Team Reasoning
2.2.1 Legitimate Public Goods
An unquestioned assumption permeates the literature on the voluntary provision of
public goods; namely, that all public goods arouse identical forms of behavior. Given
economic theorists’ attachment to the principle of revealed preferences, this assumption
need not come as a surprise; revealed preference theorists recognize the existence of only
one form of rational behavior: internally consistent choice behavior. Yet, on the face of it,
this assumption does run against a clear empirical observation: that specific systems of
rights and duties are inherent to some situations of voluntary provision of a public good
and not to others. To be concrete, assume you and I work in team on some project. Each
of our efforts will increase the chances of a good outcome, and each of us cares about
that. This is a case of voluntary provision of a public good, but not an arbitrary one. For,
in such a situation, each of us can exert demand-rights to regulate the behavior of her or
his teammate. If it becomes apparent that you are not in any way exerting efforts to bring
the project forward while I am, I have the standing to remind you of your engagements.
In normal circumstances, you will recognize that standing and make an effort to abide
by your obligations. Matters differ when we consider the following alternative event.
You and I are two regular consumers of the same youtube broadcast. The broadcaster
makes a living through crowdfunding. I belong to the group of consumers who, every
now and then, contribute a gift to this broadcaster and learn that you belong to the set
of consumers who never contribute. I may feel uncomfortable about this. Nonetheless,
in this event, I do not dispose of any demand-rights I could make use of to regulate your
behavior.
Demand-rights, as defined in Gilbert (2015), are rights that a player has over “a particular
action of a particular agent,” and to have such a right is “to have a standing or authority
to demand that action from the agent, and the standing or authority to issue appropriate
rebukes to that agent should the action not be performed” (p. 23). To find an explanation
for them, Gilbert analyzes familiar situations in which they are present. For instance,
situtations of which we may say that two individuals are walking together (Gilbert, 1990).
A strictly behavioral approach to the phenomenon of joint walks fails. A reason is this:
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if, shortly after you set out to go for a walk, I happen to join you on the sidewalk, keep
walking at a pace similiar to yours, and turn wherever you turn, after a while you will
feel uncomfortable. This discomfort will arise because I behave as if we were walking
together while, precisely, we are not. Thus, alternative accounts of walking together com-
plement behavioral criteria with further necessary conditions. Typical among these are
the requirements that each of the involved individuals intends to walk with the other
one and that these intentions are common knowledge. Yet, these will not do either. For,
Gilbert notes, it is characteristic of individual intentions that they may be unilaterally
rescinded. So if it were the case that joint walks are sufficiently characterized by a set
of commonly known individual intentions, I would not have any authority to complain
upon your rescinding of your intention once we are in the middle of the woods. But I
do. She concludes that the best explanation for the presence of demand-rights consists
in taking them to be reliable symptoms of joint commitment to act as a body, a.k.a., a joint
intention.
Accepting the idea of a joint intention demands some philosophical background.7 I deal
with this sensitive point in section 2.3 and, for now, come back to public goods. It is an
interesting fact that some public goods (e.g., team work) arouse contributive behaviors
regulated by systems of demand-rights while other public goods (e.g., youtube broad-
casts) arouse supererogatory contributive behavior. Institutionalists may want to argue
that modelers ought to integrate them in the game form. However, consider again the tax
avoidance example I alluded to in the introduction. Assume the legislator, because she
faces unreasonable enforcement costs, decides to grant identical sets of warranted actions
to individuals with differing types. Had enforcement costs been sufficiently small, she
would rather have incentivized the one type to act in this way and the other type to act in
that way. In such a context, it is possible to draw a distinction between behavior that is in
line with the “spirit of the law,” i.e., the set of states of affairs which the legislator attempts
to bring about by means of a legislative act, and behavior merely in line with the law, i.e.,
the state of affairs in which each individual simply selects her favored option within her
legally warranted set. In the first case, the actor uses her type to infer the set which, had
enforcement costs been small enough, would have been legally waranted for her and
selects her most preferred option within that set. She may be said to act responsibly. She
does not do so in the second case, in which we may say of her that she acts legally. This
distinction, I contend, casts doubt on the adequacy of an institutional approach.
There are notorious instances of legal but irresponsible actions, such as when individuals
exploit the complex features of a tax (or quota) scheme to minimize tax payments (resp.
7Anscombe (1957), notably, refutes the identification of intentions with mental states. But her account
involves a notion of practical knowledge. Can practical knowledge be plural?
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maximize their profits). And I find interesting that, in media coverage of these instances,
actors typically insist on the legal character of their deeds. Possibly, responsible behavior
is frequently observed too. Consider the following statement found in Tirole (1999): “Al-
most every economist would agree that actual contracts are or appear quite incomplete.8”
It is far from evident that contracting agents systematically exploit the incompleteness
of their contracts. Nor, in the event that they havn’t figured out the presence of ‘free
lunches,’ that they would want to exploit them once someone points these out to them.
Quite the reverse, consumers regularly contribute to a cleaner environment by diligently
sorting their wastes or adapting their consumption behavior. In public hospitals, under-
supplied medical staffs often do their best to maintain a high quality of service. In the
private sector, employers screen out individuals unable to work in team and employees
oftentimes carry out actions which are best described as being in the interest of their
compagny, as opposed to their own. Explaining all such actions as irrational or as resul-
ting from a congruence of preferences among the contracting parties need not be the best
option. And introducing a concern for reputation only seems to postpone the issue.9 It
is possible, I suggest, to understand efforts to fulfil a contract’s “spirit” as contributions
to a legitimate public good.
2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium Theories of Voluntary Provision
A specific example of voluntary provision of a public good became prominent by raising
difficulties for early Nash equilibrium theories. It is attributed to Kolm (1965), who
argued that “the definition of the optimal distribution of welfare does not result from
any value judgement made by the economist[, for he only] is an observer of citizens
value judgements and opinions, as he is an observer of their tastes concerning consumers
goods;” and that “the knowledge of these opinions presents exactly the same revelation
difficulties as that of the tastes for public goods.” In other words, if we start from the
premiss that redistribution levels are a common argument in individuals’ utility func-
tions, then legal redistribution schemes constitute institutional provisions of a public
good and charitable donations a volutary one. Following Sugden (1982), let me call
a public good theory of philantropy any account of voluntary contributions to charities in
which observed behavior is identified with the Nash outcome of a public good game.
A central feature of these theories was shown to be deeply problematic: the perfect
8The reason, economists suggest, is that every situation that involves a contract, the law, or a custom,
also involves transaction costs, and that these sometimes outweigh the benefits of contracting. Transaction
costs arise from unforseen contingencies, design costs, or implementation costs.
9It is always possible to find instances where players act without being observed.
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substituability, for every contributor, of gifts by others with her own gift.10 Under two
reasonable assumptions,11 perfect substituability was shown (i) to rule out the possibility
that large charities (e.g., the Red Cross) could exist (Sugden, 1982), (ii) to imply that
each Euro of tax-financed governmental contribution to a public goods will crowd-out
a Euro of private contributions (Warr, 1982; Bergstrom et al., 1986), and (iii) to imply
that, in large populations of heterogeneously endowed individuals, the proportion of
the population contributing to the public good decreases to zero: only the very richest
contribute (Andreoni, 1988).
A simple, ad hoc, way of escaping the puzzle was formalized by Andreoni (1989, 1990).
It consists in admitting that individuals are impure altruists, i.e., that it also matters to
them which amount they personally contribute to the public good. Call “warm-glow”
the influence that an actor’s personal contribution has on her utility function, net of the
impact it has through the induced increase in the amount of available public good. It
is possible to remove the ad hoc character of warm-glow theory by showing that such a
feature is a natural result of scientifically accepted features of human psychology. For
instance, a concern for social reputation or self-image (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006, 2011).
From this perspective, warm-glow theory brings about the desired outcome—imperfect
substituability between own gift and gifts by others—in a respectable way. Yet, there
are vantage points, too, from which warm-glaw theories are not entirely convincing.
Elster (2011) argues that acting out of a concern for self-image involves a form of self-
deception and that, as a consequence, warm-glow theories grounded in concerns for
self image cannot form convincing theories of rational behavior. His argument is best
conveyed by spelling-out a specific account of what it is, for an agent (person or group)
to have an intention. On Anscombe’s view (Anscombe, 1957), agent i intends to boost
her self-esteem if and only if: (i) she tries to carry out action a, (ii) agent i belongs to a
linguistic community in which action a can be taken to be a reliable symptom of “boosting
one’s self-esteem,” and (iii) upon proceeding, i practically knows12 action a under the
description “boosting my self-esteem.”
Now, assume agent i, by contributing a gift gi to the public good, intends to boost her self-
esteem. Then, Anscombe says, she must practically know her act of contributing a gift
10That is, if my utility function is measurable with respect to the quantities of public and private good I
consume, then any gift to the public good by another player entails the same gross benefits as a gift to the
public good I’d have made myself.
11That no contributor spends her entire income on the public good and that each of the public and
private goods is, to every participant, a normal good.
12It is a central feature of Anscombe’s view that an agent practically knows what she intends to do. In a
nutshell, this say that, upon acting intentionally, we do not know the state of affairs we try to bring about
through observation but, rather, we use an existing description of state of affairs, e.g. ‘boosting our self-
esteem,’ as a blueprint for our action. This form of knowledge gives an impression of groundlessness, unlike
when we or others get to know something as observers.
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under the description “boosting my self-esteem.” On the other hand, if her intention is
successfully carried out, she must also be taking her action to be a reliable symptom of her
moral skills. That is, she must observationally know her contribution under a description
of the form “a (morally) good action.” Self-deception, then, consists in the following
fact: agent i successfully intends to increase her self-esteem by contributing to a charity
if and only if the description under which she practically knows her contribution is
in conflict with the description under which she observationally knows it. Although
no such problem arises with warm-glow based on reputational concerns—reputational
warm-glow will occur whenever a similar conflict arises between agent i’s practical know-
ledge of her actions and other agents’ observational knowledge of them—the issue is
worth attention: not all situations are such that the agent can, by her deeds, affect her
reputation. In fact, Andreoni himself is not reluctant to associate warm-glow to an emo-
tional, as opposed to intentional, attitude. This is illustrated by his statements (Andreoni
et al. (2017), p. 627):
Psychologists posit that giving is initiated by a stimulus that elevates sym-
pathy or empathy in the mind of the potential giver, much as the smell of
freshly baked bread can pique appetite. Resolving this feeling comes either
by giving and feeling good or by not giving and feeling guilt.
I have argued in the introduction that cases of voluntary contributions to a charity are
different from cases of voluntary contributions to a legitimate public good. The claim
that, in the context of donations to charities, individuals act on their emotionans is credible
and has gained empirical support (Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002; Crumpler and Grossman,
2008; Ferguson et al., 2012). Nonetheless, this does not give a reason why every instance
of voluntary contributions to a public good should be best associated with warm glow.
In particular, it remains important to distinguish motives from the byproducts of an
action.13 In the sequel, I want to suggest that, in normal cirumstances, an individual’s
motive for contributing to a legitimate public good should be looked for in her sense for
collective rationality rather than in her emotions.
13From the general presence of positive and negative feelings in situations that invite individuals to
make a donation, one cannot infer that the motive with which one acts reduces to search or avoidance of
such feelings. When reacting to epicurean philosophies, Seneca (see Seneca (8 AD), Book IX) found a
poetical way to express this point: “ —‘But,’ says our adversary, ‘you yourself only practise virtue because
you hope to obtain some pleasure from it.’ —In the first place, even though virtue may afford us pleasure,
still we do not seek after her on that account: for she does not bestow this, but bestows this to boot, nor is
this the end for which she labours, but her labour wins this also, although it be directed to another end. As
in a tilled-field, when ploughed for corn, some flowers are found amongst it, and yet, though these posies
may charm the eye, all this labour was not spent in order to produce them–the man who sowed the field
had another object in view, he gained this over and above it–so pleasure is not the reward or the cause of
virtue, but comes in addition to it; nor do we choose virtue because she gives us pleasure, but she gives us
pleasure also if we choose her.” (Also quoted in Elster (2011), emphasis added.)
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2.2.3 Collective Intentions and Team Reasoning
Understanding which motives actually guide contributions to a public good, Sugden
argued, may demand from us to “drop the assumption of utility maximization” (see
Sugden (1982), p. 349). There are, to the best of my knowledge, two economic theories
of public good provision that do so: one is Sugden’s theory of moral reciprocity (Sugden,
1984); another is Roemer’s (normative) theory of Kantian behavior (Roemer, 2010, 2015).
The theory I present here constitutes a third alternative. I draw a distinction between
legitimate and non-legitimate public goods and suggest that, in the presence of a legiti-
mate public good, contributing individuals jointly commit to bring about an outcome
free from free riding. Call such a joint commitment a collective intention to steer clear of
free riding. Collective intentions are reminiscent of a distinction that was put forward by
Runciman and Sen (1965) in the analysis of prisonners’ dilemmas: Rousseau’s distinction
between the “general will” and the “will of all” (Rousseau, 1755, 1762).14 I do identify
collective intentions to steer clear of free riding with outcomes of a specific kind of com-
mitment by a general will. Namely, a commitment to bring about a minimal form of
common good: a public good provision process exempt of free riding. The notion of
collective intentions raises both scientific and philosophical concerns; I clarify these in
this section.
To start with scientific concerns; one may ask how, empirically, situations involving a
collective intention are distinct from situations involving a collection of individual inten-
tions. Such concerns can be met, for differences occur along two dimensions: a conceptual
one and an empirical one. To start with the former, call equilibrium path any collection of
mutually compatible contingent plans of actions and reasons for these plans. It is clear
that reasons that allude to a general will need not bring support to the same equilibrium
paths as those to which reasons that exclusively appeal to individual wills bring support.
For instance, if we take Pareto efficiency to be a necessary condition for identifying an
outcome with “the common good,15” then the exertion of the general will yields an
outcome on the Pareto frontier. This need not be true of the will of all which, as long
as individuals abide by Bayesian rationality, is bound to yield a correlated equilibrium
(Aumann, 1987).16 The second difference is empirical: reference to a general will allows
14Given a collection of individuals, the general will finds expression in a collective intention to bring
about the common good while the will of all amounts to every individual intending to bring about her
preferred state of affairs. Runciman and Sen suggest that, in a prisonners’ dilemma, a “conflict arises
between the will of all [all confess], they note, and the general will [noone confesses] [...] because of a
difference between the outcome of individual strategy and of enforced collusion.”
15In the sequel, I will not do so.
16This is precisely the point that Runciman and Sen made for the case of a prisonner’s dilemma.
Followers of Samuelson, eventually, will find this difference irrelevant. Indeed, for them, any meaningful
statement may constitute a reason for acting. If one accepts this contention, it does seem that every path
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to parsimoniously explain the the authority that individuals have when exerting of sys-
tems of demand-rights out of the equilibrium path. In the absence of a collective intention
there is no room, out of the equilibrium path, for one player to authoritatively demand
from another player that she changes her behavior. At best, one player will have the
standing to suggest another player that her action may not be in line with her preferences.
But the concerned player retains the authority to deny or confirm that suggestion. In
the presence of a collective intentions systems of demand-rights naturally arise because,
contrary to individual intentions, collective intentions may not be unilaterally rescinded.
The jointly committed players have an obligation to bring their actions in conformity
with the others’ normative expectations.
The second set of concerns is philosophical: it is not clear that the concept of intentions,
which, at first sight, involves mental states, can be applied to groups of individuals
without committing the user to a demanding ontological position. More precisely, an
answer must be given as regard to (i) the identity of the agent to which the collective
intention is attached and (ii) the ontological status of that subject. These concerns have
been partially answered in the literature. Rousseau suggests that the general will is the
will of a civic body, a “public person [...] formed by the union of all persons” (Rousseau
(1762), Book I, Chapter vi). But one does not have to look for remote philosophers. In
the area of modern analytical philosophy, Gilbert (1989, 1990) builds an anchor point for
Rousseau’s thought. She argues that the general will is the will of a “plural subject”
that cooperators have jointly agreed to constitute. And, importantly, her conclusion
does not amount to a claim about the actual existence of plural subjects. The reason
is twofold. First, in expressions of intentions, the pronouns ‘I’ or ‘we’ need not have a
referring use (Anscombe, 1975). One may, for instance, rather think of them as indexes
for the involved form of reasoning: individual or team. It is shown in Gold and Sugden
(2007) that, provided sufficient common knowledge conditions are fulfilled, there are
team reasoning schemata that can be expressed from the viewpoint of an individual
team member. Second—and this may be of help to circumvent demanding common
knowledge assumptions—the layman’s identification of intentions with causal mental
states, Anscombe (1957) showed, is flawed. Intentions conceived along Anscombian
lines, that is, intentions in action,17 may be fit for a use in the plural mode (Schmid, 2016,
2018).
singled out by collective reasons can equally be singled out by some collection of individual reasons. I
argue in Chapter 1 that it is not the case that any meaningful statement can constitute a reason for acting.
17See Chapter 1.
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2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Homogeneous, Linear Public Good Economies
An ‘economy,’ in the everyday use of the word, can be thought of as entailing a set I of n
individuals, a set W ≡ ×i∈IWi of individual endowments in inputs (a.k.a., resources) a
setX of conceivable outputs (a.k.a., goods), and, for each individual i in I , an individual
technology correspondence fi(·) and a preference function ui(·). The former maps input
quantities into a subset of the output space, fi(Wi), called individual i’s feasible output
set. The latter maps output vectors into R, individual i’s utility space. I the sequel, I
restrict the meaning of the word ‘economy’ to these very kinds of tuples, e ≡ 〈I,W,X,
(fi(·))i∈I , (ui(·))i∈I〉, and denote E the universe that contains all such possible economies.
I restrict my attention to a specific subset of this universe, namely, that of well-behaved,
homogenous and linear, public good economies, EPG.
Definition 2.1. (Well Behaved, Homogeneous, Linear Public Good Economies)
An economy e ≡ 〈I,W,X, (fi(·))i∈I , (ui(·))i∈I〉 is a member of EPG if and only if:
(i) W ≡ [0, w¯]n for some w¯ in R++;
(ii) X ≡ Rn+1+ and has typical element (x0, x1, · · · , xn);
(iii) fi(·) maps any element wi of [0, w¯] into the subset
fi(wi) ≡
{
(x0,i, xi) ∈ R2+ | xi + cix0,i = wi
},
where ci is an element of (1,+∞).
(iv) Given x0 ≡
∑
i∈I x0,i, there is an increasing, twice differentiable function u(·) from R2+ to
R such that, for all i in I and every x in Rn+1+ ,
ui(x) ≡ u(x0, xi).




Assumption (iv) captures the fact that x0 is a public good and that the xis are private
goods. The measurability restriction on u(·) rules out explicit concerns of an individual
for others’ private consumption levels. The second order condition focuses the analysis
on situations in which the public and private commodities are not substitutes. Two fur-
ther restrictions worth noting are those on individual endowments and utility functions:
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I assume they are homogeneous. There does remain a source of heterogeneity; namely, I
allow idiosyncracies in individuals’ productivites in providing the public good. Without
loss of generality, let individual indexes be such that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn.
For allw inW , f(w) ≡ ×i∈Ifi(wi) and x0 ≡
∑
i∈I x0,i jointly characterize the set of feasible
public and private good allocations feasible upon feeding inw to the production process.
Note that well-behaved public good economies allow for both wasteful allocations, i.e.,
alternatives in X \ f(w¯), and expropriative allocations, i.e., alternatives in which some
of the xi’s, i different from 0, are null. Whether or not such allocations are picked out
depends on the set of formal institutional rules that hold in economy e. Call any collection
of (i) a number of players, (ii) action sets (one per player), and (iii) preference functions
(one per player) a game. Conventionally, formal institutional rules are explicitely model-
led by the means of a game form: a function that maps the set of possible economies into a
set of possible games. I focus here on game forms which associate to every well behaved
public good economy what is commonly called a voluntary public good game.
Definition 2.2. (Voluntary Public Good Games)
For every economy e in EPG, a game form G(·) is said to define a voluntary public good game if
and only if G(e) ≡ 〈I, (Ai)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉 where, for all i in I ,
(i) Ai ≡ {(x0,i, xi) ∈ [0, w¯]2 | xi + cix0,i = w¯}, and
(ii) x0 ((x0,i)i∈I) =
∑
i∈I x0,i and, for all i in I and a in A ≡ ×iAi
ui(a) = u(x0, xi).
I denote GPG ≡ {G(e) : e ∈ EPG} the collection of all conceivable public good games in well
behaved, homoegeneous, linear public good economies.
In words, in a public good game, each individual i has full control over her endowment
w¯.18 She may use it to increase her private consumption xi or in order to make a gift x0,i
to the production of the public good x0. The actual cost of a gift x0,i to individual i, in
turn, faithfully reflects the production technology available to the individual.
2.3.2 Free-Riding: Nash Equilibrium Comparative Statics
I now consider an arbitrary economy e in EPG in which formal institutional rules define
a public good game G(e). A well-established assumption, in economics, is that neither
18The requirement that each individual budget constraint binds is without loss of generality in well
behaved public good economies.
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the specific aspects of the economy (e.g., the presence of a public good or not, its being a
substitute or a complement to private goods, etc.) nor the details of formally established
institutional rules (e.g., whether they define a public good game, whether there is a
possibility to exclude some individuals from consumption, etc.) are relevant to the deter-
mination of a rational individual’s rule of behavior in the game. Economists start from
the premise that rational individuals necessarily (or eventually) abide by Nash’s beha-
vioral postulates or, at any rate, that rationality commands them to do so. That is, each
player takes others’ behavior as given and, in response to it, selects the element in her
action set which maximizes her individual preferences. In a Nash equilibrium of a public
good game, therefore, each individual virtually solves a standard consumption problem





0,j denote the equilibrium provision of public good by players other than





subject to xi + cix0 = w¯ + cix−i,∗0
x0 ≥ x−i,∗0 , xi ≥ 0
A Nash equilibrium is an allocation x∗ in X such that, for every individual i in I , (x∗0, x∗i )
solves PNEi . Under the prevailing assumptions, a Nash equilibrium can be shown to exist
and be unique (Bergstrom et al., 1986). Following conventional uses of the term “free
rider,” as recorded in the Oxford Dictionaries, I suggest to formally define free riding as
follows:
Definition 2.3. (Free Rider)
For any given tuple (e,G(e)) in EPG ×GPG, we may fix a λe in R+ such that, in economy e and
game G(e), individual i is called a free rider at allocation x if and only if
x0,i ≡ w¯−xici < λen x0,
λe is called the standard of economy e in game G(e).
λe may be seen as marking out an informal, linguistic convention which prevails in eco-
nomy e and game G(e). λe = 1 corresponds to a case where all individuals with a
contribution lower than the average contribution are judged to be free riders. λe = 0
corresponds to a case where the free riding concept has no application. In numerous
situations, individuals seem to accept some degree of variation in objectively measured
individual contributions. This suggests a standard λe strictly smaller than unity. Con-
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versely, situations can be observed, too, in which individuals’ ability to accept choices
that differ from theirs shows limits. In such situations, the standard λe lies strictly above
it’s lower bond, 0. More generally, in the presence of a legitimate public good, if an
individual’s contribution is, for no observable reason, significantly lower than the average
contribution, a linguistic convention exists which entitles agents to call that individual a
free rider.
Now, concepts are devised and applied for a reason: they enable members of a linguistic
community to evaluate a situation and, if judged necessary, to consider alternative institu-
tional arrangements. If, in the presence of a public good, the occurence of free-riding is
taken to be a reliable signal of a deficient situation, one may expect that the setting up of
formal or informal institutional arrangements will depend on the number of free riders
in equilibrium. In this sense, a characterization of the situations in which we may expect
participants to come to a conclusion of deficiency, on the free-riding dimension, would
prove most useful. A preliminary observation suggests that heterogeneity in realized
cost types matters. Indeed, if there exists a c in (1,+∞) such that, for all i in I , ci equals c,
then all equilibrium contributions are identical, that is, there are no free riders. Therefore,
I define:
Definition 2.4. (Cost Homogenization)
Consider an economy e in EPG and let c denote the realized vector of cost types in e. Let α be an
element of [0, 1]. I call α-homogenization of c the vector of cost types c˜ such that c˜1 = c1 and,
for all i in I \ {1},
c˜i − c˜i−1 = α(ci − ci−1).
I callα-homogenization of e the economy e˜with cost type realization c˜ that is otherwise identically
equal to e.
General results on comparative statics prove hard to come by. But the following one
obtains:
Proposition 2.1. Let ECD denote the subset of EPG such that, for all e in EPG, individual
preferences can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Assume there is a λ in (0, 1]
such that, for every economy e in ECD, λe = λ. Starting from an economy e in ECD, the
equilibrium number of free riders remains unchanged or decreases whenever:
(i) w¯ decreases;
(ii) c homogeneously increases; or
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(iii) for α small enough, c is α-homogenized.
2.3.3 Systems of Demand-Rights and Joint Intentions
It is well known that, in the presence of a public good, Nash behavior is likely to bring
about an inefficient outcome. Inefficiences, when they come to be recognized, constitute
one reason why individuals think about amending the environment they face. The point
of the previous section was to show the following: there are situations such that, if
every individual abides by a personal commitment to bring about her most preferred
outcome, then, mechanically, a significant fraction of the players will be free riders. As I see
it, this constitutes an additional reason why individuals may wish to bring about policy
or cultural changes. Indeed, inefficiencies and the presence of free riding are distinct
phenomena. This may be seen by noting that Nash equilibria of public good games
without idiosyncracies are instances in which the first occurs but not the second. And
that an instance of the converse arises if I provide the Pareto optimal amount of public
good while you twiddle your thumbs. In the presence of free riding, therefore, we may
expect individuals to think about amending their environment. On the one hand, they
could adjust the rules of the game, that is, set-up a system of formal incentives. This is
the kind of procedures investigated in the instituional literature (Ostrom, 1990); I shall
not delve into these here. On the other hand, they could opt for jointly committing to act
as a body. In this essay, I am concerned with this second kind of procedures.
It is uncontroversial that individuals regularly impose constraints on their own behavior.
We call these personal commitments (of the will) or, more commonly, intentions. Joint
commitments are best understood when contrasted with personal commitments. For,
in a similar manner, “two or more people [can] impose [a] commitment on the same
two or more people– as one” (Gilbert (2015), p. 21). Call a joint commitment to act as a
body a joint intention. Two points are worth noting about them. First, it can be argued
that the use by individuals of a system of mutual demand-rights is a reliable symptom
of the presence of a joint intention (Gilbert, 1990). The reason is that joint intentions,
unlike personal ones, are mutually agreed upon. As a consequence, they may only be
multilateraly legitimately rescinded. So, in any given situation, a unilateral deviation
from a joint intention by one individual entitles conforming individuals to make use
of demand-rights and regulate her behavior. Second, when individuals jointly intend
to bring about some state of affairs, they no longer seek to conform their behavior to a
principle of individual rationality; rather, each is committed to do her bit in the collective
action in which she has engaged. This, eventually, raises a question: what does it mean
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for someone to be doing her bit? The answer will depend of the common goal that the
individuals set to themselves. I contend that, in the presence of a legitimate public good,
individuals jointly intend to steer clear of free riding.
To be precise, I contend that individuals, rather than committing to bringing about a
specific amount of public good provision or to bringing about a Pareto efficient outcome,
commit to adjust their behavior whenever the latter singles them out as free riders. Con-
sider a well defined public good economy e in EPG in which formal institutional rules
define a public good game, G(e).
Definition 2.5. (System of mutual demand rights)
A system of mutual demand-rights λ(·) is in place in economy e if and only if there exists a
map λ(·) from (1,+∞) in R+ such that, for all i and j in I with i different from j, if xi0 ≥ λ(ci)n x0
and xj0 < λ(cj)n x0, then i has a right to demand from j that she increases her effort, j recognizes
the legitimacy of this demand and corrects her behavior in such a way that she can no longer be
called a free rider.
If a realized allocation involves free riding, then implementing a demand-right once will
bring about an allocation in which one person among the free riders has increased her
contribution in such a way that, given other’s contributions, she may no longer be called a
free rider. If that person wasn’t the only free rider, then the system of demand rights still
has application. But even in the event that this person was the only free rider, the system
of demand right still may have application. Indeed, the increase in her contribution, by
raising the average, may affect the free riding status of individuals who, this far, wern’t
free riders. In fact, if there is a second free rider correcting her behavior, then the first free
rider’s adjustment will not be sufficient to maintain her ‘non-free riding’ status. She will,
once more, be subject to an obligation to correct her contribution. I call the generated
process an exhaustive implementation of the system of mutual demand-rights.
Note that, starting from an allocation x in X , the presence of a system of demand-rights
λ(·) induces a unique partition of the set I of players into two subsets, Iλ and I¯λ, such
that individual i is in Iλ if and only if an exhaustive implementation of individuals’
demand-rights would eventually oblige her, at some point, to alter her contribution. Call
every such individual an eventual free rider. It is natural to assume that, when judging
whether individual i’s move counts as a bit or not, what actually matters isn’t the starting
allocation but whether or not she is an eventual free rider.
Definition 2.6. (Doing one’s bit)
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For any given tuple (e,G(e)) in EPG×GPG, individual i is said to be doing her bit at allocation
x in X , in the presence of a system of mutual demand-rights λ(·) if and only if she isn’t an
eventual free rider.
2.4 Collective Equilibria
A legitimate exertion of a demand-right, eventually, brings about a change in the alloca-
tion that opened an opportunity for this exertion. It is natural, therefore, to identify such
events to equilibrium off-path behavior. Since (expectations about) off-path behavior
shapes on-path behavior, we may ask how equilibrium on-path behavior looks like in
the presence of a system of mutual demand-rights. I focus on a simple case: that of
cost-independent systems of demand rights. I show that, in this case, a specific form
of equilibrium behavior is salient; namely, one in which all players contribute identical
amounts to the public good. I further show that such systems of demand-rights are most
appropriate when the degree of heterogeneity across individuals remains limited.
2.4.1 Constant Collective Equilibria
Consider the case of a system of demand-rights λ(·) that is independent of individuals’
cost types realizations. That is, assume there exists a λ in [0, 1] such that, for all i in I ,
λ(ci) = λ. I shall refer to this system as the constant system of mutual demand-rights λ.
In the presence of a constant system of mutual demand-rights, doing one’s bit can be
characterized as follows:
Proposition 2.2. For any given tuple (e,G(e)) in EPG × GPG, individual i is doing her bit at







where I i− ≡ {i} ∪ {j ∈ I : x0,j < x0,i} and I i+ ≡ {j ∈ I : j 6= i, x0,j ≥ x0,i}.
To investigate stability considerations, it is helpful to consider a two stage process that
replicates the dynamics entailed by the exhaustive implementation of the constant system
of demand-rights. Assume that, in stage 1, each individual i in I can choose a quantity
x0,i to contribute to the public good and that, in stage 2, every individual has to consent or
(legitimately) complain. Also, assume that in the event that an individual has legitimately
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complained, the system of mutual demand-rights is put to work and all eventual free
riders are called upon to adjust their contributions. Let x denote the allocation reached
by the end of stage one and denote
k¯ ≡ arg max
k∈Iλ
x0,k,
the index of the highest contributor among eventual free riders. In the event of a second








if i ∈ Iλ
x0,i else
For any x in X , call x˜ the legitimate adjustment of x. A Constant Collective Equilibrium
(CCE) differs from a Nash equilibrium in essentially one aspect: individuals base their
considerations about whether or not they should deviate on different counterfactuals. More
precisely, when considering whether or not she has a reason to deviate, a rational indi-
vidual does not, as a Nash reasoner would, compare the prevailing allocation to the
one she would be bringing about by unilaterally deviating; rather, she compares the
prevailing allocation to the legitimate adjustment of the allocation she would be bringing
about by unilaterally deviating.19 This alternative counterfactual isn’t a piece of magical
thinking, but the necessary consequence individuals’ common knowledge of the presence
of a joint commitment to steer clear of free riding. In other aspects, the equilibrium
concepts are similar. In particular, an allocation marked out as ‘equilibrium’ is one in
which no individual has a reason to deviate. More formally:
Definition 2.7. (CCE – Constant Collective Equilibrium)
Fix a tuple (e,G(e)) in EPG×GPG. A Constant Collective Equilibrium (CCE) is an allocation
and constant system of mutual demand-rights pair (x∗, λ) in X × R+, such that, for all i in I ,








(ii) i does not have a reason to deviate, i.e., for all x0,i in [0, w¯],
19I am not the first one to suggest that Nash behavior need not constitute an adequate lense to understand
social behavior in the presence of a public good (see, in particular, Sugden (1982, 1984) and Roemer
(2010, 2015)). The solution concept I present here differ from theirs. Subsists the question whether or
not a scientific investigation can make use of alternative lenses. On that matter, I point out in Chapter 1
some flaws in what I take to be two important members of the set of rationales which entice economists
to understand Nash’s behavioral postulates along as if lines. For more authoritative criticisms of as if
interpretations of game theory, see e.g., Sen (1993, 1997) or Hausman (2011). For evidence that, in actual
practice, the as if interpretation does not prevail see, e.g., Coase (1982), McCloskey (1983), and Dietrich
and List (2016).











j∈I x˜0,j, w¯ − cix˜0,i
)
where x˜ ≡ (x˜0,i)i∈I is the legitimate adjustment of (x0,i, x∗0,−i).
I now show, for the case of two players, that a saliant CCE exists in which all individuals
are required to contribute the same amount and the quantity provided corresponds to
the one that maximizes the lowest cost individual’s preferences. Consider the repeated
game mentionned above. In stage 1, each of the two players decides how to allocate her
income between public and private consumption. In stage 2, each of the two players, after
observing the vector of first satge contributions, chooses between giving her consent (ct)
and complaining (ca). In the event that all players consent, the game stops. In the event
that one player complains, the legitimate adjustment of the first stage outcome is brought
about before the game stops: every individual who, according to first stage contributions,
is an eventual free rider, adjusts her contribution so as to meet her obligations. Once the
game has stopped, payoffs are realized. Formally, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, let
A1i ≡ {x0,i | x0,i ∈ R+}
A2i ≡ {ct, ca}
respectively characterize the first and second stage action spaces of each player. For each
i in {1, 2}, an element x0,i of A1i represents the amount of public good that individual i
offers to finance in the first stage.
I proceed by backward induction, that is, I first consider the second stage. At this point,
the realized vector of first stage contributions, x0 = (x0,1, x0,2), is observed and, given
some λ in [0, 1], both players are indifferent between complaining and consenting if and
only if





max {x0,i, x0,j} (2.1)
Indeed, only in such instances does x0 coincide with its legitimate adujstment. In other
instances, the player contributing the highest amount, say, player i, has an individually
rational incentive to complain; for, whenever
x0,i ≥ λ2−λx0,i > x0,j
the legitimate adjustment of x0, x˜0 = (x˜0,1, x˜0,2) is such that x˜0,i = x0,i and x˜0,j > x0,j .
We may now turn to the first stage and keep in mind that, in any equilibrium involving
consent by all players, the pair (x, λ) satisfies equation (2.1).
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In the first stage, given any contribution x0,j by player j, we can view player i as choosing
between two options:
(i) Play an adjusted Nash best response B˜Ri(x0,j) ≡ max{BRi(x0,j), λ2−λx0,j} to x0,j .
That is, Nash best respond as long as this does not lead to missing on one’s obli-
gations and, otherwise, merely abide by one’s obligations. This first stage strategy
yields her:
uB˜Ri (x0,j) = u (x0,j +BRi(x0,j), w − ciBRi(x0,j)) =: uBR(x0,j)
as long as BRi(x0,j) ≥ λ2−λx0,j and
uB˜Ri (x0,j) = u
(
2





(ii) Take the lead, that is, pick a contribution x¯0,j greater or equal to x0,j for player j,
contribute 2−λ
λ
x¯0,j , and complain in the second round to have player j abide by x¯0,j .
This first stage strategy yields her:




x¯0,j, w − ci 2−λλ x¯0,j
)
The next lemma states that it is individually rational for player i to base her choice between
the two strategies on a threshold.
Lemma 2.1. For any given λ in (0, 1], there exists a unique threshold xˆi0,j(λ) in R+ such that
player i strictly prefers taking the lead over playing her adjusted Nash best response if and only if
player j’s contribution, x0,j , is smaller than xˆi0,j(λ).
Denote x¯i,L0,j the unconstrained maximizer of the lead utility function.20 Intuition may be
gained by considering two facts. First, since best response contributions are decreasing
in the opponent’s gift, the relative cost of contributing 2−λ
λ
x¯i,L0,j , as opposed to one’s best
response, is increasing in the opponent’s gift. This obtains because x¯i,L0,j is independent of
x0,j , so that the difference between 2−λλ x¯
i,L
0,j and i’s Nash best response increases with
x0,j .21 Second, since selecting 2−λλ x¯
i,L
0,j over the Nash best response brings about a constant
contribution level on the part of j, x¯i,L0,j , the relative benefit of picking it, as opposed to
the Nash best response, is weakly decreasing in the opponent’s gift. Thus, when player
i’s opponent contributes little, player i’s best response is at it’s closest from 2−λ
λ
x¯i,L0,j ; she
20That is, disregarding the fact that, if i is to take the lead, x¯i,L0,j must be greater or equal to x0,j .
21If x0,j ≥ x¯i,L0,j , the contraint binds and the maximizer simply is x0,j itself. The identity map being
increasing, the logic still applies.
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is ready to pay the (relatively) small cost involved in picking it over her best response
because she gains a (relatively) large benefit from doing so. As the opponent’s contri-
bution increases, the gain she forgoes by not sticking to her best response increases and
the benefit from selecting 2−λ
λ
x¯i,L0,j weakly decreases. There comes a point when it is no
longer worth selecting it.
Proposition 2.3. For all i in {1, 2}, if λ = 1, then the unique eqilibrium has each of player 1 and
player 2 pick player 1’s most preferred leading provision quantity per player.
This result is intuitive enough. When λ = 1, each player is committed to do at least
as much as her co-player. Player 1 has the lowest costs, and, therefore, wants a higher
provision level than player 2. Therefore, unless player 2 contributes a half of that provision
level, player 1’s most prefered leading quantity, player 1 will take the lead and force her
hand.
Lemma 2.2. For all i in {1, 2}, there exists two thresholds, λ ≤ λ¯ < 1 such that,
(i) whenever λ ∈ [λ¯, 1), no pure strategy equilibrium exists;
(ii) whenever λ ∈ [0, λ], a unique pure strategy equilibrium exist and it is outcome equivalent
to a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2.2 shows in which sense the equilibrium with λ = 1 is “saliant.” In words,
it says that very specific circumstances need to be met for a constant system of mutual
demand-rights to bring about an outcome without free riding. Circumstances are met,
Proposition 2.3 shows, when the concept of free riding has application to all contributions
that lie below the average contribution (λ = 1). In this event, any player’s optimal leading
quantity, 2−λ
λ
x¯i,L0,j , coincides with its minimal acceptable response, x¯i,L0,j , as well as with the
minimal acceptable response to its minimal acceptable response, λ
2−λ x¯
i,L
0,j . A potential
leader, therefore, is indifferent between the first and the third options and she has no
incentives to deviate from her optimal leading quantity when player 2 follows. On the
contrary, circumstances arn’t met when λ is close to but smaller than 1. In the latter
case, going from one’s leading contribution, 2−λ
λ
x¯i,L0,j , to λ2−λ x¯
i,L
0,j , the minimal acceptable
response to x¯i,L0,j , brings about a decrease in the public good quantity and an increase
in private consumption that make player i better off, independently of her cost type ci.
Furthermore, if, on the contrary, λ is too small, then even Nash equilibrium contributions
are considered legitimate, and the system of demand-rights has nothing to contribute.
The last proposition of this section shows that the existence of the saliant equilibrium
2.4. Collective Equilibria 61
isn’t threatened by increases in the number of participants.
Proposition 2.4. For all i in I , if λ = 1, then the allocation at which each of player 1 to n pick
player 1’s most preferred leading provision quantity is a CCE.
2.4.2 Efficiency and Additive Collective Equilibria
What, concretely, is a mutual system of demand-rights? One possibiilty is conceive of
mutual systems of demand-rights as outcomes of what Buchanan named “constitutional
changes,” that is, changes in the “standards of conduct applicable to all members of the
social group” (Buchanan (1962), p. 342). Such a change, he argued, may be expected
to occur and last whenever its implementation is unanimously approved of by rational
individuals. In other words, when it brings about a Pareto improvement. We have seen
the kind of outcomes that constant systems of mutual demand rights are likely to bring
about. I now ask under which conditions such an outcome constitutes a Pareto impro-
vement over the Nash outcome.
Proposition 2.5. For every economy e in EPG, there exists a unique α¯ in (0, 1] such that, for
every α ≤ α¯, the α-homogeneization e˜ of e induces a game G(e˜) in which the salient CCE Pareto
dominates the Nash Equilibrium.
In words, while opting for a unitary λ guaranties that the joint intention will be brought
about, we may only expect a group of individuals to unanimously approve of a joint
commitment to steer clear of free riding when cost heterogeneities are relatively small.
Indeed, in the presence of large heterogeneities, high cost types would find themselves
worse off bringing their consent to a joint commitment that demands from each to con-
tribute as much as the lowest cost individual. The analysis does exclude the possibility
that, in general, systems of demand-rights arise in situations with reasonably high levels
of heterogeneity. Only, in such situations, these systems will have to be more elaborate.
The definition I gave of systems of demand-rights already suggests a possibility. Namely,
that demand rights be contingent on individuals’ relative contribution costs. Call a-
additive a system of mutual demand-rights that fulfills the following two conditions:
(i) For all i in I \ {n}, λ(ci) > λ(ci+1), and
(ii) ∑i∈I λ(ci) = a.
The next observation shows that, in the presence of two players, if the system of demand
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rights is 2-additive, then non-trivial leading equilibria exist in which high demands are
exerted on individual 2.
Observation 2.1. Consider some economy e in EPG with I = {1, 2} and an a-additive system
of demand-rights. Denote λ := λ(c2) ∈ (0, 1) and assume λ is close to but not equal to 1.
Demanding a = 2 sufficies to guaranty the existence of a leading equilibrium.
2.5 Conclusion
“In the name of God, Amen. We, whose names are underwritten, the Loyal Subjects of
our dread Sovereign Lord King James, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, &c. Having undertaken for the Glory of God, and
Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and Country, a Voyage
to plant the first Colony in the northern Parts of Virginia; Do by these Presents, solemnly
and mutually, in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves
together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furtherance of
the Ends aforesaid: And by Virtue hereof do enact, constitute, and frame, such just and
equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions, and Officers, from time to time, as shall
be thought most meet and convenient for the general Good of the Colony; unto which
we promise all due Submission and Obedience.22” Individuals, in their everyday life,
have opportunities to jointly agree to act as a body. It is not to be doubted that such
opportunities are seized, for instance, when two acquaintances go for a walk, engage in
a danse, or converse with one another. In this paper, I defend the view that individuals’
genuine attempts to unite their forces are not merely to be observed in familiar and
amicable environments, but also in economically relevant ones.
In relatively complex and anonymous situations, such as those involving many players
and a public good, a joint commitment to act as a body may be involved too. This is
shown by the fact that, in some such instances, participants to the situation use system
of demand-rights to check up on each others’ behavior. I call legitimate those public
goods which give rise to a systems of demand-rights. I conjecture that, in their presence,
individuals jointly intend to steer clear of free riding. The ambition of this essay, then,
was to describe the kind of individual commitments entailed by a joint intention to stear
clear of free riding as well as to delineate the type of situations which are likely to give
rise to a joint commitment. Situations with low and intermediate levels of heterogeneity,
22Mayflower Compact, signed aboard ship on November 21, 1620.
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I argue, are good candidates for a joint agreement. The former, despite their propensity
to bring about Nash equilibria exempt of free riding, are good candidates because a
joint agreement to steer clear of free riding brings about a Pareto improvements when
individuals are homogeneous enough. The latter because they tend to yield higher levels
of free riding than the former and still may, in the presence of a joint agreement, yield
an outcome that Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium. When heterogeneity is high,
equilibrium free riding is high and joint agreements are more complex to implement.
Despite higher costs involved, we might expect an institutional solution (Ostrom, 1990)
instead.
Chapter 3
Public Good Experiments: a Framing
Problem?
\[The general will] must be shown the good road it is in search of, secured from the seductive inuences of
individual wills [...] The individuals see the good they reject; the public wills the good it does not see."
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1762.
\[An] alternative is that giving is consistent with social norms about participation in social dilemmas.
[. . . ] Decay may simply represent the group's struggles to establish the norm."
James Andreoni, Why Free Ride?, Journal of Public Economics, 1988.
3.1 Introduction
An economist willing to follow the official methodological standards of her field, those
of revealed preference theory, will make sure to identify individual choices with the
satisfaction of individual wants and to remain agnostic about the contents of these wants.
She will only express statements about wants which are reducible to observation state-
ments1 and, upon request, may justify her deeds by arguing that, in the realm of science,
preference maximization ought to be understood in an “as if” sense. In previous chapters,
I argued that the reasons which confine scientists to the “as if” reading of preference
1By observation statements I mean statements about observable physical phenomena. For instance,
statements to the effect that an individual “prefers x over y” are conventionally reduced to observation
statements about physical choices: she chooses x when both x and y are available.
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maximization are unsound, and that, when the interactive situation under study involves
a legitimate public good, the revealed preference paradigm does not flatten but steepens
the hurdle faced by scientific analysis. Indeed, in the presence of a legitimate public
good, it is common knowledge that the absence of free riding is necessary to achieve the
common good and, for this reason, individuals carry out a collective intention to steer
clear of free riding. In this chapter, I consider public good game experiments, which I
take to be situations involving a public good whose status falls short of legitimacy. In
such situations, too, it is an empirical question whether all individuals follow principles
of individual rationality, i.e., maximize their preferences, or whether they abide by a
different kind of rationale.
From the physical standpoint, games involve individuals, their available movements, and
a set of possible physical consequences. Call interactive situation any such collection of
individuals, movements, and physical consequences. When involved in an interactive
situation, individuals do not apprehend it from the physical standpoint. They ascribe
an overarching goal to the situation and they take each involved player to be not merely
‘moving’ but to be acting intentionally, that is, with a view to make some description of the
situation come true. In her seminal contribution to the philosophy of action, Anscombe
(1957) defends the view that our descriptions of intentional actions neither are expressed
in the language of physics nor need be reducible to this language.2 We consider such
events, she suggests, from a teleological standpoint, i.e., we identify involved individuals
with goal directed agents and identify their actions with reasons for acting. In the presence
of linguistic conventions, the set of teleological descriptions which may apply to a given
situation is finite. As a consequence, it can be argued that participants know something
about each other’s possible intentions and that, against the contentions of revealed pre-
ference theorists, an objective distinction can be made between interactive situation and
their induced game—by which I mean, the induced teleological description of the situation
by individuals.
Now, the possibility to draw a distinction between an interactive situation and its induced
game does not, by itself, give a reason for drawing it. In situations such as one of bilateral
trade, where it is common knowledge that all individuals abide by the principles of
preference maximization, disregarding the interactive situation and directly setting the
analysis at the level of the game appears to be a sensible choice. But it may not be so
when we consider public good game experiments; for two reasons. First, public good
2“Consider a question ‘What is the stove doing?’, with the answer ‘Burning well’ and a question ‘What
is Smith doing?’ with the answer ‘Resting.’ Would not a parallel answer about Smith really be ‘breathing
steadily’ or perhaps ‘lying extended on a bed’?” Anscombe (1957), §43, emphasis in the text. See also
Anscombe (1958).
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experiments constitute, by design, artificial situations. This decreases the likeliness that
individuals share a common interpretation of the situation, as they often do in familiar
environments. For instance, there is some evidence that, in the case of asymmetric public
good games, normative expectations about individual behavior do not make up a social
norm (Spiller et al., 2016). Second, while public good experiments give individuals an
opportunity to act more or less ‘cooperatively’—each individual can unilaterally increase
the amount of available public good at the expense of his own stock of private goods—,
it is not immediately clear what the meaning of acting ‘cooperatively’ is, nor whether
individuals share a view on that matter or not. In this chapter, I ascribe a very loose
meaning to the word cooperating, allow for variations in this meaning across individuals
and consider the eventuality that some choose to cooperate while others choose to act
individually.
Early theories on the voluntary provision of public goods sought to reduce statements
about a potential contributor’s wants to statements about (i) the amounts of public and
private goods available to him and (ii) the marginal transformation rate characterizing
the technology structure. These approaches failed (Ledyard, 1995). A significant fraction
of the more recent literature on public good games sticks to the revealed preferences
paradigm. That is, only physical quantities are allowed in the domain of agents’ preferen-
ces and it is still taken for granted that cooperation should be reduced to preference
maximizing behavior. Within this part of the literature, fruitful alternatives arise from
extentions of the domain of individual preferences: the possibility is considered that
individuals may value physical quantities that have to do with others’—as opposed to
only their own—well being. Various extensions in the domain of individual preferences
have been investigated. Distributional and other-regarding preferences, for instance,
exploit the entire allocation of private goods among players, as opposed to a player’s
individual allocation. Theories of reciprocity take advantage of the fact that players may
know each others’ action space, they relax the assumption that individual preferences
be measurable with respect to realized actions only. Each of these alternatives perform
better than traditional, self-regarding preferences. But none of them yields a satisfactory
account on its own (Chaudhuri, 2011). Most recent studies along these lines assume
heterogeneous populations, i.e., populations of players with differing preference patterns.
These recent developments suggest an alternative possibility. Namely, that, in the context
of public good experiments, players do not share a common view regarding the meaning
of ‘cooperating.’ Each individual tags her own and others contributions with one of
two labels: cooperative or non-cooperative, but not all use the exact same rule to do so. In
the event that some player tags another player’s contribution with the label cooperative,
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she views the agent who performed it as a member of the cooperators’ team: someone
who does her bit. In the other event, she judges the agent who performed the action to
be a non-cooperator: someone who reasons strategically. In equilibrium, contributions
by each player are performed with a trade-off in mind, that between fostering one’s
objective, whether collective or individual, and inducing a belief concerning whether she
is a team reasoner or a strategic player. The cost of inducing such beliefs is endogenously
determined, it coincides with that of the cheapest deviation from one’s optimal static
play. This ensures that communication, beyond being meaningful, is credible. At the
end of every period, after disclosure of information, each player can distinguish between
the intention driving optimal static play and deviations away from it. She updates her
beliefs about the share of collective reasoners in consequence.
3.2 Related Literature
3.2.1 Public Good Games
Call parametrization of a public good game a specification of the number of players, the
number of repetitions, the individual endowments in private good, as well as the infor-
mation availbale at every point in time to each individual. Call design of a public good
game a specification of the strategy space and of a map from strategy profiles to individual
allocations in public and private goods. A reason why choices in public good games are
difficult to explain is their high sensibility to variations in the parametrization or design
of the game. Standard parametrization involve ten repetitions, four players, identical
endowments, and feedback about aggregate contributions at the end of every repetition.
Standard designs involve a constant marginal per capita return of the public good below
the price of private consumption, yet such that the aggregate return is larger than the per
capita return of private consumption.3 Important stylized facts include: (1) a gradual
decrease of average contributions from 40% – 60% in the first period to 20% – 30% in
the last one; (2) considerable variation in contributions across individuals and across
repetitions. Some contribute all, some nothing, some contribution patterns are monotonic,
others not.
Variations in the parametrization and design of public good games have been investi-
gated as well. Several conclusions were drawn; these constitute additional stilized facts.
3Here and in the sequel, the aggregate return refers to the marginal per capita return multiplied by the
number of players. Thus, the benchmark specification is such that a trade-off exists between individual
wills and the general will. Investing in the private good is individually efficient but collectively inefficient,
the converse is true of investments in the public good.
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Firstly, average contributions are increasing in (a) the marginal per capita return of the
public good, (b) the number of players, (c) opprotunities for the players to communicate,
and (d) opportunities for the players to punish each other. Yet they need not increase
with (e) individual endowments. Variations in (a) and (b) seem to operate only up to
a limit (Laury and Holt, 2008), which suggests that at least a fraction of the population
neither abides by other-regarding motives nor seeks to cooperate. Variations in (c) and
(d) induce more substantial effects. They can lead to very high contribution rates and
even reverse the declining trend described in stylized fact (1) (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
This suggests that information asymmetries might impede coordination and that non-
coordinators can be effectively disciplined. Secondly, sorting players into (random) gr-
oups has been shown to increase intra-group contributions. The effect is of particular
interest for this paper, since it does suggest a link between contributions and players’
ability to identify with a group as opposed to identifying with one’s individual-self.
Thirdly, in the event of an unexpected restart of play at the end of the initially specified
number of repetitions, average contributions jump back from low last period levels to
higher first period levels. This is known as the restart effect.
Usual explanations for these stylized facts identify them to outcomes of a simultaneous
exertion of individual wants. But not any kind of wants: wants that are measurable
with respect to variations in physical outcomes. In other words, a postulate is made that
individuals act as if they were concerned exclusively with physical outcomes and employ
the means necessary to bring about those outcomes which they judge desirable. When
the situation is thought to be a familiar one, the simultaneous exertion of individual
wants takes the form of a Nash equilibrium. Else, modellers favor uncoupled learning
processes, i.e., learning processes in which each individual’s learning rule is independent
of the payoff function of other individuals (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2003). A successful
model, along these lines, amounts to specifying simple individual preferences which,
together with the chosen solution concept, predict observed play. Several such specifi-
cations have been suggested and tested. Selfish preferences postulate that an individual’s
ranking of outcomes is invariant with respect to all physical variables apart from own
private and public consumptions, in which it is increasing. Distributional preferences (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) suggest that individuals seek a balanced
trade-off between maximized individual material payoff and minimized spread of the
overall payoff distribution. Social welfare preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002) attribute
altruistic motives to individuals, the utilities of which are monotonically increasing in
everyone’s consumption levels.
While none of these preference patterns fully explain observed stylized facts, they can
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be ranked according to their performance in that dimension (Chaudhuri, 2011). Selfish
preferences were tested first and are those which perform the worst. For instance, they
fail to explain the persistence of significant contributions in repeated experiments, and,
in particular, of those observed in the last period of the game (see, e.g., Ledyard (1995)
for an assessment of the failure, and Andreoni and Croson (2008) for mixed evidence on
the role of reputation effects in repeated games4). Distributional preferences and social
welfare preferences perform better. Each provide a simple and natural rationale for the
persistence of significant contributions. But the former fails to explain behavior in games
where individuals are heterogeneously endowed, because richer players do not appear
to contribute more than others (Buckley and Croson, 2006)). And the latter, besides
seeming to be informationally very demanding, have been statistically rejected in some
experiments (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997). As a consequence, most recent approaches
drop the assumption that all individuals share a single motive. Arifovic and Ledyard
(2012), for instance, provide an explanation of conditional cooperation using a learning
model with some selfish individuals and some individuals with distributional concerns.
All approaches mentioned so far share the assumption that players act in accordance
with individual and instrumental rationales. Taking note of the difficulties faced by these
approaches, some have considered the possibility of integrating procedural aspects into
preferences. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Ambrus and Pathak (2011), for instance,
suggest that reciprocity can explain much of the experimental evidence from public good
games. Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) look at repeated prisonners’ dilemmas and
build a model of rational cooperation between two individuals with an arbitrarily small
preference for the cooperative action. The work I present here pertains to an alternative
tradition, one which seeks the solution in alterations of the individual character of the
rationales followed by individuals.5 Harsanyi (1982), for instance, considers what hap-
pens when individuals follow a rule-utilitarian rationale. Sugden (1984) develops a
model of moral reciprocity, and Roemer (2010, 2015) one of Kantian optimization. An
ambition in writing this esssay is to take into account the fact that, independently of the
exact collective rationale that they follow, individuals can be seen as tagging observed
contributions with either of the ‘cooperative’ or ‘non-cooperative’ labels. Since, even-
tually, they will do so slightly differently, the model should also take this into account.
4At any rate, in finitely repeated games, reputation building effects either requires a population with
mixed motives or a population with boundedly rational agents (Kreps et al., 1982).
5“ To construct an acceptable theory of philantropy one must [...] jettison one of the three [neo-
classical] assumptions [...]: publicness, utility maximization and Nash conjectures. [...] The one I believe
the most promising is to drop the assumption of utility maximization.” (Sugden, 1982). “I propose that we
can explain cooperation by observing that players may be optimizing in a non-classical (that is, non-Nash)
manner.” (Roemer, 2015)
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3.2.2 Team Reasoning
Game theory is concerned with the analysis of events involving several individuals, va-
rious action possibilities for each individual, and physical outcomes ensuing from each
action profile realization. I call the collection of these physical entities and of the map
from action profiles to physical outcomes an interactive situation. An interactive situation
is not only described by scientists, but also by the individuals taking part in it. I call game a
redescription of the interactive situation in terms of the number of involved agents (a.k.a.,
players), their respective set of available intentional actions, and the map from action
profiles to the agents respective payoffs. Agents (a.k.a., players) are not physical entities
but conceptual ones. They are the entities which reason as a single body. Intentional
actions, similarly, are not mere physical motions, but means to get a description come
true. Finally, and more conventionally, payoffs do not stand for physical utilities neither,
they represent individual wants. A game, in this sense, is a framed description of some
interactive situation. In a frame, several individuals may be described as one or several
agent, several action possibilities may be identified with one or several intentional actions,
and physical outcomes are judged along a value scheme.
The account of games as framed descriptions raises at least three questions. First, what
kind of objects are frames? Second, what are the reasons that a rational player could have
to endorse a specific frame? Third, which type of frames are empirically relevant? The first
and second questions reach beyond the scope of this literature review, I touched upon
them in the first chapter of this work and will here deal with them very briefly. Rational
individuals, when reasoning about occuring events, do so by placing them into a coherent
network of concepts. In the absence of a logically prior mode of reasoning, this ‘placing’
is, arguably, a matter of choosing one network over another. A frame is just one such
conceptual network, it is a lense through which the situation is perceived. There is one
prominent reason why rational individuals may be willing to endorse one frame but not
another. Frames may be judicious in one type of situation but not in another, exactly in
the same way that geometrical analysis is convenient for low dimensional problems of
analysis but must give place to functional analysis in problems involving a high number
of dimensions.6 As Bacharach puts it, “we might call a mode of reasoning in games valid
if it is ‘success promoting’: given any game of some very broad class, it yields only choices
which tend to produce success, as measured by game payoffs” (Bacharach (2006), p. 8).
6I do not intend to say that such association of descriptions to events is conscious, only that, at some
level, it must take place since it is our only way to rationally grasp events. In this respect, I find noteworthy
that we often seem to give much thoughts to unfamiliar situations and very little to familiar ones. In the
first case, it may not yet be clear which conceptual lense will yield a sensible outcome for dealing with the
situation. In the second case, we might have already settled for a lense.
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The theory of team reasoning is about explicitly formalizing a type of frame which, some
argue (see, in particular, Sugden (1993) and Bacharach Bacharach (2006)), is valid for
social dilemmas and problems of coordination. Bacharach (2006) suggests the following
informal definition: “Roughly, somebody ‘team reasons’ if she works out the best feasible combi-
nations of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.” According to these
words, team reasoning is about framing the interactive situation from a specific vantage
point: that of a team. It is about giving priority to answers to the question “What should
we do?” over answers to the question “What should I do?” Consider, for instance, the
following interactive situation. You and I live under the same roof and must deal with the
house-chores. There are 2 individuals and the range of physical actions to be undertaken
for the chores to be done can be described, say, by a continuum from 0 (no involvment)
to 1 (full involvment). Finally, the range of possible physical outcomes may also be
described by a continuum from 0 (untidy) to 1 (tidy). For simplicity, let us assume that,
independently of the reasoning mode, individuals frame the action sets as a binary set:
{Do,Don’t}. A stand must be taken with respect to the way individuals are framed and
outcomes assessed. An account following revealed preference could look like this:
Do Don’t
Do 2, 2 0, 0
Don’t 0, 0 1, 1
On this account, you and I are two independent players, say, player 1 and 2 respectively.
From your standpoint, the event where chores are done is preferable to the event in
which they are not if and only if the burden of cleaning isn’t carried by only one of the
two individuals. Each of the two events involving an unfair allocation of the burden of
cleaing belongs to the set of your least prefered events. From my standpoint, a symetric
ordinal ranking is observed. When each of us reason individually, two action profiles are
rational, (Do,Do) or (Don’t,Don’t), but no normative account can say which one of the
two ought to be chosen.
If the situation is framed from the team’s point of view, two differences occur. First, you
and I no longer are independent players, but members of a team, say, member 1 and
member 2. Second, events (i.e., action profile realizations) are no longer described by
their consequences for us qua individuals, but are described by their consequences for
the team. That is, a judgement is passed with regard to the desirability of each respective
event for the team. Assuming that the team identifies the desirability of an event with its
Pareto efficiency, the following table represents a team reasoning frame for this situation:
(Do,Do) (Do,Don’t) (Don’t,Do) (Don’t,Don’t)
2 1 0 0
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From the point of view of the team, there is a unique maximizer: (Do,Do). This unique
maximizer is the rational outcome prescribed by team reasoning. Each of us reason as
a member of the team and, in consequence, perform the action which he has to perform
for the team to be best off. That is, we share the burden of doing the house-chores.7
The above example is ideal in two regards: (i) given aligned interests, Pareto efficiency
constitutes a salient objective for the team; and (ii) to compute the best feasible combi-
nation of actions for the team, any player must know the other player’s preferences. The
first point remains valid in public good experiments; the second not. In fact, the second
point might be a reason why, so far, the literature on team reasoning has, to the best of my
knowledge, focused on small population cooperation games with complete information
(Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hi-Lo game). Here lies a distinction between my work and the
existing literature. I analyse the possibility of extending the theory of team reasoning to
more anonymous situations. For instance, situations with large populations or assymetric
information. In particular, I ask how team reasonners would act in a context of public
good provision, and whether team reasoners would act in ways which match the stylized
facts registered by the experimental litterature on public goods provision.
3.3 The Model
Public good games, I argued, are framed descriptions of interactive situations. In this
section, I formalize this statement. An interactive situation is a possible physical situation
involving more than one individual. Let I be the collection of all possible interactive
situations, I denote:
I ≡ {ι = (I, A,X, g)}
where an interactive situation, ι, is characterized by the number of involved individuals,
I , the physical action space, A, the set of physical consequences X , and a mechanism,
g : A→ X , that maps realized action profiles into consequences.
Rather than physically describing the interactive situation they are involved in, indivi-
duals use teleological forms of description for it. That is, they describe it in terms of a
game and a solution concept, which, together, conceptualize the situation from a specific
vantage point: the end which they have ascribed to it. The collection of all teleological
forms of descriptions constitutes a language, which I denote L. Formally:
7The curious reader may ask what distinguishes team reasoning from altruism. The difference has been
clearly established in the literature (Sugden, 1993). It suffices to note that adding up the respective payoffs
while keeping the individual point of view (i.e., Nash reasoning) would be of no help in the coordination
problem illustrated by the first table.
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L ≡ Γ×Φ ≡ {G = (NG, SG,ΘG, (pin)NGn=1), (un)NGn=1)} × {φ : Γ→ ∪G∈Γ2SG , ∀G, φ(G) ∈ SG}
A game,G, consists of a set of players,NG, a strategy space, SG, a type space, ΘG, a collection
of prior beliefs about type profile realizations, (pin)NGn=1, and a collection of payoff func-
tions, (un)NGn=1. A solution concept, φ, maps games into subsets of their strategy profiles.
Rational individuals may not use language in an arbitrary way. Their may only endorse
a form of description that has legal tender in the linguistic communities to which they
belong. Call the act of ascribing to an interactive situation ι a teleological description that
has legal tender in some linguistic community a framing of that situation. Denote Λ the
collection of all possible framings, we have
Λ ≡ {λ : I → L}.
In words, a framing, λ, maps the interactive situation into a linguistic frame. This frame
entails both the game and its solution concept. Because the solution concept embodies a
specific end, the frame constitutes a teleological description of the situation.
At last, individuals peform intentional actions, that is, they (attempt to) carry out physical
movements of which they can assert, given the framing they endorse, that they are in
accordance with the solution of the game they have framed. I Denote
Σ ≡ {σ : ∪G∈Γ2SG → ∆(A)}
the set of (possibly stochastic) maps from solution sets to performances, and call any
element σ of that set an implementation policy. To summarize, when facing an interactive
situation, a rational individual frames that situation into a game and a solution concept
using a conventional framing she masters. Rationality, finally, commands her to imple-
ment the solution dictated by the solution concept. I now parametrize each of these
elements so as to fit the kind of situation under analysis: public good experiments.
3.3.1 Interactive Situation
The interactive situation, ι, specifies commonly known physical facts which obtain in the
considered situation. These entail the number of individuals, the set of physical actions
available to each player, the set of possible physical consequences, and the map from
physical actions to physical outcomes. I formalize situations involving a public good as
ι = (I, A,X, g),
where I denotes both the number and the set of participating individuals, A ≡ ×iAi ≡
[0, w]I , the set of physical actions available to all players, and X ≡ RI+1+ the physical
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outcome space. That is, I assume that, for all i in I , Ai ≡ [0, w], where w ∈ R+ and
that X is an I + 1-dimensional real vector space. The interpretation is that each Ai
corresponds to individual i’s initial endowment in private good, that all individuals are
equally endowed, and that outcomes coincide with the possible allocations of public
and private good. Denote x = (x0, x1, ..., xn) a characteristic element of X , then x0 refers
to the amount of public good provided and, for each individual i, xi is the amount of
private good left in his stock. Finally, the mechanism, g, describes the explicit set of
rules by which participants to the interactive situation have to abide. Some rules are
physical constraints, others are consequences of regulations in place. I focus on linear
and voluntary provision mechanisms, that is, mechanisms of the form
g : A× R+ → X





ai , (w − ai)Ii=1
)
In words, each individual is free to decide which part of his stock to allocate to private
consumption and which part to use as a contribution to the public good. The public
good production technology is linear, with a marginal rate of transformation equal to
M . Much data has been collected in these environments. Stylized facts mentioned above
are from such environments.
3.3.2 Game and Solution Concept
When describing the occuring physical events, rational participants in an interactive
situation abide by preestablished linguistic conventions. Their descriptions of the situa-
tion constitute a frame that they can use as a basis for reasoning. Game theorists usually
draw a distinction between two elements of a framed description of the interaction: the
game, and the solution concept. As already mentionned, the game is constituted by a
description of the players as well as their respective strategy sets and preferences, that
is, value judgements over physical outcomes. The solution concept is a specification of
‘the point of the game,’ that is, of the set of motives that agents may have upon entering
the game. Thereby, it singles out, for every game, a set of strategy profiles which are in
line with it.8
8I do not consider the game to be logically prior to the solution concept. Rather, both are logical pars
which must guaranty the existence of a solution, that is, an end, for the game. For a justification of this
view, see Chapter 1. One way to gain intuition is by considering card games. In a card game, (associations
of) players, possible strategies, and payoffs cannot be specified independently of the overarching goal of
the game, and vice versa. For instance, in a 4 participants Bridge, the 4 individuals must form 2 teams of
2, each acting as single players. Conversely, in any cut-throat game each individual is a single player and
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I consider a situation in which all players describe the situation using the same stage
game and solution concept. In the present case, the considered stage game is a tuple
G = (N,S,Θ, pi, (un)Nn=1)
whereN ≡ {1, ..., N} denotes both the number and the set of players, that is, associations
of individuals, S ≡ ×n∈NSn denotes the strategy space, that is, the respective actions
which a player could justifiably implement. Θ denotes the type space and pi ∈ ∆(Θ) a
common prior over Θ. Finally, un denotes each player’s respective comparative evaluation
of the outcomes.
It is easiest to start the explicit description of the game with that of Θ, its type space. I
interpret the type space as the set of possible associations of players. More precisely, a
type ascribed to an individual correspond to one of two roles which the individual may
take in the game: that of a strategic player or that of a team member. All team members
act as a body and, as a consequence, form a single player. Call this player the team player.
Each strategic player is a separate additional player. Formally, I assume Θ ≡ ×i∈I{0, 1} ≡
{0, 1}I , where an individual has type 0 if he is a team member and 1 if he is a strategic
player. The common prior, pi, therefore, is a probability distribution over a product
space. I assume that types are identically and independently distributed, that is, pi is
a product probability measure of a single probability distribution over {0, 1} which, for
convenience, I denote pi0.9
Coming to N , the set and number of players. Any θ ∈ Θ can be associated with a
diagonal I × I-matrix with binary entries Dθ ≡ (di,i = θi)i∈I . The product of the vector
of individual indexes with this matrix forms an intermediary vector of player indexes,
N˜θ in {0} ∪ I . In this vector, team reasoners are ascribed a new ‘identity,’ index 0, and
strategic reasoners preserve their individual identity, index i. Denote n(θ, i) ≡ rk(N˜i)
the rank of the ith component of N˜θ in ascending order. Then N , the set of players in
the game, is identified with {(n(θ, i))i∈I}. Regarding the strategy space, S, I assume that
each player can choose between contributing or not to the financing of the public good.
Formally, S ≡ {0, 1}N . But not every player’s contribution has the same impact on the
amount of public good provided. Whenever the team is of size I1, it’s contribution is I1
times more efficient than a contribution by any of the individual players.
This fact is reflected in the payoff structure. Each player n in N disposes of a payoff
function un. A player’s payoff function represents comparative evaluation of all possible
act as such. Not all game-motives combinations are compatible with the existence of a coherent end. For
instance, one which specifies teams but requires from each individual that he should never do his bit for
the team is self-contradictory.
9To carry on the parallel with cards game, types are, in general, distributed according to a degenerate
prior, as when David and Rudolf are said to make up one team and Gertrude and Ludwig another.
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strategy profiles from that player’s point of view. A comparative evaluation is a value judg-
ment, it orders every strategy profile according to its alignment with certain values. The
values which matter are embodied in a payoff function. To say that a team player disposes
of a payoff function, therefore, simply amounts to saying that, from a team’s point of
view, some strategy profiles are judged more or less valuable than others. Denote I1 the
set and number of individuals i such that θi = 0 (and, therefore, n(θ, i) = 1). I assume
the following:
Assumption 3.1. For all n in N , un(·) maps any (s, θ) in S ×Θ into[
M
(∑





Note that if each team member were assigned a payoff function similar to that of a strategic
player, then the payoff function of the team would be a positive linear transformation
of the utilitarian sum of its members’ respective utilities.10 Finally, the framed solution
concept is a conventional Bayesian Nash equilibrium, but should be understood as a
prescriptive concept rather than a positive one. That is, a solution concept for the stage
game is a map from the framed game to its set of rational strategy profiles, rather than a
map from the game to the set of physical action profiles.
Definition 3.1. A prescription of the stage game is a strategy profile
(s∗i )i∈I ∈ {0, 1}I
such that, for all i in I and all θ in Θ,
s∗i ≡ s∗n(θ,i)















In words, every strategic reasoner i identifies herself to a strategic player n(θ, i) 6= 1. A
strategic player takes as given other players’ moves, s−n(θ,i), and selects in response the
strategy sn(θ,i) in Sn(θ,i) which, in expectation, is in line with her values. In this sense,
an equilibrium strategy of a strategic player constitutes a prescription which a strategic
reasoner ought to follow. A team reasoner, instead, identifies with the team player. The
team player takes as given other players’ moves, s−1, and selects in response strategy
s1 in S1 which, in expectation, is in line with it’s values. The team player’s equilibrium
10Considering this transformation rather than the sum does not affect orderings of the team, which is
what matters for decisions in games. It entails benefits for both calculus and exposition.
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strategy constitutes a prescription that each team reasoner ought to follow. Expectations
are needed because the realized size of the team is unknown to all players, team player
included. It is important to note the prescriptive interpretation: the solution concept does
not signle out a subset of physical action profiles, but a subset of intention profiles. If the
point of the game is to be fulfilled, individuals ought to carry out physical movements
that are in line with the blueprints formed by a selected intention profile.11 Which action
counts as fullfiling such intentions is a linguistic, as opposed to game theoretic, question.
I turn to it now.
3.3.3 Idiosyncracies in Individual Framings
I assume that, in a public good experiment, the fact that the situation is framed using
the above mentioned games and solution concept is common knowledge among rational
individuals. The fact that individual descriptions of the situation share a common form,
however, does not entail that each event will be interpreted in just the same way by all
individuals. In particular, each individual’s framing specifies the detailed fashion in
which an individual maps physical events into conceptual events and vice versa. Denote
Λ the set of all possible framings for the situation at hand, that is, the set of all possible
maps between interactive situations referred to as public good experiments and the outli-
ned game–solution-concept pair. Denote λi the element of Λ which represents individual
i’s framing. Individual λ’s are identical with respect to all but one dimension. Namely,
individuals idiosyncratically tag realized contributions with one of two labels: cooperative
or non-cooperative. Non-cooperative contributions are those that fall below individual i’s
threshold wλi in [0, w], cooperative contributions are those which lie above individual i’s
threshold.
Assumption 3.2. For all i in I , after any realized action profile, the function λi maps, any aj
into {0, 1} according to the following rule:
aj 7→
0 if aj ≤ wλi ,1 else.
In words, individual framings differ in only one aspect: the precise way in which it
is assessed whether an action counts as ‘contributing’ or not. Differences in language
types, wλi , captures the eventual variety in individuals’ idea of “cooperation.” Such
11Prior to the framing process, naturally, all individuals are free to act as they please, it is no longer
so once every individual has endorsed a frame. At this stage, rational agents do have rational obligations
derivative of their framing of the situation.
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differences may be the reasult of a disagreement with regard to the obligations entailed
by a commitment to cooperate. Maybe some individuals like to “take it easy,” but others
do not. Or they could have to do with the individuals personal characteristics. For
instance, individuals may exhibit different degrees of risk aversion and, given the un-
known size of the team, perceive the actual contribution cost differently. Combining
the two, individuals could be more or less tolerant towards perceptual differences too.
The point of the model is to remain agnostic in this respect. Intuitively, differences in
framing may matter twice. First, in the performance stage, where individuals implement
the solution they have framed. Second, in the updating process that will occur once the
game will be transformed into a finitly repeated game.
3.3.4 Performances
In the present framework, game and solution concepts do not yield predictions. Rather,
they yield, for each player, a recommended intention with which an individual ought to
act if she is to fulfill the obligations entailed by the mode of reasoning she abides by. More
concretely, every rational individual performs actions which can be described, according
to her own framing, as being in line with her component in the solution outlined for
the game. Call implementation policy, σi(.), a (possibly stochastic) map from the set of
solutions of the game, φ(G), to player i’s physical action set, Ai. Denote S∗ the solution
set and s∗ an element of it. I assume
Assumption 3.3. For all i in I and s∗ in S∗, ai σi∼ [0, w] with σi such that
supp (σi(s
∗)) =
[0, wλi ] if s∗n(θ,i) = 0,[wλi , 1] else.
This merely says that no mistake in performance occurs. A rational individual with an
obligation to fulfill a given intention fulfills that intention. At this stage, no further
specification of individual’s implementation policies need be given. Eventually, the exact
form that these may take will be under discussion when I come to equilibrium selection.
3.3.5 The Repeated Game
This model is about situations where individuals are repeatedly invited to contribute
to a public good. In this section, I formalize the equilibrium concept I adopt for such
situations. Types are drawn once and for all in period 0 and each individual is privately
informed about his own type only. Then, the stage game is played in every of the T
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periods t ∈ T ≡ {1, 2, · · · , T}. Before the start of each period t ∈ {2, 3, · · · , T}, an
anonymized vector of physical contributions made in the previous period of play is
publicly disclosed. With exception of the frame, their own type, and their own history
of play, public disclosures are the only informative signals available to the individuals,
which I assume to have perfect recall.
In any given period t ∈ {2, 3, · · · , T}, each individual i in I uses the information available
to her in order to update her belief pi. Note that pi is an element of the frame. Therefore,
existence of privately observed types and of idiosyncrasies in framing will cause diver-
gences in beliefs. For all t ∈ {2, 3, · · · , T}, denote piti individual i’s updated belief. piti
depends on the following individual history:
hti ∈ H ti ≡ N × St−1 × (SN−1)t−1.
In words, an individual history is a collection of facts. A fact about one’s individual type,
n(θ, i) inN , is known from period 0 onwards; facts regarding the actions so far carried out
by individual i, (λi(aτi ))1≤τ≤t−1 in St−1, are updated at the begining of each period; finally,
facts regarding anonymized actions of the other players, (λi(aτj ))1≤τ≤t−1,j 6=i in (SN−1)t−1,
too, are updated at the begining of each period. For convenience, the set of possible
initial histories is defined for all i in I as H1i ≡ N . For individual i, then, the set of all






In any given period t in T , every individual i in I has observed a realized history hti. She
rationally adjusts the contents of her frame, using a copy ofG, denotedGti, which differs
fromG in at most one aspect: the existence of heterogeneous beliefs over the type space.
In fact, I make the following, assumption:




< 1, with equal
chances. Furthermore, for all i in I and all t in T , piti is measurable with respect to hti.
The measurability assumption is an unawareness assumption: I assume that individuals
are unaware of the existence of differences in language. A consequence of this unaware-
ness, in the presence of the assumption of no mistakes in performances, is the possibility
to model the updated frame of each individual as a copy of game G with idiosyncratic
interim beliefs, pij,ti that are measurable with respect to player types θ ∈ {0, 1}I . For all i
in I , denoteG1i ≡ G the first period game andGti, t ∈ T \{1} the subsequent idiosyncratic
copies. At every t > 1, each individual updates his game framing without being aware
that beliefs actually differ along dimensions for which the type is not a sufficient statistic.
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The timing of the game looks as follows. There are T periods and each period t contains
two stages. In stage one, players interpret the information in accordance with their
frame and reframe the situation into a copy Gt of G. They simultaneously infer the
relevant prescription for them, st∗n(θ,i) ∈ Sn(θ,i). In stage two, players implement that
prescription using their implementation policy, σi. With regard to prescriptions, I assume
the following:






of recommended strategies and interim beliefs such that,
(i) In every period t, individual i’s recommended strategy is a prescription of the stage game
Gti,
(ii) Whenever possible, after disclosure, player i’s beliefs are updated using Bayes rule:
∀i, j ∈ I , pij,ti ≡ pij,t−1i [· | hti],
3.4 The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
3.4.1 A Benchmark - Two periods, four individuals, identical framings
It is interesting to first have a look at the predictions of the model in the absence of
idyosincracies in language. In this event, assumptions 3 and 5, which guaranty the
absence of mistakes in performance, imply that no further discrepencies arise between
the individuals’ interim beliefs than those entailed by differences in types. Any triple
(I, pi,M) with I in N, pi in [0, 1], and M in [1
I
, 1]12 induces a unique repeated game, the
prescriptions of which I want to analyse. Most experimental set-ups have individuals
sorted in groups of four. I here investigate the simple case in which the number of
participants is equal to four and the number of repetitions is two. The following result
shows, among other things, that there exists a range of common prior and marginal rates
of transformation such that it is rational for strategic reasoners to build a reputation in
the first round.
12M ≤ 1/I is not an interesting case. When M is this low, even a population entirely constituted of
completely informed team reasoners would not want to invest in the public good.
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Proposition 3.1. Let I = 4 and fix an M in [1/4, 1]. The following assertions hold:




n )n∈N = (0, 0)N .
(ii) There are unique values of the common prior, pimM and pihM , pilM ≤ pimM ≤ pihM ≤ 1 such that








) ∈ {((1, 0), (1, 0)N−1) , ((1, 0), (0, 0)N−1)},
exist if and only if pi ∈ [pilM , 1] \ [pimM , pihM ].
(iii) There are unique values of the common prior, pim′M and pih
′
M , pilM ≤ pim′M ≤ pih′M ≤ 1 such that








) ∈ {((1, 1), (1, 0)N−1) , ((1, 0), (0, 0)N−1)},
exist only if pi ∈ [pim′M , pih′M].
In words, Proposition 1 states that the (pi,M) space is entirely covered by four regions.
First, a South-West region (dark blue) within which (pi,M) pairs are so low that no
individual is ever prescribed to contribute. Second, a central region (light blue) within
which team reasoners ought to contribute in the first period. This may be for one of
two reasons: either because expectations on the team size are high enough, or because
information about the team size is worth acquiring. Third, a smaller, and yet not entirely
overlapped, central region (green) in which contributions may be prescribed to all indi-
viduals. Fourth and last, a region (colorless) in the East–South-East corner of the (pi,M)
space, where no pure strategy prescriptions exist.
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The absence of a pure strategy prescription in the last region is the consequence of two
simultaneous events: the existence of an incentive for strategic players to deviate from
non-contributing to contributing when the team player contributes and no strategic player
contributes; and the existence of an incentive for strategic players to deviate from a
situation in which everyone contributes. The most interesting finding, maybe, is the
existence of an interior range of (M,pi) values within which reputation building is rational
for strategic players. It is a well know result of standard models that, when all players are
individually rational, noone has a reason to try to build a reputation in a finitely repeated
prisonner’s dilemma.
3.4.2 Increase in the Number of Individuals
Formal generalizations of the results to cases with an arbitrary number of players are not
straightforward. The reason is that incentive constraints a governed by the probability
mass function of a binomial distribution. Numerical results for the cases with 10 and 25
players suggest that (i) the region where only team reasoners are prescribed to participate
in the first period grows as I becomes larger, and (ii) all other regions tend to vanish as
I increases.
Figure 3.2. Case with 10 players (numerical result).
Figure 3.3. Case with 25 players (numerical result).
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These observations suggest an explanation why, when the number of participants increa-
ses, the number of actually contributing individuals does not significantly go down. On
the one hand, in the presence of a large number of players, strategic reasoners loose any
influence they could, by deviating, have had on other reasoners’ beliefs. They therefore
loose all incentives to contribute. On the other hand, given any marginal rate of transfor-
mation, the range of beliefs for which it is sensible for team reasoners to contribute
becomes significantly larger, potentially large enough to convince pessimistic team rea-
soners.
3.5 Conclusion
The results so far obtained are broadly in line with experimental findings. They should
be subjected to robustness checks along two dimensions: the presence of any finite num-
ber of individuals and the possibility that the number of periods be any finite number
larger than two. Although numerical simulations I effectuated along the first dimension
are encouraging, it is not clear that the results can easily be formally generalized. The
reason is that incentive constraints are characterized by inequalities which involve a bi-
nomial distribution. It is well known that, when the number of trials is large, such
distributions aren’t easily computed.
The core of the analysis should focus on idiosyncracies in language. The presence of
different thresholds to qualify contributions as a ‘cooperative’ move or a ‘non-cooperative’
one will bring about divergences in individual beliefs over time. They may explain, too,
why communication can have a significant impact on contributions. I have shown in the
second chapter that, in the presence of a joint commitment to stear cleer of free riding,
indical individuals can bring about a Pareto efficient situation provided they agree on
calling a free rider anyone who contributes less than the average.

Appendix A
Addendum to Chapter 1
A.1 Glossary
Analytic statement: An analytic statement is a statement whose truth or falsity may be
assessed by mere study of the (definitional) meaning of the words it contains. “A triangle
has three side” is an instance of an analytic statement. Analytic statements are distingusihed
from synthetic statements, whose truth or falsity may only be assessed by factual observation.
A posteriori (knowledge: knowledge that relates to the results of experience, i.e., the observation
of actually realized states of affairs.
A priori (knowledge): knowledge that is prior to experience, i.e., invariant to changes in
obtaining states of affairs.
Behaviorism: Samuelson and Friedman’s methological positions are two instances of beha-
viorism. The structure of their arguments, as well as Samuelson’s formal statements
(Samuelson, 1963), prove them to be distinct. Nonetheless, both views have two premis-
ses in common: (1) that a clear, rationally justified, distinction can be operated between
observables and unobservables, and (2) that behavior, as opposed to preferences, is
observable. They also share an important conclusion: that economists assertions about
the world are limited to assertions about choice behavior. This earns them the title of
“behaviorism.”
Discourse (forms of): I adopt here Sellars’ view that the logic of discourse is “polydimen-
tional” (see Sellars (1956), esp. §40) and take it to mean that discourse is best seen as a
collection of social practices, as opposed to a single one. A form of discourse is one such
practice: each utterance of a sentence can be identified with a move—from a context to
a sentence, or from one sentence to another—whose adequacy is determined by social
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approval or disapproval. Every form of discourse is characterized by a logic, that is,
a set of rules characterizing the moves which are approved of. In rare instances the
set of rules is explicit; this is the case of logical discourse. If I engage in the practice of
logic, then each of my moves must distinguish premisses from conclusion and preserve
the validity of the argument, i.e., abide by one of the established rules of inference:
modus ponens, reductio ad absurum, adjunction, etc. Carroll (1895) pointed out the
conventional nature of any agreement to use these rules by pointing out the absence
of a compelling justification for their use. Wittgenstein (1921) expressed a similar view
when identifying logical statements with “showings” as opposed to “sayings.” Scientific
discourse is an instance of a form of discourse where the rules are, to a large extent,
implicit. The rules of inference which prevail in this practice differ from those of logic;
they include, for example, causal inference. Hume (1739) (see Book I, part III, section
VI) pointed out to a similar problem with the rule of causal inference: one may use it but
not justify it.
Discourse (logic of): the logic of a form of discource is the set of rules which charaterize
that form of discourse. These rules need not be explicit.
Epistemic attitude: epistemology is a field in philosophy concerned with the study of
knowledge and justified belief. Attitude is to be understood in it’s ordinary sense, i.e., as
“a settled way of thinking or feeling about something” (Oxford dictionaries).
Fact: I take facts to be true propositions. It is important to distinguish this use of the word
from that which associate it with occuring events.
Mentalism: a philosophical position which holds that coherent accounts of concepts such
as ‘knowledge,’ ‘preference,’ or ‘intention,’ cannot dispense with references to inner states
of the considered person’s mind.
Ontology: the branch of philosophy concerned with what there is, i.e., with the set of
entities that must be included in our accounts of ‘reality.’
Ostensive: an ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out exam-
ples. This idea that the meaning of terms is acquired ostensively has a long tradition, as
Wittgenstein’s quote of Augustin shows: “When grown-named some object and at the
same time turned towards it, I perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified
by the sound they uttered, since they meant to point it out. This, however, I gathered
from their gestures, the natural language of all peoples, the language that by means of
facial expression and the play of eyes, of the movement of the limbs and the tone of voice,
indicates the affections of the soul when it desires, or clings to, or rejects, or recoils from,
something. In this way, little by little, I learnt to understand what things the words,
A.1. Glossary 87
which I heard uttered in their respective places in various sentences, signified. And once
I got my tongue around these signs, I used them to express my wishes.” (Augustine,
Confessions, I. 8., in Wittgenstein (1953), p. 1)
Observable: observables are the set of perceptible entities in the presence of which and
to which observational discourse can be applied. A disagreement subsist regarding
whether or not the rules which govern observational discourse are purely physiological
or also involve conventions. As far I can see it, a strong movement occured in favor of
the latter view in third quarter of the twentieth century.
Practice: I follow (Rawls, 1955) and call practice any “form of activity specified by a
system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses and so on, and
which gives the activity its structure.”
Private vs. Public: when it comes to elements of perception, I distinguish private, or
inner, elements of perception from public ones. I understand the former as accessible
to a specific individual only and the latter as accessible to any individual located at the
right place in the right moment. An example of the former is a feeling of pain, an example
of the latter is an expression of that feeling.
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Addendum to Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
For all i in I , define
Ai :=
{




x−i0 | ξi(w¯ + cix−i0 )− x−i0 < 0
},
The assumption that the public good is a normal good implies that the function conditioned
upon is continuous and monotonically decreasing in x0. Hence, there extists a unique x¯i0
such that Ai ≡ [0, x¯i0] and Bi ≡ (x¯i0,+∞).
For all i in I , define individual and aggregate replacement functions (Cornes and Hartley,
2007) respectively as follows:




+ x0 if x0 ≤ x¯i0
0 else
and
R(x0, w¯, c) :=
∑
i∈I ri(x0, w¯, ci)
The individual replacements functions are continuous and decreasing in x0 overAi. They
pick up, for any level of public good x0 produced by players other than i, the unique
quantity q such that player i’s Nash best response satisfies BRNi (x0 − q) = q.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile ((x∗0,i, x∗i ))i∈I such that, for all i,
x∗0,i = ri(x
∗





0,i. The quantity of public good provided at a Nash equilibrium, x∗0,
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coincides with a fixed point of the aggregate replacement function. In equilibrium, the
difference between player i and player j’s contirbutions is
x∗o,i − x∗0,j = ri(x∗0, w¯, ci)− rj(x∗0, w¯, cj)
For all i in I , Cobb-Douglas preferences with weight θ on the public good and 1 − θ
on the private good lead to Engel curves ξi(w) = θwci . Considering now the equilibrium
contributions of some individual i, i < I , and her nearest more-productive co-player,
i− 1; we have:



























which, clearly, increases with either of (i) an increase in w¯, or (ii) a homogeneous decrease
in c. To see why (iii) also holds, observe that, the requirements that (a) c˜1 = c1 and (b)
c˜i − c˜i−1 = α(ci − ci−1) together implies that, for all i in I , c˜i = αci + (1− α)c1. Therefore,










αcici−1 + (1− α)c1
[
ci + ci−1 + 1−αα c1







This concludes the proof.

B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Any allocation x arrived at through G(e) is characterized by a collection of individual
contributions fully ordered by the usual order on R. Consider an individual i who is
not the smallest contributor and let j be the individual such that rank(x0,j) falls short of
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then,
x0,i ≥ λ








n− (|Ij−| − 1)λ
)−1
λ









In words, if j isn’t an eventual free rider, then neither is i. Taking the contrapositive: if
equation (?) does not hold for i, then neither does it for i’s predecessor, j. Now, consider
an individual i in I whose contribution is such that equation (?) holds. Multiplying both









and rearranging, we get
x0,i ≥ λ









(|I i−| − 1)λ





⇔ x0,i ≥ λ
n




with xˆ ≡ λ
n−(|Ii−|−1)λ
(∑
j∈Ii+ x0,j + x0,i
)
being the binding contribution of individuals
who were brought to meet their obligations prior to i. This shows the equivalence between
(?) and a condition which necessarily and sufficiently characterizes the eventual free
riding of individual i.

B.3 Proof of Lemma 2.1
I start with an additional Lemma that will be of use in later proofs too.
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Lemma B.1. For any α in R++, denote xα the value of x0,j that maximizes
u ((1 + α)x0,j, w − ciαx0,j)
If α1 > α2 then xα1 < xα2 .




is increasing in α;














(1 + αl)xαl , w − ciαlxαl
)
Assume that xα1 ≥ xα2 , then
∂
∂x0







u ((1 + α1)xα1 , w − ciα1xα1) > ciα21+α2 ∂∂xu ((1 + α2)xα2 , w − ciα2xα2)
A contradiction.

Proof of Lemma 2.1
I take the point of view of some player i in {1, 2} and proceed by comparing value
functions induced by both strategies. That is, I take a look at the (x0,j, ui)-space.




x0, w − ci 2−λλ x0
) denote the unconstrained maxi-







x¯i,L0,j (λ), w − ci 2−λλ x¯i,L0,j (λ)
)





x0,j, w − ci 2−λλ x0,j
) else,
which is weakly decreasing in x0,j .
Playing one’s adjusted Nash best response, instead, may be shown to yield a payoff that
is increasing in x0,j as long as
x0,j ≤ x¯i,A0,j (λ) ≡ arg maxx0∈R+u
(
2
2−λx0, w − ci λ2−λx0
)
92 Appendix B. Addendum to Chapter 2
and decreasing afterwards. The reason is twofold:
(a) Call uA(x0,j) ≡ u
(
2
2−λx0,j, w − ci λ2−λx0,j
) player i’s payoff from merely abiding by
the obligations entailed by gift x0,j . It follows from concavity and the absence of
substitutability between the two goods that uA(·) is a bell shaped function of x0,j .
Call uBR(x0,j) ≡ u (BRi(x0,j) + x0,j, w− ciBRi(x0,j)) the utility individual i gains
from disregarding the obligation system and simply playing her Nash best response.
Since, from player i’s point of view, an increase in x0,j is tantamount to a virtual
increase her wealth, uBR(·) must be increasing in x0,j .
(b) Denote x˜0,j the point that solves BRi(x˜0,j) = λ2−λ x˜0,j . By defintion, Nash best
responding yields a higher payoff to player i than merely abiding, except at point
x˜0,j , where the two payoff functions are tangent. Furthermore, for any given λ, the
left hand side of the equality that defines x˜0,j is decreasing in x0,j and the right hand
side increasing. So, when facing some x0,j smaller than x˜0,j , player i can choose her
best response without breaking her obligations. But once x0,j is larger than x˜0,j , she
has an obligation to give up on her Nash best response and provide the minimal
acceptable response to x0,j , λ2−λx0,j . uB˜R(·), therefore, coincides with uBR(·) when
x0,j ≤ x˜0,j and with uA(·) for larger values of x0,j . Tangency at x˜0,j implies a positive
slope at uA(x˜0,j), so it must be the case that x˜0,j < x¯i,A0,j (λ).
A Cobb-Douglas Case with λ Smaller than Unity.
I first treat the case λ = 1, which is distinct from the others. Indeed, in this event, λ = 2−λ
and uL(·) and uA(·) coincide for every x0,j ≥ x¯i,L0,j (1) ≡ x¯i,A0,j (1). Prior to x¯i,L0,j (1), uL is
identically equal to the maximal value of uA. As a consequence, the graph of the leading
value function lies strictly above that of the adjusted best response value function as long
as x0,j lies in [0, x¯i,L0,j (λ)) and the two coincide afterwards. Set xˆi0,j(1) ≡ x¯i,L0,j (1). It is the
case that player i strictly prefers taking the lead over playing her adjusted Nash best
response if and only if x0,j < xˆi0,j(λ). Else, she is indifferent.
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When 0 < λ < 1, we must make sure that, as in the figure above, uL(·) and uB˜R(·) cross
exactly once—call this point xˆi0,j(λ)—and are such that uL(x0,j) > uB˜R(x0,j) if and only
if x0,j < xˆi0,j(λ). First, observe that, when player i leads, we may equally view her as




2−λx0, w − cix0
)




2−λx0, w − cix0
)
As a consequence, for any λ > 0
uB˜R(0) = max x0∈R+u(x0, w − cix0) < max x0∈R+u( 22−λx0, w − cix0) = uL(0)
By continuity, it must be the case that, for small x0,j’s, player i is better off leading.
Second, by Lemma B.1, x¯i,A0,j (λ) ≥ x¯i,L0,j (λ), with a binding inequality if and only if λ = 1.
Thus, uL(·) anduB˜R(·) must cross exactly once on the ascending side ofuB˜R(·). Furthermore,
















2−λx0,j, w − ci λ2−λx0,j
))
Therefore, it is not the case that the two curves cross on the descending side of uB˜R(·).
This completes the proof.

B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3:








2−λx0,j, w − ci λ2−λx0,j
) else.





x0, w − ci 2−λλ x0
)
Each of the two functions is located in the (x0,j, ui) space; their general shape was described
in the proof of Lemma 2.1. I am here interested in their upper envelope.
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Assume that λ = 1. Let x¯i,A0,j (1) be the value of x0,j at which uA(·) is maximized when
λ = 1. I show first that there is no x0,j at which the two folloing facts simultaneously
hold:
(i) individual i’s best response is such that she abides by her obligations;
(ii) best responding is making individual i best off.
In other words, whenever the Nash best response is such that individual i fulfills her
obligations, individual i is better off taking the lead. To see why, observe that, when
λ = 1, the objective function of the constrained maximization problem that player i has
to solve when she leads is identically equal to uA(·). Consequently, the upper envelope
of uL(.) and uA(.) coinides with uL(x0,j) = uA(x¯i,A0,j (1)) between the origin and x¯i,A0,j (1)
and is identically equal to uA(x0,j) afterwards. Now, from the proof of Lemma 2.1, we
know that uBR(·) is increasing in x0,j , always above uA(.), and tangent to uA(.) at x˜0,j , the
point that solves BRi(x˜0,j) = x˜0,j . Furthermore, x˜0,j must be strictly smaller than x¯i,A0,j (1),
because tangency is characterized by identity of slopes. Therefore, uBR(x0,j) is smaller
than uL(x0,j) whenever x0,j ≤ x˜0,j < x¯i,A0,j (1), and such that player i does not abide by her
obligations afterwards.
It follows that each player i in {1, 2} opts for her leading strategy as long as x0,j ≤ x¯i,A0,j (1)











u(2xi,A0,j (1), w − cixi,A0,j (1))
)
and is therefore decreasing in ci, player i’s cost for providing the public good. From
c2 > c1 it follows that, when player 1 picks x¯1,A0,2 (1), player 2 will accept to follow, i.e.,
to contribute x0,2 = x¯1,A0,2 (1). Finally, when player 2 makes such a contribution, player
1 cannot profitably deviate from x¯1,A0,2 (1). The converse is not true. This completes the
proof.

B.5 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof of Part (i)
Assume now that 0 < λ < 1. It is clear from the proof of Lemma 2.1 that uL(·) intersects
each of uBR(·) and uA(·) exactly once. Given any λ, denote xi,BR0,j (λ) the intersection
between uL(·) and uBR(·) and xi,A0,j (λ) the intersection between uL(·) and uA(·). By defini-
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tion, uBR(·) lies above uA(·) everywhere but at x˜0,j(λ). Since uL(·) is a decreasing fucntion
of x0,j , it must be that, for any λ, xi,A0,j (λ) ≥ xi,BR0,j (λ).
Our point of interest is xˆi0,j , the intersection of uL(·) and uB˜R(·). I first show that there
exists λ¯i in (0, 1) such that,
if λ ≥ λ¯i, then xˆi0,j = xi,A0,j (λ) > xi,BR0,j (λ)
That is, when λ ≥ λ¯i, it is once more the case that
(i) individual i’s best response is such that she abides by her obligations, and
(ii) best responding is making individual i best off,
are two mutually excluding states of affairs. To see why, consider the following two
thresholds:
x˜0,j(λ), such that BRi(x˜0,j) = λ2−λ x˜0,j ,
and
xˇ0,j(λ), such that BRi(xˇ0,j) = 2−λλ xˇ0,j .
x˜0,j(λ) is the level of x0,j at which uA(·) and uBR(·) are tangent, xˇ0,j(λ) that at which the
objective function associated with i’s leading strategy and uBR(·) are tangent. Observe
that xˆi0,j coincides with xi,A0,j (λ) if and only if xˆi0,j is larger than x˜0,j(λ). I show that, for λ high
enough, xˆi0,j is larger than x˜0,j(λ).
Since (i) BRi(·) is unaffected by λ and decreasing in x0,j , (ii) λ2−λ is increasing in λ, and
(iii) 2−λ
λ
is decreasing in λ, it must be that x˜0,j(λ) and xˇ0,j(λ) are respectively decreasing
and increasing in λ. Furthermore, the two coincide when λ = 1, so we have that, for any
λ in (0, 1), xˇ0,j(λ) < xˇ0,j(1) = x˜0,j(1) < x˜0,j(λ).





w − ci 2−λλ x0,j
) andu ( 2
2−λx0,j, w − ci λ2−λx0,j
)
=: uA(·) are bell shaped and identically equal

































is negative for low values of x0,j increasing in x0,j , and positive after some threshold x0,j






























is positive for low values of x0,j , decreasing in x0,j , and negative after some threshold
x0,j lower than the maximizer. Furthermore, Lemma B.1 shows that, given any λ in (0, 1),
















Therefore, when λ < 1, u ( 2
λ
· , w − ci 2−λλ ·
) is larger than uA(·) whenever x0,j is small
enough, it intersects uA(·) on its ascending side, and it remains below it for larger x0,js.
Observe that the point at which uA(·) becomes larger than u ( 2
λ
· , w − ci 2−λλ ·
) must lie
between xˇ0,j(λ) and x˜0,j(λ). Furthermore, when λ is sufficiently close to unity, the follow-
ing two facts hold:
(a) x¯i,L0,j (λ), which lies in a small neighborhood of x¯i,L0,j (1), is larger than x˜0,j(1). Addi-
tionally, each of xˇ0,j(λ) and x˜0,j(λ), which lie in a small neighborhood of x˜0,j(1),
must also be smaller than x¯i,L0,j (λ).
(b) u( 2
λ
x¯i,L0,j (λ), w − ci 2−λλ x¯i,L0,j (λ)) is larger than uA (x˜0,j(λ)), which lies in a small neigh-








x¯i,L0,j (λ), w − ci 2−λλ x¯i,L0,j (λ)
)





x0,j, w − ci 2−λλ x0,j
) else,
intersects uB˜R(·) after x˜0,j(λ) has been reached, as claimed.
Now, let λ¯ ≡ max{λ¯1, λ¯2}. Whenever λ lies in (λ¯, 1), player i prefers to lead as long as
j contributes an amount lower than xi,A0,j (λ) and opts for following afterwards. Assume
there is a first stage equilibrium in which, say, player j follows player i. That is, player j
contributes x¯i,L0,j (λ) and player i contributes 2−λλ x¯
i,L






x¯i,L0,j (λ), w − c1 2−λλ x¯i,L0,j (λ)
)





w − ci 2−λλ x0
) is reached prior to x¯i,L0,j (λ). But uA(x¯i,L0,j (λ)) is precisely the utility player i
would get from minimally responding to x¯i,L0,j (λ). This contradict the assumption that
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leading is an equilibrium strategy and concludes the proof of Lemma 2.1 (i).
Proof of Part (ii)
For λ small enough, the following inequalities hold x¯i,L0,j (λ) < xˇ0,j(1) = x˜0,j(1) < x˜0,j(λ).
Thus, xˆi0,j , the intersection ofuL(·) anduB˜R(·) must coincide with xi,BR0,j (λ), the intersection













0,j (λ)), w − ciBRi(x¯i,L0,j (λ))
)
,
So it also has to be the case that the two intersect prior to x¯i,L0,j (λ), that is, on the constant

















The left hand side, when considered a function of x0,j , is increasing in its argument.
The right hand side, when considered a function of λ, is increasing in its argument too
(abstracting from equilibrium requirements, a higher constraining power may only make
a leader better off). In consequence, the solution to (B.1) is increasing in λ. Note also
that, in the limit case where λ = 0, the leading utility of player i is u(x¯i,L0,j (0), w−cix¯i,L0,j (0)),
which, by defintion, is identical to u (BRi(0), w − ciBRi(0)).
Now, let (x∗0,1, x∗0,2) denote the unique Nash equilibrium provision levels of the game. In
an interior equilibrium, each must be respectively larger than 0 = x1,BR0,2 (0) = x2,BR0,1 (0).
As long as λ is such that
1{max {x1,BR0,2 (λ),x2,BR0,1 (λ)}≤min {x∗0,1,x∗0,2}}1{|x∗0,1−x∗0,2|≤(1− λ2−λ)max {x∗0,1,x∗0,2}} = 1,
each of the two players switches to her best response before Nash equilibrium quantities
are reached and the Nash equilibrium, which does not involve breaks of commitments,
obtains.

B.6 Proof of Proposition 2.4
I proceed directly, i.e., by showing that, at our candidate equilibrium (x∗, 1), each of
conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition of Constant Collective Equilibria is fulfilled.
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To start with condition (i); at our candidate equilibrium, all players contribute the same
amount, namely
x¯1,L0,i := arg maxx0,i∈R+u (nx0,i, w − c1x0,i)
Therefore, for all i in I , I i− = {i} and I i+ = I \ {i}. Therefore, equation (?) is trivially
satisfied.
Coming to condition (ii); Recall that, when λ is unitary, the objective function of the
maximization problem associated with player j’s leading strategy coincides with the
function that describes, for every x0,−j , the payoff for j from merely abiding by her





nx¯1,L0,i , w − cjx¯1,L0,i
)
Clearly, individual j cannot be made better of by deviating downwards from x¯1,L0,i because
the legitimate adjustment of x˜ ≡ (x¯1,L0,i , · · · , x¯1,L0,i , x˜0,j, x¯1,L0,i , · · · , x¯1,L0,i ) is equal to x∗whenever








x¯j,L0,i := arg maxx0,i∈R+u (nx0,i, w − cjx0,i) > x¯
1,L
0,i
But player 1 is the one with the lowest cost, so neither of these two conditions can ever
be fulfilled for some j in I .

B.7 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Fix an economy e in EPG and consider the associated gameG(e). Observe that, in a CCE,
all individuals contribute
x∗0,1 ≡ arg maxx∈R+u(nx, w¯ − c1x)
Individual i, therefore, gets utility u(nx∗0,1, w¯ − cix∗0,1), which, clearly, is decreasing in ci.
We want to compare it to her Nash equilibrium utility. In an interior Nash equilibrium,
when individuals have identical preferences, it does not pay to have a comparative ad-
vantage at producing the public good: higher cost individuals enjoy a higher utility level
(Cornes and Hartley (2007), proposition 4.2). Denote xN = (xN0,1, xN0,2, · · · , xN0,n) the Nash
equilibrium contributions. Therefore, it must be the case that, for all i in I ,
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0,j , w − cixN0,i
)




0,j , w − c1xN0,1
)
and




0,j , w − cixN0,i
)




0,j , w − cnxN0,n
)
In words, individual 1 is the one who gains the most from the constitutional change
and individual n the one who gains the least. Unanimity will fail to occur if and only if
individual n does gain something, i.e.,




0,j, w − cnxN0,n
)
Note that, for c < c˜, arg maxx∈R+u(nx, w¯−cx) > arg maxx∈R+u(nx, w¯− c˜x). Therefore, an
α-homogeneization of c will bring about an increase on the left hand side. On the right
hand side, the effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the α-homogeneization is beneficial
to individual n because it brings about an increase in the Nash equilibrium provision. On
the other hand, it is detrimental to her because she has to increase her contribution to the
public good. At any rate, when α goes to 0, the left hand side goes to u(nx∗0,1, w¯ − c1x∗0,1)
and the right hand side to u(nxN0,1, w¯ − c1xN0,1). The latter is smaller than the former, a
continuity argument suffices to conclude the proof.

B.8 Proof of Observation 2.1
If λ(c1) = 2− λ(c2), then player 1 has an obligation to contribute
x0,1 ≥ λ(c1)2 (x0,1 + x0,2) = 2−λ(c2)λ(c2) x0,2
In words, letting λ ≡ λ(c2) ∈ (0, 1), we find ourselve in a situation in which: (i) Player
2 non longer has an option to lead, but may enforce leadership by player 1 whenever the
latter contributes a low amount; and (ii) Player 1 still has an option to lead, but may no
longer follow. At x¯1,L0,2 (λ), it is already the case that a best response by Player 1 would have
her break her obligations. Since Player 1’s utility from best-responding is tangent to her
leading utility on the ascending side, she never finds it interesting to best-respond. Now,
looking again at x¯1,L0,2 (λ), player 2 would enjoy a lower provision level but cannot bring
it about because she must at least follow. Since her provision cost is greater than that of
individual 1, she does not want to deviate upwards either. This concludes the proof.

Appendix C
Addendum to Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Lemma C.1. Let I = 4 and fix M ∈ [1
4
, 1). Let f and g be two functions from [0, 1] to R
assigning to any pi the respective values:
fI,M(pi) = 2−
(




gI,M(pi) = (1−M)P˜pi(I1M < 1−M).
Their graphs have exactly one element in common.


















Note first that, for any admissible I and M, fI,M(pi) = 2(1−M), gI,M(0) = 1−M , fI,M(1) <
0, and gI,M(pi) = 0. Therefore, it suffices to show that the derivative of their difference or
the difference of their derivatives has a constant sign. This can be done for each of three
ranges whitin which M may lie when we are in the presence of four individuals.
Case 1: M ∈ [1
2
, 1), that is, d(1−M)/Me = 1
In this event, E˜pi[1{I1M≥1−M}I1] = 3pi and P˜pi(I1M < 1−M) = (1− pi)3. Thus,
∂f(pi)
∂pi
= −6M < −3(1−M)(1− pi)2 = ∂g(pi)
∂pi
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where the inequality follows from the fact that M ≥ 1
2
and pi ∈ [0, 1].




), that is, d(1−M)/Me = 2
In this event, E˜pi[1{I1M≥1−M}I1] = 6pi2 − 3pi3 and P˜pi(I1M < 1−M) = 1 + 2pi3 − 3pi2.
Thus,







= −3M(pi2 + 6pi + 1)− 6pi(pi + 2) < 0




), that is, d(1−M)/Me = 3
In this event, E˜pi[1{I1M≥1−M}I1] = 3pi3 and P˜pi(I1M < 1−M) = 1− pi3. Thus,
∂f(pi)
∂pi
= −3M − 9Mpi2 = −3M(1 + 3pi2) < −(1−M)(1− 3pi2) = ∂g(pi)
∂pi




) and pi ∈ [0, 1].

Proof of Proposition 3.1:
I proceed by backward induction and, therefore, start with each player n(θ, i)’s period 2
prescription given any updated belief pi2n(θ,i) ≡ pii[· | θi, a1]. These take one of two forms:
For all i in I such that θi = 0, s2∗n(θ,i) =
1 if Epi2n(θ,i) [I1]M ≥ 1,0 else.
For all i in I such that θi = 1, s2∗n(θ,i) = 0
Team reasoners do their bit if and only if the expected team size is large enough, and
strategic reasoners shirk. Since, along the equilibrium path, second period beliefs are
Bayesian updates and, for all i in I , λi = λ, assumption 3 (no mistakes in performance)
guaranties that:
For all i, j in I , j 6= i, pii[· | θi, a1] = pii[· | θi, s1]
Thus, we just have to analyze first period prescriptions.
(i) An equilibrium without any contributions exists if and only if none of the players,
strategic or team, has a reason to deviate. Note that when noone contributes the team
player may have two reasons to deviate. A direct reason: given a high enough common
prior, the team has a higher expected payoff from investing in the public good. An indirect
reason: even in cases where the prior belief is not high enough to directly motivate a first
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round contribution, prescribing team members to contribute in the first period yields
—as a deviation from the no contributing equilibrium— perfect information about the
team size for the second period. Under perfect information, an optimal second period
choice can be made with certainty. Thus, the team player deviates if and only if:
2 < Epi[I1 | θi = 0]M + Ppi(I1M ≥ 1 | θi = 0)Epi[I1 | θi = 0, I1M ≥ 1]M




2 + (I − 1)pi + E˜pi[1{I1M≥1−M}I1]
)
M
< (1−M)P˜pi(I1M < 1−M)
(C.1)
where P˜pi(·) and E˜pi(·) result from considering trials among I − 1, not I , individuals:
all individuals but individual i.1 Both the left hand side and the right hand side are
continuously decreasing fucntions over [0, 1]. Lemma C.1 establishes that, in the presence
of 4 individuals, for any admissible values of M , the two curves cross only once. Denote
pilM the value of pi where the two curves cross. It is well defined for any M above 1/4.
A strategic player deviates if and only if his deviation brings about higher chances of
contributions by a sufficiently large team in period 2. No combinations of pi and M can
be such that strategic reasoners have a reason to contribute in the first period when team
reasoners do not. Indeed, considering the most optimistic off-path belief possible—one
that takes the deviating contribution to constitute doubtless evidence about the team
reasoner status of the contributor, we obtain that the deviation will trigger a second
period contribution by team reasoners if and only if











But, for such values of pi, the expected team size is too small to make deviations attractive
to strategic reasoners, since
2 < M + 1 + Epi[I1 | θi = 1]M ⇔ pi > 1−M(I−1)M
This establishes the first statement.
(ii) Any equilibrium in which the team contributes in the first period when strategic
players do not is characterized by reasons to deviate. Equation (C.1) in the proof of (i)
guarantees the existence, for each M , of a unique threshold, pilM , below which the team
1The reformulation, permitted by our assumption of independence between types, is useful because it
avoids conditioning on a 0-probability event whenever pi = 0.
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has a reason to deviate from the equilibrium where only the team contributes and after
which it has none. Assume pi is larger than pilM and consider the incentives of a strategic
player. He has a reason to mimic team reasoners whenever his deviation brings about
higher chances of contribution by a sufficiently large team in period 2. This will happen
in exactly one event: when the realized team size is b 1
M
c. Thus, imitating team-reasoners
is profitable in expectation if and only if:
1−M < Ppi(I1 = b 1M c | θi = 1)b 1M cM
That is, if and only if M > 1
4
and










c(1− pi)I−1−b 1M cb 1
M
cM (C.2)
When M belongs to (1/4, 1/3], the right hand side of equation (C.2) takes value M(1 +






For any such M , denote pimM ≡ max {pilM , ((1−M)/3M)1/3}. This threshold is uniquely
defined and smaller than 1 =: pihM .




]. The right hand side of equation (C.2) takes
value M(1 + 6pi2(1− pi)), so that equation (C.2) holds if and only if
pi2(1− pi) > 1−M
6M
Since the maximum of the left hand side over [0, 1] is smaller than the minimum of the




], equation (C.2) never holds for such aM . Define pimM ≡ pihM ≡ 1
The case where (1
2
, 1] is more subtle. Note first that, wheneverM belongs to this interval,
the right hand side of equation (C.2) takes value M(1 + 3pi(1 − pi)2). Hence, it holds if
and only if
pi(1− pi)2 > 1−M
3M
(C.3)
The left hand side reaches a maximum for pimax = 1/3 and the right hand side is decreasing








]. When M belongs to (9/13, 1], the right-hand side in
equation (C.3) is strictly lower than the maximum of the left hand side. pi(1− pi)2 being
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bell shaped, the constant map (1−M)/3M intersect it twice. Call pimM the maximum of pilM
and the abscissa of the first intersection, and pihM that of the second. Within that interval,
equation (C.2) holds. Outside, it does not.
(iii) (Proof for any I ≥ 3) Assume, for instance, that an equilibrium could be sustained
which involves participation by all reasoning types in the first period. Then we must
have pi ≥ 1−M
(I−1)M since otherwise the following equation
1−M > Epi[I1 | θi = 1]M
would hold, which says that, for strategic reasoners, benefits from separation are larger
than expected benefits from pooling. Furthermore, the absence of a contribution by a
strategic player i leads to non-contribution by team reasoners in the second period if and
only if team reasoner’s off-path beliefs are such that:




Such off-path beliefs can be specified if and only if pi ≤ 1−M
(I−2)M . Thus, for allM in [1/4, 1],
the existence of equilibria involving full contribution in the first period entail:
1−M







C.2 Octave Code for Figures 1-3
C.2.1 Figure 1
1 c l ea r
2 % E q u i l i b r i a f o r I=4
3 m= 0 . 0 0 : 0 . 0 0 1 : 1 ; % p o s s i b l e v a l u e s o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n r a t e
4 p = 0 . 0 0 : 0 . 0 0 1 : 1 ; % p o s s i b l e v a l u e s o f t h e p r i o r b e l i e f
5
6 z=zeros (1001 ,1001) ;
7
8 y=zeros (1001 ,1000) ;
9
10 for i = 1 :1001
C.2. Octave Code for Figures 1-3 105
11 for j = 501 :1001
12 i f ((1−p( i ) ) ˆ3∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )−6∗p( i )∗m( j ) )
13 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
14 e lse
15 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (3 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(3− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand s i d e
o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
16 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(3∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
17 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(2∗m( j ) )>=p( i ) )







25 for i = 1 :1001
26 for j = 335 :500
27 i f ((1+2∗p( i ) ˆ3−3∗p( i ) ˆ2) ∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )−(3∗p( i )+6∗p( i ) ˆ2−3∗p
( i ) ˆ3) ∗m( j ) )
28 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
29 e lse
30 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (3 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(3− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand s i d e
o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
31 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(3∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
32 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(2∗m( j ) )>=p( i ) )







40 for i = 1 :1001
41 for j = 252 :334
42 i f ((1−p( i ) ˆ3) ∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )−(3∗p( i )+3∗p( i ) ˆ3) ∗m( j ) )
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43 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
44 e lse
45 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (3 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(3− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand s i d e
o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
46 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(3∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
47 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(2∗m( j ) )>=p( i ) )







55 for i = 1 :1001
56 for j = 1 :251




61 %[mm, pp ] = meshgr id (m, p) ;
62
63 colormap (” winter ”) ;
64
65 contour (p ,m, y ,[−1 ,−1]:[1 1])
66 hold on
67 contour (p ,m, z ,[−1 ,−1]:[2 2])
68 hold o f f
69 t i t l e ({”Case I =4”}) ;
C.2.2 Figure 2
1 c l ea r
2 % E q u i l i b r i a f o r I =10
3 m= 0 . 0 0 : 0 . 0 0 1 : 1 ; % p o s s i b l e v a l u e s o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n r a t e
4 p = 0 . 0 0 : 0 . 0 0 1 : 1 ; % p o s s i b l e v a l u e s o f t h e p r i o r b e l i e f
5
6 w=zeros (1001 ,9) ;
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7 x=zeros (1001 ,9) ;
8 z=zeros (1001 ,1001) ;
9
10 for i =1:1001
11 for j= 1 : 9
12 x( i , j )= nchoosek (9 , j )∗p( i ) ˆ j ∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(9− j ) ; % B a s i s f o r
e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
13 w( i , j )= nchoosek (9 , j )∗ j ∗p( i ) ˆ j ∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(9− j ) ; % B a s i s f o r




17 y=zeros (1001 ,1000) ;
18
19 for i = 1 :1001
20 for j = 501 :1001
21 i f ((1−p( i ) ) ˆ9∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )−18∗p( i )∗m( j ) )
22 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
23 e lse
24 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (9 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(9− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand s i d e
o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
25 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(9∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
26 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(8∗m( j ) )>=p( i ) )







34 for i = 1 :1001
35 for j = 335 :500
36 i f (((1−p( i ) ) ˆ9+x( i , 1 ) )∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )−(18∗p( i )−w( i , 1 ) )∗m( j ) )
37 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
38 e lse
39 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (9 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
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∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(9− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand s i d e
o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
40 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(9∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
41 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(8∗m( j ) )>=p( i ) )







49 for i = 1 :1001
50 for j = 102 :334
51 i f (((1−p( i ) ) ˆ9+sum(x( i , [ 1 : c e i l (1/m( j )−2)]) ) )∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )
−(18∗p( i )−sum(w( i , [ 1 : c e i l (1/m( j )−2)]) ) )∗m( j ) )
52 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
53 e lse
54 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (9 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(9− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand s i d e
o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
55 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(9∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
56 i f min(1 ,((1−m( j ) ) /(8∗m( j ) ) )>=p( i ) )







64 for i = 1 :1001
65 for j = 1 :101




70 %[mm, pp ] = meshgr id (m, p) ;
71
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72 colormap (” winter ”) ;
73
74 contour (p ,m, y ,[−1 ,−1]:[1 1])
75 hold on
76 contour (p ,m, z ,[−1 ,−1]:[2 2])
77 hold o f f
78 t i t l e ({”Case I =10”}) ;
C.2.3 Figure 3
1 c l ea r
2 % E q u i l i b r i a f o r I =25
3 m= 0 . 0 0 : 0 . 0 0 1 : 1 ; % p o s s i b l e v a l u e s o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n r a t e
4 p = 0 . 0 0 : 0 . 0 0 1 : 1 ; % p o s s i b l e v a l u e s o f t h e p r i o r b e l i e f
5
6 w=zeros (1001 ,24) ;
7 x=zeros (1001 ,24) ;
8 z=zeros (1001 ,1001) ;
9
10 for i =1:1001
11 for j= 1 :24
12 x( i , j )= nchoosek (24 , j )∗p( i ) ˆ j ∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(24− j ) ; % B a s i s f o r
e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
13 w( i , j )= nchoosek (24 , j )∗ j ∗p( i ) ˆ j ∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(24− j ) ; % B a s i s f o r




17 y=zeros (1001 ,1000) ;
18
19 for i = 1 :1001
20 for j = 501 :1001
21 i f ((1−p( i ) ) ˆ24∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )−48∗p( i )∗m( j ) )
22 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
23 e lse
24 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (24 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(24− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand
s i d e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
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25 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(24∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
26 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(23∗m( j ) )>=p( i ) )







34 for i = 1 :1001
35 for j = 335 :500
36 i f (((1−p( i ) ) ˆ24+x( i , 1 ) )∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )−(48∗p( i )−w( i , 1 ) )∗m( j )
)
37 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
38 e lse
39 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (24 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(24− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand
s i d e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
40 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(24∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
41 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(23∗m( j ) )>=p( i ) )







49 for i = 1 :1001
50 for j = 42 :334
51 i f (((1−p( i ) ) ˆ24+sum(x( i , [ 1 : c e i l (1/m( j )−2)]) ) )∗(1−m( j ) )<2−2∗m( j )
−(48∗p( i )−sum(w( i , [ 1 : c e i l (1/m( j )−2)]) ) )∗m( j ) )
52 y( i , j )=−1; % Oppos i t e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 1 )
53 e lse
54 y( i , j )=m( j )∗(1+nchoosek (24 , f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗p( i ) ˆ ( f loor (1/m( j ) ) )
∗(1−p( i ) ) ˆ(24− f loor (1/m( j ) ) )∗ f loor (1/m( j ) ) ) ; % Right hand
s i d e o f e q u a t i o n (C. 2 )
55 i f ((1−m( j ) ) /(24∗m( j ) )<=p( i ) )
C.2. Octave Code for Figures 1-3 111
56 i f min(1 ,((1−m( j ) ) /(23∗m( j ) ) )>=p( i ) )







64 for i = 1 :1001
65 for j = 1 :41




70 %[mm, pp ] = meshgr id (m, p) ;
71
72 colormap (” winter ”) ;
73
74 %s u b p l o t (1 , 3 , 2)
75 contour (p ,m, y ,[−1 ,−1]:[1 1])
76 hold on
77 contour (p ,m, z ,[−1 ,−1]:[2 2])
78 hold o f f
79 t i t l e ({”Case I =25”}) ;
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